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EDITORIAL POLICY

The Journal of Political and Administrative Studies (JPAS) at the University of Port Harcourt is a double-blind peer-review journal aimed at publishing well-researched, scholarly articles in political science, public administration, and related fields in the social sciences on contemporary issues of interest to policymakers. Thus, we welcome original articles from across the world that have not been previously published. Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced in Times New Roman, font size 12, between 6000 and 8000 words in length, including references. An abstract of not more than 200 words must accompany every article. A short biographical note about the author and a cover sheet with the article's title, author's name, institutional affiliation, email address, and telephone and fax numbers should accompany the submission. Only electronic copies are acceptable and should be in a format compatible with MS Word 2007.

Articles must conform to prescribed styles, formats, and standards. The Journal adopts only the American Psychological Association (APA) referencing class (7th edition). Contributors should ensure authors cited in the text are listed alphabetically in the section for references. The Journal does not accept the bibliographical listing.

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The Editorial

The International Symposium on Security and Peace (ISSP) is a research forum of the Center for Peace and Violence Prevention (CPVP), where actionable knowledge is shared to address the human suffering caused by violent and non-violent conflicts, climate catastrophes, diseases, and the results of human decisions. It serves as a link between policymakers, academics, and civil society actors who have made significant contributions to their communities through determination and courage. The ISSP is a safe space for those looking to raise awareness or share their work with the scientific community and change-makers seeking solutions to issues affecting vulnerable peoples, groups, and communities.

The 2021 edition of the ISSP was co-hosted by the Centre for Peace and Violence Prevention (CPVP) and the University of Port Harcourt's Department of Political and Administrative Studies. The event brought together over sixty participants from ten countries. We were fortunate to have seasoned academics and civil society players, namely, Prof. Patrick Bond, a distinguished Professor of Political Economy from the University of Johannesburg, and Nnimmo Bassey, recipient of the Right Livelihood Award. The key participants at the symposium were Peter Mousaferiadis, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Founder of Cultural Infusion Australia; Christi Wigle, CEO of United Against Slavery, USA; Prof. Georgewill Abraham, Vice Chancellor of the University of Port Harcourt, Prof. Prince Mmom, former Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt and now Honourable Commissioner for Education, Rivers State, Nigeria, Prof. Fidelis Allen, Head of Department, Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, and Dr. Charles Wratto, Founder and President of the Center for Peace and Violence Prevention.

The journal management team is grateful to the University of Port Harcourt and the Center for Peace and Violence Prevention for contributing to the successful hosting of the symposium. The team is also thankful to Camelia Jula, Alex Bulgaru and Mbodeno Samaki for their contributions to the success of the symposium, journal cover design, and preparation of the papers.

Twelve papers presented at the symposium were selected among many others submitted for publication in this special edition of the Journal of Political and Administrative Studies (JPAS). The first article, written by Patrick Bond, examines the issue of economic crises in Africa with COVID-slowed recoveries, climate disasters and eco-socio-political resistance. The author gives a lucid explanation of the multiple dimensions of the present situation in Africa. An article by Martín Abimbola Ogunbajo and Modupe Oluremi Albert on globalization, democracy and human rights follows. Prince Ikechukwu Igwe explains the prospects of natural resource Justice as a framework for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. The author goes on to argue in favour of solving the problems of peacebuilding in conflict zones in Africa with the framework.

On the other hand, Grace Isodiki Allen and Kialee Nyiayaana took a critical look at the role of women in conflict management in a patriarchal society, using the case of Joinkrama, Nigeria. The following article, written by Simeon Gbimoiye Nenbee and Joseph Osaro Denwi, examines the monetary policy, institutions, and macroeconomic stability of the Nigerian financial system. Next is an article by Olusodi David Popoola and Ohita Angela Idonije about child rights violations in northern Nigeria. The recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by the United States of America (USA) is the focus of the article written by Boma Amaso and Fidelis Allen. They look at the implications of the decision and see it as a projection of the United States power in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following article, written by Gospel Lebari, Ferguson Onuegbu and Juliana Ogbe, explains the kidnapping of minors in Northern Nigeria. They consider the current trend towards insecurity in this part of Nigeria as a sign of state failure. Related to this is M-arkyaah Mongo and Aaver James's article on violence-induced human rights violations in internally displaced persons camps in Benue State.

The following article, written by Obinna Nwodim, addresses the issue of climate change and the Nigerian policy response. It argues that climate change represents a threat to development in Nigeria. Philips Okolo examines gender disparities in Bayelsa State, Nigeria. And finally, on the topic "Ethnicity and challenges of Federalism in Nigeria," Ogu Sunday Chukwuma and Pauline Chimuru Obikaonu analyse the challenges that ethnicity poses to the effective functioning of the federal system in Nigeria.

Prof. Fidelis Allen
Editor-In-Chief

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AFRICA'S CRASH AND BURN

Economic Crises, Covid-Stunted Recoveries, Climate Catastrophes
and Eco-Socio-Political Resistance

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ABSTRACT

Amidst economic crises, debt repayment stresses and climate impacts occurring in uneven ways across Africa, the impact of Covid-19 was devastating. Even the post-crash rise in commodity prices became a source of renewed net wealth depletion, as was witnessed during the prior (2002-2015) super-cycle. As Africans continue to produce mainly raw materials for the world market, the decline in natural capital accounts is uncompensated for by minimal increases in productive fixed-capital and educational investments.

Moreover, as hard-currency loans proliferated, repayment pressure caused debt distress: Zambia and Tunisia were punished with soaring interest rates (causing partial defaults), and other states – Eritrea, Sudan, Cabo Verde, Mozambique, Mauritius and Angola – ran up debt/GDP ratios above 100%. The only countries granted sufficient debt relief by the G20, Bretton Woods and bilateral creditors were the Central African Republic, Mauritania and Liberia. International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights allocations for Africa in mid-2021 were also inadequate: $23 billion of the $650 billion (i.e., 3.5% notwithstanding Africa's 17.2% of the global population).

Finally, several African countries – Mozambique, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Kenya – were considered among the world's worst affected by climate catastrophes. Yet climate reparations owed Africa were largely unpaid by the major emitters of greenhouse gases. Emergency aid fell far short of meeting needs for recovery, for adapting to the climate crisis and for compensation that is due as a result of forgoing carbon space that now can never be utilized if temperatures are to remain below 1.5C degrees. Social resistances include local anti-extractivist and national democratic rebellion, with Pan-African and global networking potentials as a new continental free trade area emerges and as Egypt hosts the 2022 United Nations climate summit.

Keywords: Economic Crises, Covid-Stunted Recoveries, Climate Catastrophes, Eco-Socio-Political Resistance.

INTRODUCTION

Africans face interrelated catastrophes, from public health to economy to environment:

The immediate Covid-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns – including third and fourth waves of new variants – did dramatic damage to African people, societies and economies, at a time Big Pharma and allied governments (and powerful philanthropists) conspired to delimit vaccination access, in order to protect monopoly profits, exacerbated by the continent's under-funded and often buckling health systems, at a time of widespread public-sector fiscal austerity. Ongoing economic crisis combines worsening vulnerability to natural resource-export dependency during an era of unprecedented trade, commodity price and financial volatility, with still-severe foreign debt repayment stresses, in the context of the highest ratios of debt and financial speculation to real production ever witnessed (driven by rich countries' monetary loosening, generally considered infeasible in emerging markets and low-income countries); and ecosystem breakdowns, in which African countries anticipate suffering climate damage more than any other. This is notwithstanding that Africa has generated the lowest levels of Greenhouse Gas emissions – a factor patently obvious in the countries hardest hit the last twenty years (Mozambique, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Kenya) – but without the ethically-required 'polluter pays' financial support from the rich and middle-income high-emissions economies.

Given the scale of poverty and underdevelopment, most African activists in health, economic justice and environmental movements demand increased international grants as partly a solution. Some would term these 'reparations' payments. For example, more generous grants and public-sector debt relief would rebuild Africa's buckling public health systems. But in addition to aid, the debilitating Intellectual Property restrictions on Covid-19 vaccines and treatments should be lifted – as called for by the governments of South Africa, Kenya, Eswatini and others (starting in October 2020 at the World Trade Organisation) – which would not only increase access in Africa, but also prevent new variants from making Covid-19 a 'forever' global pandemic.

As another example, onerous debt repayments owed by African governments to international financiers – mainly multilateral and bilateral creditors, but also bond market purchasers in several cases – should be revisited. Not only has it become unrepayable in some countries, but often, liabilities were unjustly imposed on a citizenry that did not assent to the projects or to the leaders who contracted the debt. Constant repayment pressures contribute to other adverse international relations (such as export-oriented commodity dependence and brain-drain migration in search of remittances) that exacerbate economic underdevelopment. And third, there are long-overdue ecological reparations – especially climate debt not just for 'loss and damage,' but also adaptation costs and unused emissions space – owed by high-emitting economies to Africa, in contrast to the largely predatory climate finance instruments now being imposed on the continent, not to mention the West's failure to pay at least 80% of the annual $100 billion promised to poor countries at the Copenhagen summit in 2009.

AFRICA'S COVID-19 DEBT STRESS

Critiques of the IMF's perspective from advanced forces in civil society emerged at each stage of these policy prescriptions, in each of the three sites of crisis. First, there was a clear alternative option to buying into the West's private-sector led, generously publicly-subsidized patent system for Covid vaccines and treatment. That system's extension to the Global South took the form of an ineffectual, Davos-originated vaccine distribution system: 'Covax.' The elite strategy failed, since wealthier countries such as the United Kingdom drained Covax of vaccines in the crucial early months of 2021, and also enjoyed more general vaccine access – in the case of Canada at a rate five times the population's size – but failed to pass along surpluses to poor countries.

Source: World Bank, 2021a

These beneficiaries and designers of what is termed "vaccine apartheid" were located mainly in Europe and North America. But as South Africa's leading immunologist, Salim Karim suggested in March 2021: "South Africa is as guilty as many other countries. As much as we have committed to Covax, we have gone around it. We have negotiated and paid high prices and secured vaccines early to jump the queue because there was political pressure to do so" (Kahn, 2021). Confirmed Norwegian global health ambassador, John-Arne Røttingen: "The danger is that we are going to see an increasing number of bilateral deals struck by these middle-income countries that may not be in their best long-term interests" (Wintour, 2021).

The alternative to this system was to follow a successful precedent set with AIDS medicines two decades earlier at the 2001 Doha World Trade Organisation (WTO) summit: an exemption to Intellectual Property rights. At the time, most African governments supported this approach (although South Africa's leader, Thabo Mbeki, was an AIDS denialist). In the country with the highest number of people living with HIV, South Africa (six million), life expectancy recovered from a low of 52 years in 2005, to 65 by 2019, in part because healthcare activists successfully demanded that generic AIDS medicines were administered free through the public health system. In 2021, it was shocking that notwithstanding a global pandemic whose excess

deaths exceeded 10 million after 18 months (including more than 240,000 in South Africa), the same strategy was not approved in the WTO despite more than 100 countries endorsing it, mainly due to German and British opposition.

Other aspects of Covid-19 require economic analysis. The hard-hitting lockdowns caused by the pandemic caused dramatic crashes of output and increases in debt for most of Africa. There were several results, seen immediately in macroeconomic indicators, with adverse implications for Africa's debt burden due to both state borrowing and sovereign debt:

- much lower-than-average GDP growth (about half the world average in 2021, after 2020's recession, the first since Africa achieved independence from colonialism);
- a rise in sovereign debt as a share of GDP, in part because African currencies were rapidly losing value against the dollar;
- a rise in locally-denominated debt partly because some countries were compelled to introduce a degree of fiscal stimulus; and
- a consequent rise in interest expenses (which had, in any case, already soared from 8 to 18% of revenues over the prior decade *before* Covid began in 2020).

Arguably, these Covid-related debt burdens are entirely unjust and ordinary African borrowing states and their citizenries should not be compelled to pay full cost. Due to simultaneous crises of global economic turbulence and climate catastrophe, discussed below, the arrival of Covid-19 was not the fault of Africans. Tourists brought the disease to the continent from wealthier countries; South Africa's first patient in March 2020 had been skiing in Italy at a site frequented by Chinese tour groups, and other strains were soon identified in Cape Town imported by European visitors prior to the April 2020 border closure. Subsequently, the air travel and hospitality industries in South Africa and other countries overly dependent upon tourism suffered the worst economic decline. South African tourism minister Lindiwe Sisulu (2021) cited World Travel and Tourism Council estimates of the sector's 2019 sectoral contribution to Africa's GDP: $200 billion (6.9% of the total) supporting 24.7 million jobs. The Covid-19 collapse in 2020 cost $83 billion and 7.2 million job losses.

It was only in late 2021 that major tourist-receiving countries – especially Kenya and South Africa – were lifted from Britain's "red list," but international air travel to Africa remained far below prior peaks, with many changes in entry requirements, testing and vaccination passes to and from Africa. The costs of this economic devastation in the tourism and travel sectors alone are enormous. Combined with attention that flying is getting as a source of greenhouse gas emissions, with tough carbon taxation anticipated for air travel from Europe, the UK and U.S., a full recovery is unlikely.

Was the Covid-19 crisis an "act of God" that cannot be compensated for by guilty parties? Or instead, were two other theories explaining the disease's origins relevant to Africans seeking justice for these losses? If African countries make the case for debt cancellation in relation to Covid-related fiscal and international stresses, they could do so on grounds of either theory.

The first is that the zoonotic character of the virus (i.e., animal-to-human inter-species disease transmission) meant Wuhan's wet market was a site where excessive economic penetration into China's hinterlands was to blame, whether from bats via a pangolin or other carrier, in which case capitalist expansion is to blame; or the second is that U.S. government-funded research on "gain of function" strengthening of bat viruses, carried out at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and the virus leaked from that facility.

Regardless, the Covid-19 pandemic was an economic calamity for Africa and it is evident that with a negative 2.1% GDP growth in 2020 and just over 3% increase anticipated for 2021 (half the rest of the world's average growth), the African continent did not cause the damage but took the main pain. Just as in the 2008-2009 global crisis and the climate catastrophe, Africans will pay the greatest costs, and not least because vaccine apartheid and Intellectual Property monopolization prevent the continent's workforce and broader society from acquiring adequate levels of medical protection. With most Western countries – as well as South Africa – offering residents a *third* (booster) shot of the vaccine by late 2021, with Africa only 4% vaccinated, the injustice in global health is palpable.

The second and third aspects of the IMF approach to Africa's debt burden and climate finance opportunities are better addressed within a general critique considered next.

SOURCES OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS, FROM SHORT- TO- LONG-TERM

The impact of Covid-19 on debt accumulation was severe, with many countries either in default or facing high levels of repayment stress, as discussed below. To generalize about the continent, however, the African Development Bank's deconstruction of the drivers of debt are intuitive: exchange rate depreciation, rising state fiscal deficits and higher interest rates. Against these were countervailing forces that lowered debt/GDP levels: a degree of GDP growth in some regions, inflation (the GDP deflator) and other factors including aid and trade surpluses.

The African Development Bank's (2021, pp. 45-63) recent *African Economic Outlook* report observes:

● In the short term, the average *debt-to-GDP ratio in Africa is expected to increase significantly to over 70%, from 60% in 2019.* Most countries in Africa are expected to experience significant increases in their debt-to-GDP ratios for 2020 and 2021, especially resource-intensive economies.

● Debt decomposition indicates that the debt dynamics have been driven mainly by *cumulative depreciation in exchange rates, growing interest expenses, and high primary deficits.* Strong growth recorded over the years has helped to dampen the rate of growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Other major drivers of debt dynamics are *high inflation, weak governance, security spending, and weaknesses in revenue mobilization.*

● The composition of Africa's debt continues to shift toward commercial and non-Paris Club creditors, and from external to domestic sources. *Commercial creditors*

and non-Paris Club official creditors have increasingly supplied new financing to African governments. Between 2000 and 2019, 18 African sovereigns have made debuts into international capital markets and issued more than 125 Eurobond instruments valued at more than $155 billion. Local currency debt has increased since 2019, accounting for close to 40% of the total debt stock. (Emphasis added)

African government financing needs are greatest in countries that could then conceivably make a major fiscal commitment to restoring citizen's lost incomes, building stronger public health systems and investing in climate-resilient infrastructure, as desirable examples. Unfortunately, that desperation was felt most in several countries that took on much higher levels of new foreign debt during the crisis, including South Africa, whose foreign borrowings specifically for Covid fiscal stimulus in 2020-2021 included $4.3 billion from the IMF and $2 billion from the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) New Development Bank, in addition to regular global financial market access. But the foreign debt was dubious both because hard-currency financing was not needed for domestic fiscal stimulus, and because substantial shares of the proceeds were diverted to corrupt ends, benefiting companies favoured by the ruling party in a procurement process that the Treasury admits results in 35-40% average unethical price mark-ups (Bond, 2020). Other countries, e.g., Mozambique and Zimbabwe, witnessed even more extreme abuses of borrowed funds or international aid.

The hard-currency character of many such loans is particularly onerous, even though it is not acknowledged as a danger by the AfDB in this statement: "Low global interest rates present an opportunity to use cheap capital for high return public investments that accelerate growth on the continent." However, the AfDB's dissection of Africa's debt burden, particularly the role of currency depreciation, is a marked improvement on prior analysis which was generally unconscious of borrower exchange rate risk. Still, other components of unjust debt are generally neglected by the AfDB. While it is aware of the Illicit Financial Flows problem and offers occasional mild critiques of corporations engaged in transfer pricing and other tax dodges – which the African Union's Mbeki High-Level Panel in 2016 counted at $80 billion annually (Ighobor, 2016) – it downplays further illicit flows in the form of illegal logging, fishing and trade in wildlife/plants which cost an estimated $29 billion/year (Global Justice Now! et al, 2017).

Two other reasons for the decline in African currencies are legal ("licit") payments to foreign firms and banks, and depleted non-renewable natural wealth. First, one force driving down currencies is the *licit financial outflow* recorded as "income balance": i.e., profits, dividends and interest payments within the country's "current account." Conclusive, updated data do not exist for Africa as a whole but the country suffering the most serious multinational corporate and international banking penetration, South Africa, lost a net 1.7% of GDP as a result of such *net* flows in 2020 (i.e., of $373 billion GDP, a $6.4 billion loss). The net income also includes a large inflow of profits, dividends and interest Africa from other countries, and South Africa typically receives between half and two-thirds as much from its own corporations' overseas profits as it pays to multinational corporates headquartered abroad. Still, the net outflow of these resources is a pressure point on the current account, which fortunately in 2020 went

positive for the first time in 17 years, as imports fell dramatically and commodity prices rose sharply for key exports (unfortunately, including coal).

As for the continent as a whole, the AfDB decomposed the current account balance for 2000-2019 and recorded systematic declines in the net income component, exceeding a third of the current account in most years. The London NGO Global Justice Now! (2017) and allies recorded 2015 profits and dividends from Africa sent to multinational corporations as $32 billion, and interest and principal on loans of $18 billion, even though 2015 was a year in which the revenues of mining houses collapsed after the commodity super-cycle's downturn. On the other hand, African countries received $19 billion in grant aid (plus $33 billion in new loans which would have to be repaid), and $31 billion in personal remittances from overseas workers. The simple way to address licit outflows is through imposition or tightening of exchange controls, a technique common in the pre-independence and early-independence era, and one that large economies (e.g., China and India) still use today to protect against economic sovereignty loss.

The second structural reason that African currencies have been falling unnecessarily far in the recent period is the permanent loss of natural resource wealth and pollution damage, uncompensated for by proceeds from the extractive industries (minerals, fossil fuels, old-growth forests, etc.). The term "adjusted net savings" captures this loss and other factors ignored in GDP, such as educational investments and wear and tear on machinery (i.e., fixed capital depreciation). When negative, it means the economy's GDP plus reinvestment of profits in human capital (education) are together less than the loss of natural wealth that is depleted in the extraction process or due to pollution, or of physical capital wealth due to the depreciation of fixed capital stock (World Bank, 2018; Bond and Basu, 2021). The adjusted net savings losses that result from just two factors – depleted natural resources and pollution – were in excess of 15% of the sub-continent's income in 2014 (World Bank, 2018). Nor are the Bank's pollution damage estimates updated for the $3000/ton social cost of carbon (Kikstra et al, 2021) noted below, so even these high costings are a vast underestimate.

For Sub-Saharan Africa, the typical annual net loss the World Bank (2018) estimates occurred due to these combined factors during the 2002-14 commodity super-cycle (high-growth, "Africa Rising") era, was more than 3% of the sub-continent's GDP. The peak year of decline during 1995-2015 was in 2008 when resource extraction alone resulted in wealth shrinkage of 16% of GDP, or $213 per African.

Adjusted net savings by region (% of Gross National Income, 1995-2015):

Adjusted net savings in Sub-Saharan Africa (% of Gross National Income, 1995-2015):

Source: World Bank, 2018

This measure of declining wealth is very conservative, neglecting not only the impact of climate change in sites subject to drought, extreme storms and other manifestations of the crisis. The measure also leaves out two categories of extraction – the platinum metals group and diamonds – that are particularly important to Southern African mining revenues and wealth depletion. The Bank calculates natural capital as 9% of the world's total wealth, but in Sub-Saharan Africa it is 36%, revealing the dependency upon primary commodities which leaves the region four times more exposed to depletion than elsewhere. Adding North Africa and other factors would easily suggest that depleted natural resources and pollution cause more than $100

billion in net lost African wealth annually, were GDP accounts to one day reflect these factors (as well as women's unpaid labour, educational spending and fixed capital depreciation).

These calculations can be considered as South-to-North "unequal ecological exchange" (Bond and Basu, 2021). The net flows are largely beneficial to the corporations, states and consumers of both the West and middle-income economies which serve as transmission belts for African resources, especially China and India. They also make Africa's currencies far more liable to decline, including in panic episodes such as the Covid-19 pandemic. And all these net costs are incurred by Africa even before the various damages associated with climate crisis are added. The importance of the arguments made is ultimately less than the pressure offered by activists engaged in socio-economic resistance at the points of extractivism, including a "Blockadia" movement that Berman *et al* (2014) found closely correlated mining to social conflict across the continent.

DISSECTING DEBT DISTRESS AND COVID NEEDS

The economic implications of the illicit financial outflows, licit outflows and uncompensated natural wealth depletion (and pollution) are formidable, as they easily exceed $200 billion annually, or 6% of Africa's GDP. One corollary to the decline in currency valuations was the higher price paid by African states when issuing bonds. From below a 5% spread in early 2020, the rate differential soared to nearly 11%, though rates did return to a 6% spread by year's end.

To contextualize what the high debt levels looked like in individual countries, there were – even prior to the Covid crisis – six major African economies that suffered episodes of severe debt distress: Nigeria (2003), Cote d'Ivoire (2004-07), Ghana (2009 and 2016), Mozambique (2016-17), Zambia (2016 and 2019-21) and Tunisia (2009, 2016 and 2019-20). Each suffered dramatic spikes in the premium they were expected to pay, up to a 35% interest rate penalty in Cote d'Ivoire's case, 28% for Nigeria and 21% for Mozambique. These costs, akin to usury (in which interest expenditures quickly exceed principal repayments), were reflected in a shrinking fiscus – as austerity policy – even though in each case the citizenry were already victims of malevolent forces of malgovernance and corruption beyond their control, forces that should have deterred lending in the first place.

Africa's recent 'debt distress' episodes ('basis points' premium is the interest rate x 1000)

Africa's recent 'debt distress' episodes ('basis points' interest premium)

Source: African Development Bank (2021)

Moreover, the rise of these and other African states' public debt (not necessarily foreign but also domestic) reflects the degree to which economic vulnerability remains high: Eritrea, Sudan, Cabo Verde, Mozambique, Mauritius and Angola suffer debt/GDP ratios of 100% or higher. The largest African borrower, South Africa, had built up a public debt of 80% of GDP by 2020 (although it would have been around 10% higher had there not been a 2021 GDP rebasing exercise). South Africa's foreign debt – including parastatal agencies and private borrowers – was in excess of $165 billion by 2021, which at nearly 50% was a much higher ratio to GDP than in 1985 (41%) when the apartheid government defaulted. Egypt's $135 billion was next (or 37% foreign debt/GDP), but no other African countries were close.

Nearly all the "spending measures" and "revenue measures" that were adopted (according to the AfDB) were financed in local currencies. Some additional costs associated with primary, secondary and tertiary education – including online teaching resources such as faster internet access, downloadable data and associated hardware – would have hard-currency implications (so as to import higher-technology goods and services), but are not included in the expenditures. The temporal nature of these needs changed in 2020-2021, as various degrees of infection hit – in waves – at different times.

The worst-affected country throughout was South Africa, and its inability to manage Covid-19 resulted in the world's seventh highest "excess deaths/capita" rate (*The Economist* 2021), with more than 240,000 through September 2021. South Africa's very strict lockdown devastated the economy, as 7% of GDP was lost. But in borrowing from the IMF ($4.3 billion in August 2020) and BRICS New Development Bank ($1 billion in both 2020 and 2021), funds were

diverted by politicians into corrupt ventures, including by the Health Minister, who was fired. Elsewhere, the crisis and resulting financing needs were greater, especially where there were state failures (Somalia and Sudan) or lower revenue due to tourism lockdowns (Mauritius and Tunisia).

INADEQUATE G20/MULTILATERAL DEBT RELIEF AND ADDITIONAL FINANCE

Especially in the cases of very poor African countries suffering debt crisis, the final insult in 2020-2021 was the debt-relief stinginess on the part of the G20 group of wealthier countries (which includes from Africa only South Africa). Their Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) scheme was poorly implemented, and notwithstanding several appeals by the African Union's 2020 rotating leader, South Africa's Cyril Ramaphosa and a few leaders' demands for debt relief (and in some cases cancellation), the results were disappointing. Only three out of the 33 African countries whose debt servicing was suspended benefited at a level of more than 70% deferred: the Central African Republic, Mauritania and Liberia. Another six countries had between 50-70% of their payments temporarily suspended. A tiny fraction of payments owed to the IMF were cancelled. At the same time, $36 billion in payments were made by these low-income countries to the various creditor groups, with just $10.9 billion suspended in 2020-2021. The G20 and other multilateral debt relief initiatives were patently inadequate.

Only China stood out for suspending a substantial portion in absolute terms ($5.7 bn). Yet the largest set of payments made in this difficult period was also to China ($6.9 bn). In prior periods, China took the lead in writing off debt, e.g., in 2000 with $10 billion in cancellations and in 2003 and 2018, although details are not available. But China's controversial "resource backed loans" – requiring the extractive industries' future revenues to be reserved for repayment as collateral – continued recently in Ghana and Guinea in spite of widespread criticism, given how chaotic the prices for commodities were during the 2010s and especially in 2020-21 (Globalisation Monitor, 2021). Aside from Kenya, China's single biggest African borrower during the 2010s was South Africa, whose Transnet and Eskom debts to the China Development Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China were, respectively, shown to be corrupted by the Gupta family's intervention in South China Rail locomotive purchases and Hitachi's bribery of the country's ruling party so as to get contracts for boilers within the world's two largest coal-fired power plants.

Not including South Africa, there were seven African countries that borrowed several billion dollars from Chinese banks so as to build coal-fired power plants, although Lamu in Kenya was ultimately canceled due to eco-social activist opposition. The pricing of China's loans to Africa has also been subject to controversy, for as Globalisation Monitor (2021) reports, "even when they are 'concessional' or 'interest free' they might pose a greater risk of a debt burden… [because] concessional loans have higher rates of interest when compared to World Bank loans, smaller grant elements, shorter repayment periods and require noncompetitive single sourcing from China" as well as other charges and fees that make them as expensive as market-based loans.

African countries (33) with debt suspended (%) under DSSI from May 2020-April 2021

Cote d'Ivoire 1%	Uganda 27%
Tanzania 3%	Zambia 27%
Lesotho 5%	Cabo Verde 28%
Maldives 6%	Cameroon 30%
Ethiopia 8%	Niger 36%
Chad 10%	Burundi 42%
Kenya 10%	Sao Tome Principe 44%
Mozambique 10%	Burkina Faso 49%
Senegal 11%	Togo 50%
Madagascar 16%	Angola 52%
Guinea-Bissau 17%	Guinea 52%
Gambia 18%	Sierra Leone 57%
Congo, DR 20%	Comoros 59%
Mali 20%	Congo, Rep 65%
Djibouti 25%	Central Afr. Republic 74%
Malawi 25%	Mauritania 74%
	Liberia 78%

Creditor grouping	Payments suspended	Payments made	% suspended
Bilateral	$10.3 bn	$11 bn	48%
Multilateral	$0.6 bn cancelled	$10.4 bn	5%
Private	$0.024 bn	$14.9 bn	0.2%
Total	$10.9 bn	$36.4 bn	23%

Creditor	Suspended	Payments made	% suspended
UK-based private	$0 bn	$3.2 bn	0%
Bondholders	$0 bn	$5.3 bn	0%
World Bank	$0 bn	$3.2 bn	0%
IMF	$0.6 bn cancelled	$1.9 bn	24%
China	$5.7 bn	$6.9 bn	45%
Japan	$0.5 bn	$0.4 bn	56%
India	$0.3 bn	$0.2 bn	60%
France	$0.9 bn	$0.5 bn	64%
Saudi Arabia	$0.5 bn	$0.2 bn	71%

Source: Jubilee UK, 2021

The G20's DSSI was, however, even less generous to Africa, in comparison to China. Overall, according to Jubilee UK (2021, 1), "The 46 countries which applied for the scheme had just 23% of their external debt payments suspended between May 2020 and June 2021, with 77% continuing to be paid." In particular, "private creditors received $14.9 billion in debt payments from the 46 countries since the pandemic began, the largest amounts of any creditor grouping, and suspended just 0.2% of payments." The irony that not only well-compensated private bond holders but also oil traders are beneficiaries of the pittance of G20 debt relief is a reminder that the fossil fuel industry continues to engage in predatory activities on the African continent. Although the SDDI will run through the end of 2021, its failure is so obvious, as Jubilee UK (2021) reports, even with a new name (the Common Framework for Debt Treatments).

Achieving a lasting solution to Africa's debt crisis – ideally, cancellation in part based upon the acknowledgement that vast amounts were inappropriately lent and are "Odious Debt" – depends upon the extent to which creditors are willing to take a hit, what they demand for it in return and whether an alternative strategy of questioning the debt is feasible for civil society. In August 2021, a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) issuance from the International Monetary Fund represented a global-scale Quantitative Easing, but of a very minor character. The original objective of SDR issuance in 1969, when over three years enough were allocated to IMF owners so as to represent 2% of all international reserve holdings (including gold), was boosting global liquidity when the U.S. dollar was subject to high demand as a result of its Bretton Woods System semi-gold status.

From 1973 to 2009, there were no further SDRs issued, but during the global financial collapse of 2008, the G20 encouraged an IMF review (led by South Africa's Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel), which recommended a $750 billion increase in the IMF's liquidity support via loans as well as increased SDRs, raising the total in circulation to 204 billion. Recipient states received SDRs as hard-currency grants to promote liquidity and prevent further financial collapse, with the total again rising to 2% of world reserves by 2011, having dropped in 2008 to a negligible share. SDRs were issued out proportionate to IMF voting shares, thus favouring rich countries, especially the U.S. which has held between 15-18% of the shares in recent decades, enough to exercise veto power.

Within Sub-Saharan Africa, aside from South Africa ($4.2 billion) and Nigeria ($3.4 billion), which were not at the time suffering debt repayment crises, there was concern that the amounts allocated to assist the poorest countries would go into debt servicing, not Covid-19 relief or economic recovery. For four countries, the amount of the SDR gift as a share of state debt exceeded 10%: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (20%), Liberia (19%), South Sudan (19%), the Central African Republican (14%) and Burundi (10%).

The inadequacy of the SDR allocation to Africa is a point often made: an aggregate $23 billion of the $650 billion – 3.5% – in spite of having 17.2% of the world's population. All low-income countries received only $7 billion (1.08%), and with middle income countries receiving $268 billion (41%), the hope was to establish a fund to ensure that underutilized components of the $375 billion SDR increase under the control of 55 rich countries (58% of the SDRs) could be

recycled – even though that would likely entail borrowing countries paying a fee or interest (in spite of the rich countries receiving the resources for free). But such a fund has not yet transpired.

Milan Rivié and Éric Toussaint (2021) of the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt condemned the "derisory, paltry" character of the SDRs: "The allocation is likely to be used first to directly or indirectly repay private creditors. The current dominating logic for countries of the South is to preserve their trustworthiness on financial markets and with investors." Even vast sums of Odious Debt were not questioned by elites.

International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa (2021) (absolute values, millions) (as % of) (absolute values, millions) (as % of)

IMF Special Drawing Rights allocations in Sub-Saharan Africa (2021)

Country Name	SDR	USD	LCU	GDP	Govt. Debt	Country Name	SDR	USD	LCU	GDP	Govt. Debt
Angola	709	1,022	670,483	1.64	1.29	Mali	179	258	137,660	1.46	3.31
Burundi	148	213	413,773	7.06	10.16	Mozambique	218	314	23,495	2.18	1.78
Benin	119	171	91,388	1.13	2.48	Mauritania	123	178	6,517	2.17	3.65
Burkina Faso	115	166	88,847	1.00	2.27	Mauritius	136	196	7,760	1.72	1.96
Botswana	189	272	2,937	1.71	8.56	Malawi	133	192	148,094	2.26	3.36
Central African Republic	107	154	82,226	6.50	14.47	Namibia	183	264	3,858	2.50	3.80
Côte d'Ivoire	623	898	479,961	1.46	3.20	Niger	126	182	97,085	1.33	3.00
Cameroon	265	381	203,641	0.98	2.26	Nigeria	2,353	3,388	1,290,916	0.79	2.25
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1,022	1,472	2,901,555	3.00	19.78	Rwanda	154	221	214,996	2.13	3.50
Congo, Rep.	155	224	119,567	2.19	2.15	Sudan	604	870	47,846	2.53	0.96
Comoros	17	25	9,874	2.02	7.52	Senegal	310	447	238,825	1.83	2.78
Cabo Verde	23	33	2,935	1.87	1.34	Sierra Leone	199	286	2,901,437	6.81	9.47
Eritrea	15	22	330	1.05	0.57	Somalia	157	226	..	4.58	..
Ethiopia	288	415	16,263	0.43	0.78	South Sudan	236	340	60,207	8.34	18.57
Gabon	207	298	159,371	1.91	2.63	São Tomé and Príncipe	14	20	408	4.89	6.01
Ghana	707	1,019	5,868	1.49	1.91	Eswatini	75	108	1,581	2.74	5.83
Guinea	205	296	2,953,915	1.91	4.62	Seychelles	22	32	682	2.79	2.83
Gambia, The	60	86	4,433	4.49	5.92	Chad	134	194	103,476	1.80	4.19
Guinea-Bissau	27	39	20,941	2.73	3.50	Togo	141	203	108,326	2.70	4.69
Equatorial Guinea	151	217	116,256	2.28	4.47	Tanzania	381	549	1,262,258	0.87	2.27
Kenya	520	749	81,795	0.75	1.10	Uganda	346	498	1,818,950	1.32	2.90
Liberia	248	357	58,586	11.76	19.04	South Africa	2,924	4,212	61,856	1.39	1.81
Lesotho	67	96	1,406	4.66	9.27	Zambia	938	1,350	28,582	7.29	6.19
Madagascar	234	337	1,290,160	2.44	5.59	Zimbabwe	677	976	79,794	4.64	5.22

Source: World Bank, 2021a

An added critique of international financial management is the emergence of extreme speculative bubbling, from not only SDR issuance but more general Quantitative Easing-type monetary stimulation (as well as bank bailouts and artificially-low interest rates) that are not tied directly to appropriate fiscal expenditures or real fixed investment. It is no surprise that the upticks of financial speculation in many stock markets coincided with QE, as was evident at the world scale when market valuation measured by the World Bank (2021b) rose from $32 trillion in 2008 to $92 trillion in 2020. Two of the main bursts occurred in 2009 and 2020, with QE and related monetary easing.

One measure of such stock market overvaluation is the Warren Buffett Indicator, which in the World Bank's (2021b) definition is stock market capitalization over GDP. (Capitalization is the share price times the number of shares outstanding for listed domestic companies, but without including investment funds, unit trusts, and companies whose only business goal is to hold shares of other listed companies.) From 56% at year-end 2008, the Buffett Indicator for world markets soared to 135% in 2020; in the U.S. the rise was from 79% to 195%, with major bursts evident as a result of QE.

Eurodad researchers Daniel Munevar and Chiara Mariotti (2021) are among many in the NGO advocacy community who critique the paltry character of the $650 billion IMF SDR expansion. However, the call they and many others in civil society make for an expansion 4.6 times bigger, does not take into account the dilemma that monetary loosening of the sort anticipated would feed even worse speculative tendencies: "More liquidity must be channeled to developing countries through a larger SDRs allocation, in the range of $3 trillion. Such an allocation would inject around $977 billion into developing countries' economies."

In this context, appeals by African leaders for more equity in IMF ownership, dating back decades, are poignant. There was in 2015 a recapitalization of the IMF that not only doubled the Fund's quotas to 500 billion SDRs, but dramatically increased several developing countries' shares, e.g., Brazil by 23%, Russia by 8%, India by 11% and China by 37%. But of the three largest African shareholders, two suffered dramatic declines in their voting power at the IMF that year: Nigeria by 41% and South Africa by 21%, alongside substantial declines in influence for Libya (39%), Morocco (27%), Gabon (26%), Algeria (26%), and Namibia (26%) (van der Merwe, *et al,* 2019).

Munevar and Mariotti (2021) also make the point that African debt service in 2021 – at $37 billion – far exceeds the SDR allocations, not only in Africa but all other regions including the Debt Service Suspension Initiative countries that were most desperately in need of debt relief in 2020-21, and that failed to receive sufficient amounts to withstand Covid, economic lockdowns, a volatile world economy and the worsening climate crisis.

CLIMATE REPARATIONS OWED AFRICA

One way to redress the public health and economic injustices described above is through climate reparations. Vast sums are due Africa, as one aspect of the broader ecological debt which, as discussed above, would logically acknowledge not only pollution costs – of which greenhouse gas damages will be most extreme in coming decades – but also uneven ecological exchange. Above, arguments were presented to show the extent of the economic damage to Africa by virtue of its role in the world economy, mainly as a primary product exporter.

This critique is leveled not only against the extractivist firms and financial institutions of the West, which began this damaging process once the kidnapping of 12 million human lives as slaves began in the fifteenth century, initially by the Portuguese and then the British and French. More recently, both Western and many emerging economies can be blamed for the

subsequent damage their firms and financial institutions have done to Africa by illicit financial flows – mostly associated with the extractive industries' tax dodging and income – but also the excessive licit financial flows and the ecological debt associated with uncompensated natural capital depletion, especially of non-renewable mineral and fossil fuel resources.

Turning to the specific problem of assessing and claiming the climate debt, there are categories that extend from "loss and damage" caused by extreme weather events, droughts and related climate damage; the expenses of adaptation and resilience especially in infrastructure and other built environment investments; and compensation due to Africa for not occupying the space of greenhouse gas emissions that it would be logically due were there a just distribution of pollution instead of the domination – ecological imperialism – locked in by uneven industrialization histories.

What is the essential character of the argument, that climate reparations be recognized? The ethical core of the original United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 was expressed in a declaration acknowledging both that "The largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries." The concept of climate debt first emerged in 1992 at the Earth Summit of the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro, in an NGO 'Alternative Treaty'. While reparations demands were periodically made since then from the Global South, the most recent statement along these lines from an international climate leader based in the Global North was Bill McKibben's (2020) *New Yorker* column in which he argued, paying reparations is "the only honorable, and only sensible, course."

The most famous rejection of climate debt was a Trump-style denialist declaration by U.S. State Department climate negotiator Todd Stern, replying to Solon at the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit: "We absolutely recognize our historic role in putting emissions in the atmosphere up there that are there now. But the sense of guilt or culpability or reparations? I just categorically reject that" (Broder, 2009).

Although Stern's opposition was reflected in the Paris Climate Agreement's rejection of historic climate debt liability, in various Northern jurisdictions – most recently in Germany and the Netherlands – it appears that if not yet in North-South terms at least in generational terms and with respect to tort law, the states and corporations responsible for the damage may indeed be increasingly liable. Moreover, the opportunity to turn reparations-denialism around exists, not only because of such liability-related lawsuits. There was mention in the Glasgow Climate Pact of November 2021, that rich countries and their financial institutions should give "additional support for activities addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change" although still no acknowledgement of polluter-pays liabilities.

Who are the climate debtors? There are many ways to count, including annually, on a per capita basis, cumulatively, correcting for embodied carbon in trade, and adding factors such as deforestation and land use to standard data sources of CO2 emissions. At the time of Paris, the main countries emitting greenhouse gases in a given year were China (around 10 Gigatonnes

of CO2 equivalents), the US (5Gt), Europe (3Gt) and India (2Gt), together responsible for 58% of world emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion and cement production. Other important categories of direct emissions are in manufacturing, transport, commercial agriculture (especially with high-fossil fertilization), urbanization and disposal systems generating methane.

Taken in absolute cumulative terms and using the year 2000 as a starting point, by 2017 the six leading emitting countries were the United States (33%), China (18%), Japan (4.8%), Russia (4.0%), South Korea (3.8%), Saudi Arabia (3.4%) and Canada (3.3%). Going back further, to pre-industrial times (1751 when fossil fuel combustion data began to be kept), the U.S. had 25%, the European Union (including Britain) 22%, China 13% and Russia 6%. Of Africa's 2.7% contribution over that longer period, nearly half was due to South Africa at 1.3%. So as to calculate the reparations owed, how can damage associated with climate catastrophe be costed, given that CO2 emissions stay in the atmosphere for hundreds of years and methane for at least 12 years while being 25 times more potent a greenhouse gas? A widely-accepted way to assess such damage is termed the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC).

The concept is not uncontroversial, but has for at least 15 years become the central variable in assessing notional climate debt. Such costs are typically defined as the marginal social damage from emitting one metric ton of CO2-equivalents. For reasons associated with U.S. high-emitter self-interests, the 2021 Biden Administration calculation of SCC – $51/metric ton – is very conservative. If the climate crisis is indeed the existential threat that scientists describe, a more serious effort is needed – one that incorporates not only realistic loss and damage given fast-rising climate risk, environmental justice, intergenerational justice and mortality. However, in September 2021 a new SCC was estimated by a European research team, of $3000/ton (Kikstra et al 2021). As the University College London (2021) summarized, "when taking more robust climate science and updated models into account, this new study suggests that the economic damage could in fact be over $3,000 per tonne of CO2."

The $3000/ton social cost of carbon should be used alongside awareness of factors such as mortality (using equal-life valuations not biased to price a Northern life higher than a Southern life as a commercial insurer or Northern economist might), inequality and a more appropriate discount rate in African advocacy, for Loss and Damages and for expenses associated with adaptation and resilience. Moreover, in a just world, Africa's share of greenhouse gas emissions (2.7% historically) should correspond to its share of world population (17.2%), which in 2020 was 1.34 billion out of 7.8 billion people on earth. If so, the fair share of Africa's emissions would be 6.25 times as much as at present.

While these arguments have been offered since the early 2000s by Africa's myriad climate justice organisations, they have fallen on deaf ears, in part because African elites have been too coopted within United Nations climate summits – but mainly because they cross the red line of what is considered acceptable discourse in global elite circuits (Bond, 2012; Mwenda and Bond, 2020). While the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact did offer momentary rhetorical acknowledgment of rich-country failure to pay poor countries even the transparently

inadequate $100 billion annually, and with 'Loss and Damage' provisions more openly acknowledged, the major problem remains the refusal to countenance 'polluter pays' principles by United States and European Union. As Biden Administration climate negotiator John Kerry put it, "you know, I think, obviously, the United States remains concerned about not opening up some legal track with respect to liability, and we don't intend to do that."

CONCLUSION

The wretched state of African economies, politics, society and environment reflects the adverse balance of forces within local, regional and global power structures. The tools of political economy and political ecology unveil many of the most objectionable outcomes. Such an approach provides insights into ethical argumentation against prevailing power structures that can be more robustly advanced based on the data presented above. In 2021, the struggles that are most fierce are against Covid-19 vaccine apartheid, unpayable burdens of debt and ongoing Illicit Financial Flows, unequal ecological exchange in the extraction of natural wealth, and climate catastrophe caused by others and visited unfairly on Africans.

These are macro matters. But in micro settings, the vast income and wealth outflows to both the imperialist West and to many emerging markets – especially the BRICS sub-imperial block – have, especially since the early 2010s, generated uneven but impressive forms of resistance. Social protest across the African continent has never been more portentous, and even during the Covid-19 lockdowns was visible and often surprisingly effective (Acled, 2021; Bond, 2022).

African protests and violent demonstrations ('riots'), April 2020-October 2021

Source: Acled, 2021

The possibility for ending the super-exploitative relations between Africa and international capitalism was given a name by the continent's most renowned scholar of these processes, Samir Amin (1990): 'delinking.' A full analysis of the opportunities to mix ideas like delinking (and 'deglobalisation ,' localization and Ubuntu groundings in economic development) on the one hand (as a macro-economic strategy), and on the other hand, social protest that drives progress from below, awaits African activists' own maturing.

There is, as of yet, a Pan-African ideal but no concrete principles, analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances – at least in institutional form. With the Egyptian Al-Sisi dictatorship hosting the 2022 United Nations climate summit, perhaps in a post-Covid era in which more activists can travel to one of the world's oldest civilizations, the balance of forces can be profoundly adjusted, and real change, from what are now genocide-scale social relations, finally achieved.

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GLOBALISATION, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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ABSTRACT

This paper takes a critical view on the development of globalisation, democracy, and human rights in their current guise. It looks at the assumption that human rights and democracy are symbiotic. It argues that this assumption is less secure than it appears at first sight, particularly when the imperatives of economic growth and development are pressing. This paper continues by arguing that some states are democratic only in as far as they possess the formal institutions of democracy, as opposed to those social institutions that support democratic outcomes, including the protection of human rights. It then goes on to look at the politics of the democracy–human rights nexus, as it is promoted in many quarters and concludes that the needs of the global economy are once again at the center of critical explanation.

Keywords: *Globalisation, Democracy, Human Rights, Global Economy and Development*

INTRODUCTION

Sections of the academic and policy community have stressed the tension between universal claims and those of sovereignty. If everyone claims human rights, 'and everyone equally, by virtue of their very humanity' (Vincent, 2006, 13), then sustaining a definition of sovereignty that includes non-intervention, domestic jurisdiction, self-determination and non-interference in the internal life of the nation, is no simple task.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the globalisation of the state and the potential for greater levels of communication facilitated by the rapid spread of information technology, many came to believe that the prospects for protecting human rights were never better. For some commentators, such a conclusion was further supported by the growing acceptance of liberal democracy as the best, indeed the only legitimate, form of government, since liberal democracy and human rights are understood as two sides of the same coin (Carothers, 2004; Adebambo, 2018, 342). This view was articulated by the then United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when he argued that 'democracy is a thread which runs through all the work of the Organisation' and that 'human rights, equal rights and government under law are important attributes of democracy' (Fox and Nolte, 2005, 5).

Before examining the reasons for treating the assumed relationship between human rights and democracy with caution, something should be said about the idea of democracy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Although there are distinctive versions of liberalism, and therefore of liberal democracy, each of which provides a different approach to agency, autonomy and rights, talk of democracy in the post-Cold War era usually refers to some form of representative democracy, such as that claimed to have triumphed over socialist alternatives. Four important general assumptions flow from this widely held view of democracy, which are important to our discussion.

The first assumption is that the territorial state is the appropriate community for democratization (Held, 2002; Hindess, 2009). The territorial state is the basic unit that defines the limits of democracy, insiders from outsiders and citizens from non-citizens. This is not to suggest all people living within a particular democratic state share the rights associated with citizenship equally: indeed, in all liberal democracies, the constitution makes some provision to exclude some categories of people from full participation, for example, children, aliens, criminals, the insane. However, at the millennium, the generally held assumption is that the concept of liberal democracy is tied to the idea of a self-governing community, a community of citizens defined by national sovereignty, the territorial nation-state, self-determination and domestic jurisdiction. This view is so entrenched that most commentators would agree that 'political theory has made a profound connection between democracy and the nation-state' (Clark, 2011, 147), which international theory and practice reinforce, placing democracy squarely within the domestic sphere.

The second assumption places the principle of accountability at the center of all forms of liberal democracy. Upholding important civil freedoms secures the guarantee of this principle, including the freedom of speech, assembly and the press. Accountability is further guaranteed through the practice of holding periodic elections to a representative assembly, a practice that is widely understood as the single most important requirement for a government to claim democratic credentials. According to this assumption, the constitution of a democratically elected representative assembly, possessing both the powers to approve all taxation and legislation and the capability to scrutinize the actions of the executive branch of government, provides the basic building block upon which all other attributes of democracy rest (Adebambo, 2018, 358). As the central institution concerned with accountability, the responsibilities of a representative assembly concern harmonizing popular demands and political equality with the demands of globalisation, which provides the context in which the modern liberal democratic state operates (Beetham and Adekunle, 2002).

The third assumption is that democratic states continue to exercise a high degree of autonomy, including the capabilities to pursue policies that further the interests of the people. Citizens have an expectation that governments can, in fact, fulfil the aims and objectives of the community as expressed through the ballot box. This is not to argue that governments are always powerful enough to achieve their policy objectives but, rather, that governments are free to utilize the material, social, economic and political assets of the community to promote common interests in accordance with the principles of democracy. The autonomy of a democratic state is assumed not to be constrained by external factors beyond those that arise from its relative power position within the international order.

The final assumption is that the democratic state acts in the interests of the people, not in the interests of particular national or global interests. There is an obvious tension between the liberal and democratic elements of liberal democracy, which is often expressed in terms of the limits to individual freedom and rights and the distinction liberals often make between the public and private spheres, political and economic life and the roles of the state and civil society (Beetham, 2012). The social demand for greater freedom in the private sphere contrasts with the need to pursue the common good, often through policies that make provision for excluded groups, if not in the name of social justice, then in the name of social order (Held, 2002). The democratic state is therefore a limited state, a state that attempts to reconcile individual freedom exercised in the pursuit of wealth with state intervention exercised as a necessary condition for social order.

The dominant assumptions surrounding ideas of democracy, including the state as the appropriate community, accountability, autonomy and the national interest, have meant that little attention had been given to understanding new forms of democracy more appropriate in the age of globalisation. As David Held has pointed out: the very idea of consent through elections, and the particular notion that relevant constituencies of voluntary agreement are the communities of bounded territory or a state, becomes problematic as soon as the issue of national, regional and global interconnectedness is considered. The nature of a so-called 'relevant community' is contested.

Whose consent is necessary and whose participation is justified in decisions concerning, for instance, AIDS, or acid rain, or the use of nonrenewable resources (Held, 2002, 22). For Held, the most striking feature of the global demand for democracy, in its most widely acknowledged form, is that it is emerging 'just at that moment when the very efficacy of democracy as a national form of political organisation appears open to question' (Held, 2002, 31). Several features of globalisation challenge the current understanding of national democracy. First, the assumption that governments remain in control of state borders cannot be sustained under conditions of globalisation, where economic flows, ideas, cultural exchanges, social interactions and political interconnectedness are widening and deepening (Held and McGrew, 2003, 2009).

The development of new technology enables the formation of new transnational relationships that challenge the territorial limits of democracy, raising the question of how to define the appropriate democratic community. If some groups possess the capabilities to free themselves from the regulatory machinery of governments by using technology, then the globalisation of economic, social and political relations places them beyond the democratically constituted controls of the state.

Second, globalisation has seen state power decline as transnational processes grow in scale and number. This is evident in the growing intensity of global economic, social and political interconnectedness that threatens the capacity of the state in its role as the guardian of the 'common good' and the national interest. The power of Transnational Corporations (TNCs), with annual budgets greater than that of many states, is the most visible sign of this change. Instead of acting in the interests of the community as a whole, in important areas of social, economic and political life the role of the state is reduced to that of an administrator, to oversee and enforce regulations that emerge from decisions made at the global level, for example, global trade regulations (Evans, 2019). Consequently, decisions that are beyond the reach of democratically elected governments constrain the capacity of the sovereign democratic state in important economic, political, social and legal aspects of citizens' lives.

A third feature of globalisation that challenges the dominant understanding of democracy follows from the above. As economic and political life becomes more complex, many traditional functions of the state are transferred to global and regional international organisations. States therefore surrender their sovereignty to larger political units such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As critics have observed, the WTO already has the authority to 'strike down particular national interests, even when these are enshrined in law or custom', creating a model for a future world order in which the state plays a lesser role (George, 2019, 22). Given the growing authority of these organisations, the assumption that national democratic communities 'make and determine decisions and policies for themselves' or that governments 'determine what is right or appropriate exclusively for their own citizens' seems doubtful (Held, 2002, 21).

As the former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal has noted, many of these organisations are looking and acting like 'self-appointed presidiums," a recent phenomenon that has escaped the attention of most political leaders and commentators. However, the democracy idea has a larger reach than national frontiers. Democracy at the national level but authoritarianism in the global homeland – these are contradictions in terms (Ramphal, 2012; Chidiebere, 2021).

The conclusion drawn by Held and other commentators from this analysis is that the state is losing its autonomy because of decisions made from above, at the global level, raising questions that challenge the generally held assumptions about democratic representation and the accountability of government. The response from below, at the local level, is to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the existing institutions of democracy, which are perceived as no longer capable of promoting the interests of citizens or protecting their human rights satisfactorily. While the formal rights represented by a democratic constitution may offer some assurance that the state has an obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens, the policies, actions, decisions and authority of transnational organisations and corporations weaken the state's ability to deliver on those rights.

Similarly, although international law presents the state as the main guarantor of human rights, the state may not possess the capabilities to fulfil its obligations. Instead of creating a post-Cold War order that offers the prospects for protecting human rights through democracy and the rule of law, globalisation has created the conditions for disorder, authoritarian rule beyond the territorial state, the reformation of the state entity and the potential for continued violations of human rights (McCorquodale and Fairbrother, 2020, 758). For those who continue to put their faith in democracy, the assertion that the 'great beauty of globalisation is that no one is in control' (Hormats, 2008), offers a chilling reminder that democracy at the state level will not be enough.

If these conclusions are apposite, then the assumed close relationship between democracy and human rights may not be as secure as the dominant version of democracy anticipates. If the democratic state is no longer fully accountable to the people, if the state is losing its autonomy, and if the interests of the whole of the people are no longer served by national systems of democracy, then the universal acclaim that democracy enjoys at this historic moment does not mean that all is well with democracy (Johansen, 2013, 213; Nweke, 2017; Adebola, 2019). What this means for universal human rights is the subject of the remainder of this paper.

DEMOCRACY AND UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

An example of the confusion over democracy and human rights is seen in the Human Rights Watch Report on Latin America and the Caribbean. At the onset, the report asserts that 'multi-party democracies appear stable throughout most of Latin America and the Caribbean' (HRW, 1999, 1). However, the body of the report is concerned with detailing the failure of many states in the region either to protect human rights or to fulfil their responsibilities under international law. More tellingly, the report details measures to withdraw from human rights obligations

previously accepted. For example, the government of Trinidad and Tobago announced in May 1998 that it was considering withdrawing from the American Convention on Human Rights and the First Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

This follows the withdrawal of Jamaica from the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR in 1997, allegedly in an attempt to avoid further scrutiny of its policy on capital punishment (Nweke, 2017, 118). The report also notes the attitude of several Latin American leaders, including President Alvaro Arzú of Guatemala who has denounced organisations like Human Rights Watch as 'sly instruments of foreign policy', self-appointed spokespeople 'whose representativeness is debatable' (Nweke, 2017, 122). In a similar vein, President Carlos Menem claims that Argentina is willing to sacrifice human rights protection in the service of fighting crime, which Menem argues can only be achieved by overlooking the extralegal actions of the police (HRW, 1999, 6). Similar examples of human rights abuses in democratic states are not difficult to find, for example, the Narmada Dam project in India, the treatment of the Ogoni people in Nigeria and military brutality in Chiapas, Mexico (Adeola, 2010; Flinchum, 2018).

It is clear from these examples that the claim that human rights and democracy share a symbiotic relationship must be treated with great caution. For many students of democracy, this will come as no surprise. While all theories of democracy include a concern for rights, historically such rights were never extended to all people sharing a common territory. Athenian democracy, for example, bestowed rights only on adult males born in Athens, an exclusionary practice that denied formal political participation to women and slaves. Some have even argued that the denial of rights to women and slaves provided the mechanism through which male citizens acquired the necessary time to participate in democracy (Arat, 2001; Adekunle and Amodu, 2020). It follows from this that if a commitment to democracy does not necessarily mean a commitment to equal rights, it cannot imply a commitment to universal human rights. Indeed, any attempt to legitimize a set of universal human rights represents a threat to a democratic community's claim to autonomy, self-determination and the right to decide upon its political, economic and social order. Yet, even if we accept that national democracy could deliver human rights, it is doubtful whether this could be sustained under conditions of globalisation. Although some authors have argued that growing economic interdependence brings a parallel growth in 'moral interdependence', global society shows few signs of democratizing itself as a solution to the potential failure of national governments to protect human rights (Donnelly, 1986, 618).

One consequence of globalisation is that it is no longer possible – if it ever was – to understand development, security, environmental degradation or human rights as exclusively national problems. And if they are not exclusively national problems then the institutions of national democracy alone cannot be expected to provide a framework for people to participate in seeking solutions. Furthermore, under conditions of globalisation, governments seem increasingly unable to exercise the necessary authority to secure democratic outcomes or offer protection for human rights, particularly economic and social rights (Gill, 2006). Therefore, if the protection of human rights is imperative, it will not be enough to enhance the institutions and practices of liberal democracy at the national level alone. While strengthening national

institutions must support democracy, ensuring that deprived, marginalized and forgotten groups can exercise their right to participation. This will achieve little unless global society itself is democratized (Sakamoto, 2001; Bolajoko and Hamzat, 2019).

In this respect, the United Nations (UN) is often thought of as the first step in democratizing global politics. The UN's role in the field of human rights is, however, paradoxical. On the one hand, the impressive body of international law on human rights generated by the UN has stimulated extensive debate in a wide range of national and international forums. This has kept the 'idea' of human rights at the center of global politics and engaged the interest of a growing number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) devoted to securing justice and the protection of human rights throughout the world (Bolajoko and Hamzat, 2019). It has also prompted a shift in the international normative order, if only because the addition of human rights to the international political agenda 'alters the day-to-day conduct of international relations', with human rights demanding more attention, and of a different kind, than in the past (Ruggie, 2003, 100). In this way, the United Nations has contributed to the global reach of the 'idea' of universal human rights. On the other hand, as an organisation based upon sovereign equality and non-intervention, the UN cannot respond to the demand for universal human rights it has itself engendered. This is reflected in Flinchum (2018) that the UN is good at setting standards, but poor at implementing those standards. In short, the UN remains responsive to the demands of states, not to people and their demand for rights (Felice, 1999; Bolajoko and Hamzat, 2019, 342).

DEMOCRACY AND GLOBAL ORDER

The threat of social unrest, which would disrupt the supply of raw materials, restrict investment opportunities and severely damage prospects for exploiting low-cost labour, cannot be avoided by using coercive policing and military suppression, as it was during the Cold War period. During the Cold War such coercion was legitimated by the argument that the threat of communism justified support for any tyrannical government provided it was avowedly anti-communist (Mahbubani, 2002). Violence was justified 'because the Third World people were being killed to protect them from the evil incarnate – communism' (Shivji, 2009, 257). The collapse of the Soviet bloc removed this rationale for maintaining order at the expense of human rights and justice.

This left those who trade with repressive regimes, or those who want to maintain cordial relations for political reasons, with the dilemma of promoting a new rationale that justified continuing economic and political relations. The distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, which assumes that the former represents a transitory stage in the move to full democracy, while the latter does not, offers a well-known foundation for resolving this dilemma (Kirkpatrick, 2002). The success of this move can be judged by the way that the democracy discourse increasingly replaces the human rights discourse in US foreign policy circles (Carothers, 2004). Through this device, it remains legitimate to continue with economic relationships, to call for extended aid programmes and to develop new trade and business

relations, unhindered by moral concerns, provided a country has created the institutions of democracy.

However, the promotion of democracy was not necessarily concerned with social justice, human rights, human security or ideas of human worth, but the need to create an appropriate global order for the continued expansion of global capital (Bolajoko and Hamzat, 2019, 285). In support of this aim, powerful capitalist states sought to promote democracy in its procedural guise: as a set of democratic institutions rather than as a means of achieving social and economic transformation that would have empowered the poor and the socially excluded. This form of 'low-intensity democracy' may be understood as a component of 'low-intensity conflict', a policy that the US sought to promote as a means of securing anti-communist and anti-reformist support that avoided either unstable representative democratic systems or military dictatorship: Democracy was thus used as a form of intervention. Its intent was to pre-empt either progressive reform or revolutionary change. Beyond seeking to demobilize popular forces, it also sought to legitimize the *status quo*. Authoritarianism was thus discredited and delegitimized. The new 'democratic' regime, which temporarily enjoys increased legitimacy, can in fact undertake economic and social policies of 'adjustment' that impose new hardships on the general population and compromise economic sovereignty.

The paradox of Low Intensity Democracy is that a civilianized conservative regime can pursue painful and even repressive social and economic policies with more impunity and with less popular resistance than can an openly authoritarian regime. From the point of view of the US and conservative domestic elites in these countries, this quality must make it an interesting and useful alternative to traditional overt authoritarianism. (Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, 2003, 8; Daramola and Chike, 2020). This paradox does not escape the consciousness of citizens where low-intensity democracy operates. As incidents of resistance to globalisation often remind us, the economic conditions suffered by many people, together with an absence of basic liberties, stimulates challenges to established systems of government, which are seen 'domestically as predatory and corrupt and internationally, servile executors of the economic agenda of ruling classes of the major Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations' (Cheru, 2007, 164).

By adopting a definition of democracy that places emphasis on the creation of formal institutions, which promises limited changes to civil and political rights but has little to say about economic and social reform, 'repressive abuses of human rights continue usually against the familiar targets of labour, students, the left and human rights activists' (Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, 2003, 21). For those countries who adopt the institutions of low-intensity democracy, the economic support offered by international financial institutions and aid programmes, together with the promise of corporate investment, is conditional upon maintaining a particular type of democracy that plays a crucial role in maintaining the conditions of globalisation. If reformist groups attempt to transcend the limitations imposed by low-intensity democracy, and instead promote a version of popular democracy that includes social reform and justice, then support is withdrawn and the spectre of military intervention surfaces (Chomsky, 2008). In short, democracy often means little more than a 'thin veneer of

Western concepts', including national sovereignty, statehood, parliamentary institutions and the 'rule of law', all of which are intended to subdue ethnic, cultural and religious tensions in the effort to secure an order fit for economic growth and development (Mahbubani, 2002).

For critics of democracy, however, the claim to have established a democratic form of government must rest upon something more than the introduction of formal institutions, which often do nothing to provide for social, economic, and political reforms or the rights of the people. In countries where low-intensity democracy operates, governments give little attention to developing an open, rights-based culture. On the contrary, the governments of low-intensity democracies commonly work to ensure that trade unions are weak, wages are kept at a level beneath that necessary for a dignified life, non-governmental organisations are marginalized or declared illegal, and the press and media are censored. The practice of offering fledgling democracies technical and training assistance to strengthen some state institutions – the police and the military, for example – can provide the means for maintaining a domestic order that pays little attention to human rights and social justice (HRW, 1999; Carothers, 2004).

Furthermore, the social structures and traditions that support low-intensity democracy often mean that in practice access to public office is restricted to groups. While the existence of the institutions of democracy may help to legitimate external relations, particularly where the established democracies of advanced technological states remain squeamish about trading with authoritarian governments, the protection of universal human rights is not necessarily guaranteed. Although some commentators defend the introduction of low-intensity democracy, arguing that it is the first stage in a journey that ends in full democratic participation and social reform, Gills, Rocamora and Wilson argue that it is more accurate to understand it as an end in itself – as a way of maintaining an order that supports the interests of global and national capital.

These arguments are refuted by some authors who suggest that a right to democracy is also a human right, not only under international law but increasingly as an actual right observable in the practice of states (Frank, 2008). Frank argues that this right to a democratic form of government is built upon the right to self-determination, which replaced the previously accepted norm of colonialism at the end of the Second World War (Art. 1 of the UN Charter). According to Frank, this claim is further supported by the norm of self-determination, established under Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which gives everyone 'the right to take part in the government of his [*sic*] country ... expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting processes'. Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which asserts that 'All peoples have the right of self-determination', lends further support to Frank's claim. Similarly, the regional human rights regimes of Europe and Africa acknowledge the right to self-determination and democratic representation.

Frank's argument, however, remains embedded in the idea of national democracy. In Frank's view, the territorial state continues to define the limits of the democratic community. All that

is necessary to satisfy the human right to democratic government is the creation and maintenance of national democratic institutions, including periodic elections and a representative assembly. Frank has little to say about the need to democratize the global institutions of global governance, the impact of globalisation on the realization of democracy or the human rights consequences of the form of democracy he seeks to promote. Under conditions of globalisation, limiting the scope of our thinking to the national democratic community may not be enough. If the decision and actions of transnational actors are not democratically accountable, but nonetheless have consequences for the life chances, human security and human rights of individuals and communities (Cox 2010), democracy practiced at the national level may have limited value. Furthermore, it remains unclear how a right to democracy necessarily follows from a right to self-determination, since self-determination must permit a people to decide its own political system and form of government.

In cases where the creation of low-intensity democracy fails to silence dissent, governments seek new strategies for coping with social unrest. Robert Cox has suggested that these new strategies can be divided into two broad categories: 'poor relief' and 'riot control'. Cox argues that the growing number and importance of non-governmental organisations devoted to humanitarian aid, which parallels the importance that the United Nations attaches to humanitarian assistance, offers the most tangible evidence of the poor relief element. When both low-intensity democracy and poor relief fail to prevent political and economic destabilization, governments resort to employing military force.

Thus, poor relief and riot control 'help to sustain the emerging social structure of the world by minimizing the risk of chaos in the bottom layer' (Cox, 2010, 58). In this view, democracy and human rights are of limited interest when social unrest threatens the smooth continuation of the practices of globalisation. Decision-makers rarely ask questions about accountability when the maintenance of the global political economy is at stake.

This raises questions to do with the potential for the democratization of world order, including the protection of human rights. On the one hand, some authors suggest that liberal democracy and a good human rights record are increasingly necessary if a state is to achieve and maintain global legitimacy (Hoffman, 1998). The future for liberal democracy and human rights therefore seems bright, because globalisation means that no state can escape detailed public scrutiny. The work of NGOs and their use of communications technology is significant in this respect. On the other hand, if the state has less political and economic significance under conditions of globalisation, state legitimacy may not be of great importance.

To achieve democracy and human rights under conditions of globalisation therefore requires us to abandon traditional thinking on the state and world order. Instead, globalisation theory urges us to take a more inclusive view of the global political economy, including our understanding of democracy, with a view to creating new expressions of global democratic governance. Frank's optimistic view – that a right to democracy is already accepted under international law – may therefore offer unintended support to those whose interests are best

served by maintaining the centrality of the state system when thinking about the democratization of world order.

DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The above discussion has attempted to point to the dangers of substituting the language of democracy for that of human rights. More particularly, it has attempted to demonstrate that the effort to promote the dominant version of democracy has more to do with maintaining an order that serves the interests of global capital, rather than the interests of those whose human rights and security are constantly threatened. Fostering the assumption that '*by definition* promoting democracy entails promoting human rights', provides a rationale for foreign policy interventions intended to secure a form of government sympathetic to the aims of the neoliberal consensus (Carothers, 2004, 109). Frank's attempt to argue that democracy is itself a human right lends support to this argument. Should a state fail to provide the conditions necessary for promoting the values associated with the neoliberal consensus, it is then possible to argue that intervention is justified, not on the grounds of economic interests but, more nobly, in the cause of populations deprived of the right to democracy. Moreover, the widely accepted configuration of democracy, the free market and human rights, which reflects the values of the neoliberal consensus, further justifies the use or threat of force against those who attempt to voice an alternative view.

This section looks at some of the issues surrounding development, democracy and human rights that follow from the above discussion. Although all states pursue economic development and growth, in the current period of globalisation it might be argued that these goals are 'profoundly anti-democratic' for two sets of reasons: one concerned with the domestic context of democracy and the other with the global context (McCorquodale and Fairbrother, 2020). Within the domestic context, the right to development is defined as the right of 'every human person and all peoples to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized' (Declaration on the Right to Development 1986, Art. 1). However, the dominant understanding of development tends to ignore all but the goal of economic development at the expense of social, cultural, and political development. Following arguments that globalisation provides the conditions for privileging economic development over social welfare and human rights (Clark, 2011, 133), some scholars argue that the policy of sacrificing the rights of some for the good of others or future generations is the accepted wisdom of elites in all countries, not merely developing countries (Tomasevski, 2015).

The most visible evidence for this conclusion is seen in the practice of assessing development by reference to economic growth rates, gross domestic product (GDP) and the success of efficiency-maximizing strategies. Although the Human Development Index, published annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its *Human Development Report*, attempts to reverse this trend, the economic element of development continues to dominate the thinking and language of most leaders. Following this limited definition, development becomes an end, rather than a means to an end, which would offer an alternative

definition that placed human rights, democracy and social justice at its center (Sieghart, 2013). Making this observation, critics argue that it is not possible to 'talk your way to democracy in the language of development economics [because] liberty and justice do not exist as technical terms in economic science' (Lummis, 2021, 52).

A second assumption that informs the politics of the domestic context is that full economic development is a realistic goal for all. This assumption is predicated upon the premise that levels of consumption, such as those achieved in the US and other Western economies, is a viable goal for all people. Following from this is the further assumption that a fully developed world will see current inequalities gradually narrowed and finally abolished. However, according to the 2015 United Nations *Human Development Report*, the top 20 per cent of the world's highest income countries account for 86 per cent of total private consumption, while the poorest 20 per cent account for a mere 1.3 per cent. Furthermore, the richest 20 per cent consume 45 per cent of all meat and fish, compared to the poorest 20 per cent who consume 5 per cent, and 58 per cent of total energy, compared to 4 per cent by the poorest 20 per cent. The report also notes that these cross-country comparisons conceal continuing high levels of poverty and deprivation in all industrialized countries, with an estimated 100 million people in developed countries suffering deprivation similar to those in less developed countries (UNDP, 2015). Given these statistics, it is difficult to see just how the promotion of democracy can be achieved through a model of development that is demonstrably failing to achieve a reduction in inequalities. Perhaps more tellingly, the UNDP notes that although consumption has doubled in the US compared to the 1950s, the percentage of Americans calling themselves 'happy' has declined steadily since 1957 (UNDP, 2015).

If popular movements do raise the issue of democratic participation when investment banks, aid donors and corporations engage in development programmes, the focus is rarely on questions about whether the people support national policy objectives that lead to rapid changes in social life, social dislocation, and loss of livelihood. Instead, project managers take the objective of rapid economic growth and development as a given. Popular resistance is then understood as a failure to consult with national and local groups at the planning stage, following the decision to proceed with a project. Participation is appropriate if it helps the smooth running of a project by deflecting unwanted public attention and defusing the potential for social unrest. As UNDP-sponsored research has noted, however, the failure to appreciate the distinction between resistance associated with a rejection of the 'common sense' of rapid economic growth and development as a policy objective and the rejection of a particular project, offers an insight into why programmes sponsored by the World Bank continue to attract antagonism (Taylor and Pieper, 2019). World Bank officials have argued, for example, that care should be taken to invest in the social infrastructure of a community, particularly where 'resettlement' is an issue, before projects begin, to avoid delays caused by social protest and resistance. The Bank's anxiety to gain post-decision legitimation is further seen when the 'problem of identifying *appropriate* community-based organisations (CBOs) for the project's participatory component' is considered (Bhatnager, 2019, 17). Since there are often difficulties in getting agreement between donors, borrowing governments, Bank officials and local people on what participation means, and who should have a legitimate right to participate, the selection of

appropriate participants becomes a vital issue that 'serves merely as a way to get people to agree with what the project wants to do' (Dichter, 2016, 92).

A final reason why development might be seen as anti-democratic also concerns the 'common-sense' model of development, because it draws attention away from political goals, including the demand for human rights, and instead places the focus on economic goals. As economic development is understood increasingly as the central aim of all governments, the deprivations suffered by those whose environment is degraded, culture devastated, freedom to protest peacefully suppressed and traditional ties with the land forcibly severed are seen less as the victims of human rights violations and more as the unfortunate citizens who must bear the cost of economic progress for the good of the wider community (Tomasevski, 2015; Kotheri, 2017; Bolajoko and Hamzat, 2019). Those who continue to protest are referred to pejoratively as insular, conservative and traditionalist, bent on denying the benefits of modernization to the mass of the people.

The strategy adopted by some states in response to both the demands of globalisation from above and the demand for democracy from below – referred to by one commentator as 'authoritarian democracy' (Mittelman, 2015) – attempts to take advantage of globalisation while offering its citizens a measure of participation, although not at the expense of a failure to achieve economic growth and development. Although 'in theory democracy means accountability to the governed, in practice leaders are accountable to market forces, most notably debt structures and structural adjustment programmes' (Mittelman, 2016, 9). This attitude reinforces the view that government is about achieving economic progress rather than good governance, democracy, human security and human rights. While these goals may be desirable, the global neoliberal consensus argues that achieving these values must follow success in economic growth and development, not precede it.

The emphasis on economic development that is central to both the discourse on universal human rights and the discourse on democracy has given many governments an opportunity to plead for special tolerance of their human rights record. Many of these governments argue that their attitude to human rights is conditioned by two important factors that do not pertain in developing countries. The first is the need to build a nation on the remains of colonial institutions. These governments argue that their priority is stability: when thinking about human rights, does the promotion of a particular human right help or hinder the process of nation-building and the move from a postcolonial to a mature state? Second, these governments embrace the idea that economic development is of paramount importance to the long-term stability and security of the nation. Governments must not allow traditional values and alternative versions of development to deflect the nation from achieving the goal of economic development. Suppression and coercion of those who attempt to stand in the way of necessary social, cultural and political change are therefore legitimate, in the interests of future generations (Tamilmoran, 2012).

Furthermore, many leaders in less developed countries argue that the history of the West demonstrates that human rights and democracy came onto the agenda following the effort to

achieve economic development. The leaders of less developed countries therefore accuse developed states of placing the 'democratic cart' before the 'economic horse' (Mahbubani, 2002). Moreover, these leaders often point to the deep tribal, ethnic, family and religious divisions within their countries, which they argue cannot be overcome simply by transplanting forms of democracy established in developed countries over many centuries. Accordingly, national leaders argue that social divisions offer a hostile context in which to develop the institutions of democracy because they represent a barrier to developing a politically active middle class, which most accounts see as a prerequisite for democracy (Kotheri, 2017). Additionally, leaders in developing countries are prone to reminding the developed world of the historic consequences of imperialism, which, they argue, was instrumental in impoverishing current populations. For these reasons, nation-building becomes a code for the strong state, which is a prerequisite for stability, foreign investment and the guarantee of a 'cheap, docile and disciplined labour force' (Mandani, Mkandwire and Mamba-din-Wamba, 2013). Before tackling issues of democracy and human rights, governments must achieve the transition from less developed to developed status successfully.

Therefore, leaders in developing states argue that their first task is to build a strong economy that nurtures the common interests of the middle classes, breaks down traditional ties and provides the economic conditions for democracy and human rights. To achieve the levels of economic growth necessary to break free of abject poverty, many governments argue for tolerance towards levels of authoritarianism that often include violations of universal human rights (Mahbubani, 2002). The success of the East Asian 'miracle' is seen as a vindication of this approach. The demand for democracy and human rights, which was at the forefront of protests in East Asia during the 1997 and 1998 economic crisis, is said to provide further evidence for tolerance towards 'market-preserving authoritarianism' (Davis, 2008).

These sentiments were forcefully articulated by Asian leaders during the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. Stressing the particularity of Asian society, Asian leaders sought to present an approach to human rights, based upon 'Asian values', that distinguished it from the dominant Western approach. Important among these Asian values are respect for authority, deference to societal interests, emphasis on duty, the politics of consensus rather than conflict and the centrality of the family in all social relations (Mahbubani, 2002; Mauzy, 2007; Freeman, 2015, 2016). According to Asian leaders, the West's approach to human rights, which stresses the importance of freedom as an end in itself, leads to a 'vulgar individualism' that separates rights from responsibilities and duties (Muzaffar, 2015). In contrast to the West, Asian society understands individual freedom as a means to an end that seeks to promote the collective interest of the whole of the community. According to many Asian leaders, the West should recognize that the social and economic costs of illegal drugs, divorce, family breakdown, single-parent families and rising crime rates owe much to the cult of individualism, which the Asian tradition does not recognize (Woodiwiss, 2008; Dauda, 2016).

From the perspective of many East Asian countries, the immediate task is to build upon the economic success achieved during the last two decades, by developing a sense of national identity, clearly differentiated from that identity associated with their colonial past (Tang,

2005). Part of the process of achieving this aim is to assert Asian values in the field of human rights, since the conception of universal human rights developed through the United Nations regime takes no account of any Asian tradition, for example, Confucianism or Buddhism. Through asserting a conception of universal human rights based upon Asian values, Asian countries seek to reflect their new and elevated status within the global political economy and to free themselves from the last vestiges of colonial influence and control. Fortuitously, Asian values also support policies that protect markets by legitimating state non-intervention, most importantly, in areas of economic life that promote the conditions necessary to attract investment, for example, wage controls, environmental protection and levels of social expenditure.

Consequently, economic interests based in non-Asian economies argue that the attempt to promote Asian values, as an alternative to universally recognized human rights, is more concerned with attracting investment and securing a competitive advantage by offering a disciplined workforce and less burdensome restrictions on corporate behaviour (Tang, 2005; Bolajoko and Hamzat, 2019, 311). Thus, as one scholar has observed, while 'the doctrine of human rights can be misused to disguise Western neo-imperialism, the doctrine of cultural relativism can be misused to conceal or justify oppression by Asian states' (Freeman, 2015, 15).

Furthermore, promoting Asian values as an alternative vision of human rights offers an opportunity to reject any attempt to implement universal standards through the use of conditionality (Oladipo, 2018, 113). According to Asian countries, human rights conditionality reinforces several attitudes that are no longer appropriate in the current global political economy. Among these is the old imperial ethos that 'right is might', the assumption that human rights violations occur only in less developed countries and that it is rational to promote civil and political rights by denying access to aid intended to promote economic and social rights (Mauzy, 2007; Boyle, 2020). In short, by emphasizing the moral, social and cultural differences between Asian and Western countries, Asian leaders seek to promote an alternative vision of human rights that supports Asian economic interests and provides a defense against external criticism of current human rights practices (Caballero-Anthony, 2017).

Finally, at the domestic level, the political culture of many less-developed countries makes little distinction between wealth and politics, making it less possible to separate capitalist accumulation from political control (Taylor and Pieper, 2019). Globalisation enables wider access to media images that allow the masses to compare their own standards of living with those enjoyed by both the West and the wealthy in their own societies. This often leads to a growing sense of inequality and, consequently, to social and political pressure for policies that promise higher incomes and access to goods currently enjoyed only by the few.

Should leaders fail to respond to these demands, particularly when the introduction of 'low-intensity democracy' promises greater accountability, increasing social tensions may lead to social disruption, threatening the authority of social groups accustomed to assuming the reins of power. This often leads to coercive measures intended to suppress the demand for greater

equality, which threatens the goal of ever-greater economic development. Despite the fact that governments organize such coercive action, it is worth noting that such action is encouraged and supported by the military aid, technology transfers and financial incentives offered by those with an interest in supporting a low-wage, docile workforce (Arat, 2001).

If the domestic context suggests that the creation and maintenance of the institutions of democracy do not necessarily deliver a culture of rights, the global context is no more encouraging. The move to introduce both financial and trade liberalization on a global scale, managed by organisations like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank, further weakens the potential for people to exercise any claim for democratic governance. An examination of levels of participation, representation and accountability demonstrates the paucity of democracy at the global level.

The argument that the majority are excluded from participating in the current drive to liberalize global markets focuses on the activities of the WTO, which is often seen as the embryo of a global governing authority (George, 2019). According to critics, participation in developing the substance of WTO rules and decision-making procedures often means that greater attention is given to the interests of transnational capital rather than to rights and human security. Martin Khor of the Third World Network argues that rule and decision-making processes at the WTO display an 'utter disrespect for democratic participation of the majority of Members [of the WTO]'.

This is manifest in the practice of convening small groups, with memberships that include only the advanced capitalist states, to discuss and develop the WTO position on particular issues. It is also seen in the lack of transparency during negotiations and the non-incorporation of views expressed by less developed countries in the working drafts of proposed trade agreements (Khor, 2020). The outcome of these tactics is that many trade agreements and declarations reflect a harmony of interests within the developed world, rather than a 'consensus' resulting from negotiations that allow the full participation of all countries. As Khor argues: The process of decision-making and negotiations in the WTO has to be democratized and made transparent. 'Green Room' meetings should be discontinued. Every Member, however small, must have the right to know what negotiations are taking place, and to take part in them. Until the reforms to the system and to the substance of the WTO take place, the organisation's credibility will remain low (Khor, 2020).

Similarly, the activities of the World Bank often make it impossible for people to exercise a right to democratic representation because they are not allowed to participate in the decision-making processes associated with economic development. The Bank often supports projects aimed at certain types of development that do not necessarily benefit the majority. Many of these are large-scale projects that directly lead to human rights violations by displacing people, destroying their environment and denying access to traditional lands used for agriculture or hunting. When those who suffer these violations of economic, social and cultural rights attempt to organize resistance to such development, civil and political rights are frequently denied. This is hardly surprising, since the World Bank, in common with other international financial

institutions, is more concerned with creating the necessary conditions for the smooth running of the global free market, not in assisting in delivering human rights. The Bank's concerns are external to the needs of the people and cannot focus on education, welfare, jobs, subsistence and the other factors of human security (McCorquodale and Fairbrother, 2020; Adekunle and Baoku, 2021, 105). In other words, a clear distinction must always be drawn between human rights and economic interests.

For critics of WTO and World Bank practices, liberalization is 'imposed' upon people who are excluded from full participation in the decision-making processes that directly affect their ability to claim human rights. Those who plead for 'special and different treatment', including the time to implement changes to avoid the worst social consequences of new liberalization regulations, are rarely listened to (Chimni, 2019, 341–342). Even when less powerful groups are offered a role in these processes, a lack of resources severely limits their ability to follow the detail of negotiations, and to understand the full implications of agreements. Although liberalization often leads to a denial of economic and social rights, a decline in the ability of the state to act autonomously in the interests of its people and a denial of democratic participation, developed economies continue to press for further deregulation. As Susan George has noted, consumerism is the only form of participation widely acknowledged by proponents of liberalization. The 'superfluous billions' unable to engage in the liberal, free market, consumer-oriented global order do not qualify for a voice in shaping a future global order (George, 2019).

Representation at the formal discussions on further liberalization is also deficient. Formally, all members of the WTO enjoy equal status within the organisation. However, many less developed countries do not possess the resources to support a permanent representative at WTO headquarters in Geneva. Recent research by Christian Aid shows that over half of the less developed countries have no representation in Geneva: These countries have a total population of 81 million people who, despite being members, have no voice at all at the WTO. Those developing countries that do have some representation in Geneva often have only one person responsible for all negotiations in the WTO, where there can be more than 40 meetings a week on subjects ranging from air transport to competition policy, environmental agreements to industrial tariffs. By contrast the US has over 250 negotiators at Geneva, and richer countries frequently fly in technical experts to deal with complex issues (Christian Aid, 2020).

In the absence of any system that supports the capacity of poor countries to participate in all the important discussions at the WTO, developing countries cannot hope to 'follow the negotiations, let alone participate actively [or] understand what they are committing themselves to' (Khor, 2020). It is also doubtful if even those countries with the resources to fund a permanent delegation in Geneva represent the best interest of their citizens on human security and human rights. The close relationship between WTO delegations and the representatives of global business and finance suggests that the interests of the poor are of little concern.

Again, Christian Aid notes that Cargill, a company that controls half the global trade in grains, 'was heavily involved in preparations for the US negotiating position on agriculture before the

last round of trade talks – with some commentators claiming that the company wrote the first draft of the US negotiating position' (Christian Aid, 2020). Similarly, business groups were extensively canvassed by the European Union during the process of drafting a proposal for an investment agreement, although other interest groups were excluded. In a further case, the Australian delegation included eight representatives of business but rejected all attempts by NGOs and trade unions to gain a seat (Christian Aid, 2020). In effect, this means that the interests of the majority of the world's peoples are denied a voice in important negotiations and decision-making processes that help shape their lives.

The message that this transmits across the globe is that satisfying the interests of transnational capital, by providing the conditions for an efficient global economy, is the primary objective of liberalization: all other values, including universal human rights, must be sacrificed to this cause. At the center of this project is what Susan George has recently referred to as the 'fast caste', or those who have access to knowledge and the formal structures for decision-making. Members of the fast caste have no loyalty to any country, nation or community beyond their own business associates, whose interests they attempt to represent and promote (George, 2019). To give some scale to this assertion, the UNDP estimates that of the forty thousand TNCs currently operating in the global economy, the top one hundred control one-fifth of all TNC assets. Furthermore, one-third of all world trade is now intra-firm and a further third is inter-firm.

In those cases where NGOs are allowed access to negotiations on liberalization, WTO officials and delegation members often receive them with a courteousness that is often mistaken for influence (Taylor, 2019). Reinforcing Taylor's observation, George argues that assuming that any change: ... because it would contribute to justice, equity and peace, need only be explained to be adopted is the saddest and most irritating kind of naivety. Many good, otherwise intelligent people seem to believe that once powerful individuals and institutions have actually *understood* the gravity of the crisis (any crisis) and the urgent need for its remedy, they will smack their brow, admit they have been wrong all along and, in a fit of revelation, instantly redirect their behaviour by 180 degrees (George, 2019, 181).

Finally, as some commentators have pointed out (Khor, 2020; Coote, 2020; Akinsola, 2021, 243), the decision-making procedures of the WTO are often secretive, protecting decision-makers from all attempts to make them accountable. The practice of 'Green Room meetings', which are not officially announced, not mandated by the full membership of the WTO and rarely publish their conclusions, has already been mentioned above. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism established under the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, gave considerable powers to ensure compliance with trade rules, no matter the labour, environmental, social and human rights consequences for some people. However, a dispute settlement panel 'meets without observers and their documents, transcripts and proceedings are not disclosed' (George, 2019, 22). Furthermore, although the dispute settlement procedures do make provision for appeals, this hardly measures up to the levels of accountability expected when decisions might damage the social and human rights prospects of millions of people. Lacking transparency, developing countries often treat dispute settlement with suspicion and

accuse the developed economies of using the WTO to enforce market discipline on the weak while denying access to their own markets.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to argue that human rights and democracy do not necessarily share a symbiotic relationship, as is often assumed. Although the imagery of democracy has achieved a high profile in global and international politics in recent years, the discussion here points to a political rationale that has little to do with achieving the conditions for protecting and promoting human rights. Instead, the image of democracy is used to legitimate forms of behaviour supportive of particular economic interests associated with globalisation. Held and Hindess, for example, argue that national forms of democracy are incapable of providing a culture of rights until we recognize the need to democratize both the institutions that operate *above* the state, at the global level and those *below* the state, at the local level (Held, 2001, 2002, 2005; Hindess, 2001, 2002, 2009). Gills, Rocamora and Wilson also recognize this need in their conceptualization of 'low-intensity democracy' (Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, 2003), which is more concerned with the formal creation of institutions than with democratic outcomes.

At the national level, the idea of a democratically elected government, representing the interests of a bounded community, seems less possible, given the context of globalisation and a widely held definition of development that focuses almost exclusively on economic indicators. At the global level, the increasing authority of global institutions, and the activities of transnational corporations, suggests that democratic representation and participation are less achievable in the post-Cold War world than many commentators argue. The creation of a global free market, backed by the creation of new global institutions with international standing, described by some as the 'new constitutionalism', favours the interest of capital above the interests of all others. This is seen in the activities of the World Bank, the WTO and regional economic unions, all of which are designed to impose a market discipline that favours corporate and financial interests.

Rather than taking a wider view of development that includes human rights, security and dignity, 'new constitutionalism confers privileged rights of citizenship and representation on corporate capital, whilst constraining the democratization process that has involved struggles for representation for hundreds of years' (Gill, 2015, 413). Given the argument that the spread of the democracy idea, as it is currently promoted, relates more to economic growth and development, the interests of global capital and finance and the conditions for globalisation, than with human rights and human security, the popular assumption 'if democracy then human rights' is at least questionable.

Countries in the Global South have the potential for promoting and sustaining democracy, human rights and development, but the challenges facing them are many: ineffective leadership, poor governance, weak workforce, poverty, human rights violations, conflict and insecurity, and more. These problems, which have persisted over many years, have tended to bring overall development in most parts of the Global South to a standstill. Developing

countries' seemingly deplorable state has resulted in a kind of addiction to external aid that helps create or reinforce misrepresentation and negative stereotypes. Such misinformation affects developing countries' credibility in the global market, and the people in the Global South countries alone can work together to correct it by changing the underlying dynamics.

Africans especially, at home and in the diaspora, need to take up the challenge of ensuring that discussions on educational and development issues reflect an accurate image of the continent. African leaders, and their people, must be retrained to work for peace, development, and the good of society. Such changes would ultimately eliminate the worst misconceptions and stereotypes, extend African development opportunities to attract greater foreign investment, and increase external trade and interdependence. Although foreign aid is crucial in sustaining economic activities in Global South countries in general and African countries in particular, providers of such aid must be positioned and seen as partners to their recipients, and should not be misrepresented and misunderstood as leading development in developing countries.

Once the people in developing countries and their leaders bear the responsibility for their own economic transformation by engaging in selfless local revenue mobilization initiatives, they would certainly be less dependent on foreign aid. They would then be respected and recognized as participating meaningfully in a knowledge economy, for "the West respects Japan, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan today because these countries did not wait for the advice of the white man to jump into their own style of modernity. People in the Global South countries, too, must find their own way in the modern world"—the world of global business and interdependence.

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NATURAL RESOURCE JUSTICE AND CAPABILITIES
A FRAMEWORK FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

How natural resource justice and capability can provide a framework for peace building remains a less studied theme in conflict prone resource rich developing societies. Despite Nigeria's assent to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2003, it appears that natural resource justice remains a problem in post amnesty Niger Delta as there are evidence of post amnesty violence. This article examines dimensions of natural resource injustice in the Niger Delta and proposes natural resource justice and capability alternative frameworks for peacebuilding. It follows Sen and Nussbaum's capability models and its assumption that freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance. Second, freedom to achieve well-being must be understood in terms of people with capabilities or what the people are able to do. Drawing on the Niger Delta experience, the article demonstrates that post amnesty transition dynamics appear not to have taken cognizance of the capabilities of the erstwhile combatants 'in what they are able and willing to do' for a living. This accounts for resurgence of post amnesty conflict. Consequently, the article argues that for sustainable peace to thrive, a broader 'homegrown' approach to natural resource justice, with recognition of the capability of ex-combatants is proposed. Such approach can engage the ex-combatants with issues of sustainable livelihood to develop priorities for sustainable peace policy. The article speaks to resource justice and the need to strengthen the capability of the ex-combatants for sustainable peace. It posits that the recognition of natural resource justice and existential conditions of ex-combatants are central to sustainable peace building.

Keywords: *Capability, Resource Justice, Peace Building, Sustainable Development, Niger Delta.*

INTRODUCTION

In November 2021, a new militant group in the Niger Delta known as Bayan-Men blew up an oil facility operated by the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) in Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni Local Government Area of Rivers State (Odiegwu, 2021). The angry militants, who destroyed the oil well, OB5 (Obiavu-5), accused the international oil company of failing to deal directly with the host communities, insisting that they were fighting for justice for their people (Odiegwu, 2021). This and similar occurrences linked to resource injustice continue to fuel crisis and strife in the Niger Delta, which pose threats to sustainable peace. Recent interest in natural resource injustice in the developing societies of the Third World, and in relation to peace building, has brought issues of capability to the center of current academic debates.

The term capability according to Sen (1985) is a normative term which underscores the willingness, choices and ability regarding what an individual is willing and able to do for a living. It is a departure from welfare economics and adopts a micro level analysis of individual potentials in development enterprise. In particular, in relation to the various perspectives of the concept of capability (Sen,1985; Nussbaum, 2011; Alkire, 2013), this study considers the prospects, as well as challenges, of capability drawing on the Niger Delta context. The emergence of capability or capabilities approach (Sen,1985; Nussbaum,2003) is connected to a rise of interest in human development (Alkire,2009) and in particular, a departure from welfare economics to a more substantial pro poor development and growth model. The aim is to overcome underdevelopment, disempowerment, and livelihood vulnerability.

Sen's (1985) capabilities approach largely influenced the UN's human development report. The capability debate essentially stimulated the UN's Human Development Index (HDI), which measures human development, within the context of capabilities in health, education, and income (Alkire, 2009). In the 2000s, the Human Development and Capability Association was formed, which has further inspired debates among scholars (See.Alkire,2009; Nussbaum, 2011; Anand, Santos & Smith, 2009; Ingrid, 2016). Related strides of the capability model include the emergence of the journal of Human Development and Capability (Nussbaum, 2011). Following the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in 1956 in a Niger Delta community, Nigeria has been a leading exporter of crude oil. According to OPEC, Nigeria has almost 40 billion barrels of proven oil reserve (NEITI, 2021). After nearly 50 years of exploration, the oil and gas sector continue to play a significant role in the economy and accounts for 65% of total revenue to the government. With a maximum crude oil production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day, Nigeria is Africa's largest producer of oil, and the 13th largest oil producing country in the world (NEITI, 2021).

Despite the huge revenue, the oil-bearing communities remain poor and underdeveloped. The country has been faced with significant challenges in managing the sector such as the unaccountable use of revenues, corruption, and non-transformation of the oil-bearing Niger Delta, which accounted for Nigeria's assent to EITI in 2003, hence the emergence of Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) process is a global initiative that seeks to promote transparency in company

payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining (NEITI, 2021). Nigeria was the first among the 50 member countries of EITI to support the implementation of the principle with the establishment of NEITI in 2004, followed by the NEITI Act in 2007 (Udo, 2015).

As at August 2009, report has it that 30 mineral-rich countries including Nigeria were 'candidate' countries implementing EITI (Shaxson, 2009). For instance, NEITI has identified USD 9.8 billion owed to the Federal Government, of which USD 2.4 billion has been recovered through Nigeria EITI's efforts (NEITI, 2021). While NEITI focuses on strengthening public debate and promoting policy options around signature bonuses, unpaid royalties, crude oil and refined products theft, discourses linked to natural resource injustice in contexts characterized by complex deleterious oil resource extraction dynamics of oil multinationals have been in the margins giving rise to agitation and militancy.

In 2009, the federal government granted unconditional amnesty to the aggrieved militants. However, post amnesty violence in the region and exponential rise in environmental degradation are pointers to the quest for natural resource justice, which contrasts Niger Delta's oil wealth and undermines the development capabilities of the region through neglect of the oil-bearing communities by the federal government (UNEP, 2011). Beyond neglecting these communities by the oil multinationals, there is evidence of water and land pollution, soil contamination, gas flaring acid rain. For instance, in 2011, UNEP, in its flagship report, maintained that there is need for effective clean-up of Ogoni community degraded by oil resource extraction of the multinationals (UNEP, 2011). A central concern has been the inability to strengthen the development capability of the rural oil-bearing communities. For instance, post amnesty reintegration of the ex-combatants on the basis of their capabilities have been illusory (Ebiede, 2018).

Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to make a new contribution. It demonstrates that while there is a need for a possibility of building sustainable peace in the Niger Delta, this cannot be separated from the debates on the issues of resource justice. It explores natural resource justice and capability linkages to understand how both terms could be useful proxies for sustainable peace in the Niger Delta. In particular the paper calls for natural resource justice and contends that when resource conflict issues are raised, the question regarding natural resource justice cannot be set aside. The contribution of this study is two- folds. First, the evidence provided suggests significant natural resource injustice in the Niger Delta. Thus, the study shows how natural resource injustice undermines the capability of the oil-bearing Niger Delta communities accounting for resource conflicts. Secondly, the study demonstrates how resource justice and capability could constitute a modality for peacebuilding.

It is on these premises that the study argues that natural resource justice and capability could strengthen peace building, overcome environmental degradation, systemic decimation of the flora and fauna, which undermine the capabilities of the oil-bearing locals to attain sustainable livelihood. Our argument follows the capability framework and demonstrates that building the capabilities of the oil-bearing communities is essential for peace building. Thus, while natural resource justice is an evolving research agenda, there is need to expand the area of study to

include questions of livelihoods vulnerability, empowerment, capacity building, environmental degradation, exclusionary and lethal dynamics of capitalist oil resource exploitation.

On the other hand, the study further seeks to understand where capability stands normatively in capitalist resource exploitation debate, and how such capitalist exploitation accounts for natural resource injustice in the developing countries. In particular, the study shows that resource justice is important in peace building.

METHODOLOGY

Content Analysis (CA) technique was used as a method for identifying, analyzing, and reviewing concepts in the literature in the broad fields of natural resource justice and capability. Holsti, (1969:14) offers a broad definition of content analysis as, "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages." Thus, content analysis methodology adopts a wide range of review including various theoretical approaches such as critical, multidisciplinary, exploratory, cross-sectorial.

The methodology allowed for a detailed analysis of frustration aggression, resource justice and capability theories, and further, a review of extant literature providing useful insights on gaps in the literature and further an investigation of the patterns of natural resource injustice in the Niger Delta as arguments regarding a convergence between natural resource justice and capability as a peacebuilding framework is less distinct in the literature. Thus, leading to the development of natural resource justice and capabilities framework, which is the key contribution of the study to the wider literature. This makes for a deepened exploration of various interrelated themes, theoretical and conceptual perspectives, criticisms and prospects on subject matter related to natural resource justice and capability. The methodology was informed by the policy and disciplinary relevance of linkages between natural resource justice and capability especially among the developing societies of the global South with systemic disempowerment and poor capability building. The methodology is also useful in research contexts as scant studies have provided a relational content analysis or review of possible linkages between natural resource justice and capability in the Niger Delta as in most developing countries. Our framework thus builds on relational content analysis to explore the relevant literature, disaggregating their various perspectives and arguments and also detailing their relationships in the broader contexts linked to resource justice and capability.

The literature review was designed to understand what the scholarship is saying, advance knowledge, identify gaps and help fill the identified gaps and in particular to develop an appropriate model to understand the interconnections between natural resource justice and capability. In developing a framework for post conflict peace building across multi-sectoral strands, among various actors and stakeholders, including civil society groups and policy makers, the study makes a new contribution to the sub field.

Our methodology thus combines, divergent viewpoints in the literature to broaden the scope of our analysis. The literature review was undertaken to explore the historical and ideological

context(s) of natural resource justice and capability, further help map the broad field of research, and to create knowledge across disciplines, particularly to provide an agenda for both present study, and further research. Despite limitations posed by lack of evidence of empirical data linking natural resource injustice to capability in the study area, the identified knowledge gaps in the existing literature in an evolving area of research makes for policy response that is necessary for the transformation of the field of study and in particular, the focus area of our analysis, namely, the Niger Delta. This theoretical basis thus, provides a broad background for any future empirical studies.

FRUSTRATION AGGRESSION, RESOURCE JUSTICE AND CAPABILITY THEORIES

There are various theoretical perspectives on the resource injustice debate. Prior studies have provided insights into various underlying dynamics of resource injustice such as resource equity, distributive justice, or resource governance (Helstein, 2008; Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2014; Sweetman & Ezpeleta ,2017; Amstrong, 2017). Resource justice theory emerged largely as a reaction to the widely held notion of the resource curse debate that poverty contrasts wealth among resource abundant societies especially in the developing societies of the global South (Ross,1999).

To identify the cause of the curse, resource justice debate emerged to raise questions of distributive justice, dynamics of resource access and control as well as resource governance (Amstrong 2017). For example, within resource conflicts in the corporate environment both Anderson and Reeb, (2003) and Maury, (2006), identify the issue of ownership, which helps reduce conflicts thereby improving overall corporate performance. Thus, where such "ownership' is linked to equity and fairness involving the resource bearing communities natural resource justice could prevail. This has been a major policy lacuna in the Niger Delta context. Similar theories such as stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) have been adopted from the management sciences to understand the core stakeholders in resource appropriation. Consequently, the neglect of stakeholders could result in intra or inter resource conflict. The resource dependency theory posits that in monolithic economies over dependence on one resource as a mainstay of the economy gives rise to competition for resource control and struggle for resource access. This as a consequence, causes complex conflicts.

In their analysis, proponents such as Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978) shed light on the need for environmental linkages between corporate organisations such as oil multinationals and efficient resource use. According to this perspective, an organisation's need for resources leads to the development of exchange relationships or network governance between organisations and the outside world. Thus, where such resource needs are exploited harmoniously it leads to socio-ecological compatibility but on the contrary, there is bound to be resource conflicts. Amadi et al; (2014) summed this within corporate eco–efficiency debate and argue that the 'use of less resources to do more' is central to ecological efficiency and constitutes a check to resource waste and mitigation of activities that might taint the natural environment.

Following the assumptions of the above theories and within the particular context of our study, the study follows three interrelated theories to demonstrate the complex challenges of natural resource injustice as a key issue to peace building in the region namely frustration aggression theory, postulated by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939), the group attempted to account for virtually all of human aggression in relation to basic needs. The assumption is that where human needs are confronted with state repression, inequality or exploitation, aggression ensues and takes various forms (Dollard, etal;1939; Berkowitz,1989). This in relation to the resource justice theory (Armstrong,2017) suggests complex injustice associated with resource extraction. While the capabilities theory emphasizes human freedom in terms of what the individual is able to do. These have been the most pertinent theories among studies aimed at exploring the relationship between natural resource injustice, capability, and peace building in the Niger Delta.

There are linkages between natural resource justice and capability. For instance, Claassen, (2017) has attempted to create an agency-based capability theory of justice building a framework that deepens the possible nexus between capability and justice. The theoretical debates on such linkages suggest that resource injustice undermines capability including gender disparities and inequality. For instance, Sweetman & Ezpeleta, (2017) argue that natural resource justice from a gender justice and women's rights perspective seeks to understand the extent to which women have access to natural resources - land, water, forests, air. Similarly, resource injustice accounts for agitation and conflicts as the later implies incompatibility of goals. Ramsbotham, et al. (2016) posit that while conflict entails incompatibility of goals among different parties, concern has been the content of such conflicts, which they posit could be unequal, where one party holds an advantaged or powerful position than the other. This perspective is in line with the asymmetries and complex degradation associated with oil resource extraction in the Niger Delta. Such asymmetrical relationship as documented in recent scholarship benefits the multinational oil companies and the federal government to the detriment of the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta (Amnesty International, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2020), thus accounting for resource injustice.

The asymmetry also gives rise to frustration aggression exemplified in resource agitation thesis, which has taken several dimensions including communal resource conflicts, oil bunkering, artisanal refining, militancy involving youths whose capability to meet their daily subsistence is undermined with issues of pollution, soil contamination, oil spill and unemployment (Amadi,2018). Thus, the rural communities are predominantly farmers, fishermen and women who derive their subsistence from tilling the soil and fishing (see Amadi, 2013). The understanding of the capabilities of the oil-bearing communities in terms of 'what they are willing and able to do' for a living, justifies the suitability of the capability theory in relation to natural resource justice thesis. As a consequence, resource expropriation and environmental degradation (which are unjust) create a negative relationship between oil resource bearing locals and the government.

Several studies have shown that this problem is usually more important in situations characterized by resource marginalization and inequality, which increasingly undermine

capability transformation. For example, UNEP (2011) reinforces patterns of resource injustice in which the environment has been degraded and the soil contaminated. Despite its 2011 report, the clean-up of Ogoni community remains increasingly politicized. Thus, the combined effect of environmental degradation, disempowerment of the Niger Delta youths and increasing youth unemployment (Ebiede,2021), have made both natural resource justice and capability theory useful. In particular, from the theoretical lens of the capability approach, poverty is understood as capability-deprivation.

It is noteworthy that the emphasis is not only on how humans actually function but also on their having the capability, which is a practical choice, to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value (Sen, 2001). For instance, in the post amnesty Niger Delta context, were the ex-combatants given a practical choice, 'to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value'?

Leading proponents of the capability theory such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum postulated ideas overlooked in traditional approaches to the welfare economics. Sen (1985) demonstrates that the framework was conceived in the 1980s as an alternative approach to welfare economics. The central thesis of the capability approach is on what individuals are able to do or put differently, a range of things an individual is capable of doing (Sen, 2001). The relevance of this theory to the natural resource injustice is that the indigenous Niger Delta people are traditionally fishermen and women and farmers who are not only alienated from the natural resources but whose natural environment are degraded. The unjust destruction of their natural environment through capitalist oil resource extraction such as water and land pollution undermine the core sources of livelihood of the people and account for systemic disempowerment, poverty and livelihood vulnerability thereby undermining their capability for subsistence and self-sufficiency. The capability theory is also linked to human development index. According to Alkire, (2009) such indexes are framed within three key indicators of health, education, and income.

An insightful example is provided by the UNDP Niger Delta Human Development report 2006. The report identified poverty and low human development index in the Niger Delta in comparative terms with other oil producing states in the Third World (UNDP, 2006). Thus, capability and human development nexus underscore the underlying essence of fair and just treatment to humanity.

The corresponding effects of the theoretical assumptions of the natural resource justice is that unjust natural resource extraction accounts for environmental degradation and low human development. The Niger Delta context is well documented (see UNDP, 2006). This has led natural resource justice theorists to argue that there is need for distributive justice (Hellstein, 2008). Similarly, Amstrong, (2017) affirms the importance of equitable share of the benefits and burdens from natural resources to promote greater equality across the world, and governance of many important resources. In our context both theories are central to sustainable peace building. The arguments in this study will follow these theoretical perspectives.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section examines existing viewpoints on the concepts of natural resource justice, capability, and pace building. It identifies gaps in the literature and fills the identified gaps in specific Niger Delta contexts. Debates on natural resource justice focus on dynamics of unjust resource extraction, adverse effects on the natural environment, human and non -human species (See Amadi et al. 2014; Sweetan & Ezpelata, 2017). The role of natural resource justice is crucial because the hegemonic power, control and distribution of natural resources can have an asymmetrical and deleterious implication on the polity particularly the oil-bearing communities. This accounts for crisis and resource wars.

Understanding resource justice is central to peace building. Resource justice is a research approach which specifically engages with the causes and consequences of exploitation, uneven power relations over natural resources and the environment. This study conceives natural resource justice as "the study of dynamics of natural resource extraction, distribution and outcomes, and various positions stakeholders occupy in resource distribution chain. "Resource justice" as one of the key areas of sustainable development is an ethical concept which seeks to understand the fair use of natural resources as well as its effects on the natural environment, human and non-human species. Other key concepts (eco labeling, environmental security, resource, equity, feminist ecology, peace building, inequality, ecological rights, violence etc) are relevant in exploring strands of natural resource justice. Following natural resource perspective, the effect of environmental change on society (including conflict) is always socially mediated, and environmental factors are generally considered as context (or consequences) rather than cause (see Bassett, 1988). In contrast, researchers from natural resource justice studies have often sought to determine the causal factors and dynamics of injustice associated with capitalist resource exploitation (Shiva, 1988).

This is often centered on inequality and capitalist resource exploitation (Kovel, 2000). Resource justice debates have accounted for increasing concern on greening (Fairhead, et al; 2012, Amadi, et al, 2014), most notably in relation to the concept of environmental degradation and alienation. Relatedly, the literature on 'resource scarcity', applies to a wide range of resources such as water, land or renewable resources and related shock and tension arising from limited supply or availability of such resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999). As a result, the question regarding resource justice and peace building is often focused on critiques of capitalist resource exploitation. This is evident in debates about exclusion, marginalization and concerns regarding inclusive resource extraction.

The arguments on resource inequality have been made from a gender perspective. According to Sweetan and Ezpelata (2017:357), "women's marginalization from natural resource governance and decision-making profoundly harms the ability of development planners and policymakers to assess the impact of resource extraction on communities".

In the Niger Delta context, dominant studies have examined resource conflict in relation to sustainable development (see Ukaga, Ukiwo & Ibaba, 2014), natural resource injustice though

evident across the region has been less discussed in recent scholarship. Not many studies in the literature have captured this and many others, have inspired scholars to focus more closely on exploring how dynamics of natural resource extraction could have lethal implications and which mechanisms should be implemented to ensure the alignment of natural resource and degradation trajectories among the oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta (UNEP, 2011).

In fact, minority oil bearing communities as in the Niger Delta have been exposed to environmental risks arising from degradation such as water and land pollution, gas flaring and acid rain etc. The literature on environmental degradation in the Niger Delta suggests that the oil-bearing communities remain vulnerable and their opportunities to be fully involved in decision making process is minimal thereby oil proceeds rarely benefit them (Onwuka, 2005). Other studies in the literature have examined arguments on resource curse (Ross, 1999; Obi, 2010; Amadi & Alapiki, 2014) to provide evidence that natural resource abundance does not always translate to wealth. These studies in the literature help to understand the various contexts natural resource justice debates have been explored. There are several incidents of resource injustice some of these are largely linked to various patterns of natural resource extraction. For example, compensation for prospecting for oil among the local communities is often contested and conflicting. Amnesty International (2018) has provided evidence of "non-transparency' in much of the dealings of the multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta. Such occurrences include gas flaring, soil contamination, oil spill deforestation etc.

Thus, capitalist resource expropriation undermines their subsistence and livelihood (Amadi, 2013). In this context, research on the relation between natural resource justice and capability has highlighted the importance of the resource rights, equal access, transparency, which can guarantee the involvement of all stakeholders. For instance, Sweetan and Ezpelata (2017) argue that to achieve natural resource justice, political and business leaders must be accountable to all.

Equally insightful from capabilities approach, is notion of human development (Alkire, 2009) human dignity and wellbeing (Nussbaum, 2011), the latter can integrate employment creation, sustainable livelihoods and some of the insights offered by resource justice, to overcome conflicts and strengthen peace building. Capability is also useful in understanding indigenous autonomy in relation to socioeconomic and –environmental resources and wellbeing (Alkire, 2009; Nussbaum, 2011; Binder & Binder, 2016). For instance, Central to Sen's (2001) analysis of the capabilities approach is an emphasis on freedom and individual choices on what an individual can do.

For Sen, it is essentially the freedom character of human endeavor that accounts for an individual's ability to achieve results in terms of various activities particularly wellbeing and survival. Similarly, Nussbaum (2001), argued quite explicitly that an individual's willingness to establish binding ties with each other hinged on their shared capabilities is central to collective wellbeing. Capability is both a means and an end. Nussbaum, (2020) puts forward an explicit social analogy in understanding human capability which largely determines the specific capability of an individual. On this basis Arneson, (2020) attempts to link the

capabilities approach to political liberalism emphasizing the conceptual nexus of the term capability with freedom.

Particularly significant is the "open" and "reciprocal" character of the capability approach. The capability thesis, as Binder (2019) suggests, is linked to freedom and a distinctively liberal trajectory, as Arneson (2020) observed, since it is consensual, integrative and cooperative, rather than coercive. Capability agency, specifically, individual freedom of choice and ability to engage in self- sustaining or provisioning activity is thus central to the capability approach (Binder,2019). Alkire's conception of capability shares some broad affinities with Sen's and Nussbaum's which also emphasizes individuals' consensual aspects as central to the specific socioeconomic features of human development (see Alkire, 2013). According to Sen (2001) capability is achieved through institutional enablers and values concomitant to individual's ability to substantially engage on what he has the ability to do. This neo liberal perspective has broadened the scope of recent scholarship on capability (see Byskov,2017; Arneson, 2020) alongside features in the social apparatuses, aimed at establishing a socio-economic community" (Byskov, 2020). Providing ontological primacy to the social relations and productive forces, capability nonetheless shares Sen's emphasis on social emancipation as the social basis in which capability is constructed and consolidated. Moreover, both Sen and Nussbaum's accounts tend to focus on the internal features of the individual in assessing the overall character of human wellbeing and ability in development contexts.

In this context, both conventional and mainstream perspectives converge around the idea that capability is essential in strengthening and consolidating a world economic order (Claassen, 2011; 2018; Byskov, 2020). For example, Claassen (2018) provides possible evidence of capability in just Society. The central postulation suggests that capability thrives in a just society. Whilst there are important insights offered by both Sen and Nussbaum in their various accounts, both perspectives say little about institutional constraints such as corruption in their respective historical schema and, more importantly, omit any conceptualization of the issues of moral values in their theoretical schemas.

This not only weakens their respective analyses especially in the developing countries but also serves to misconstrue the character and evolution of capability. In the Niger Delta, this historical-cum-theoretical gap has been evident in resource transparency as corruption and resource rents account for resource injustice and similar causal sequencing regarding the construction of resource injustice. Thus, resource injustice constitutes the actual causal trigger of degradation and resource conflict. This remains a key driver in understanding political economy of resource injustice, development constraint and vulnerability in the region. And while these are connected to exploitation there are equally strands of corruption and non - resource transparency (see Amnesty International, 2018).

On its part, the term peace building has been examined from various perspectives. The evolution of the concept of peacebuilding is traced to the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. As inter-state wars came to an end, post -Cold War intra state conflicts within borders, such as inter-ethnic violent conflicts that could no longer be attributed to superpower rivalry persisted.

Thus, the question regarding bringing about lasting peace to such local conflicts remains an issue (Kaldor, 2012). This concern constitutes the root of contemporary concept of peacebuilding, popularized by the United Nations in the post-Cold War era to bring collective violence within as well as across states to an end (Grävingholt, Gänzle & Ziaja, 2009).

Peacebuilding encompasses measures in the context of emerging, current, or post-conflict situations for the explicit purpose of preventing violent conflict and promoting lasting and sustainable peace (DAC, 2005). Gawerc (2006) identifies a wide range of theoretical and concrete perspectives in peacebuilding emphasizing the theoretical and policy relevance of the concept. Although prior studies have examined complex environmental degradation in the Niger Delta as well as resource conflicts (UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011), this article argues that when we try to build consensus on peacebuilding , there is need to make a distinction between the following issues: a) natural resource justice as an evolving   academic agenda, which focuses on the issues of equality, transparency and accountability in resource extraction; b) Natural resource justice as a globally expanding phenomenon emphasizing distributive justice – or inclusive resource access and control as a modality for collective consensus for peace building; c) capability as an attempt to strengthen freedom or peoples' choices on "what they are able to do for a living" provides normative set of subsistence and values putting people first in development principle and practice (See Sen,1985).

Against the backdrop of our reviewed literature, there is a gap in the literature on linkages between natural justice, capability, and peace building in the Niger Delta. To contextualize our analysis, we primarily examine the discourses on resource justice, capability, and peace building in the Niger Delta. As such, our contribution to the literature remains more of a review and comparative analysis, with focus on how natural resource justice and capability can foster sustainable peace in the Niger Delta. Our foray into the likelihood of resource justice and institutionalization of peace in the volatile region stems from the issues of injustice and marginalization, which are common strands of resource agitation in the region.

 Thus, resource justice and capability thesis can make distinct and original contributions to both an understanding of peace building and dynamic of environmental degradation, inequality, poverty and overall policy response on resource marginalization. For instance, Amadi and Alapiki (2018), argued that natural resource policies in Nigeria are either weak or their enforcement is ineffectual. The quality of environmental protection provided to minority oil bearing communities largely depends on statutory provisions and the extent to which such statutes are enforceable (Amadi & Alapiki, 2018). This means that to ensure natural resource justice, environmental protection is not only important but it is essential that laws define resource justice and also an efficient institutional mechanism to implement such policies and guarantee the protection of the oil-bearing communities against resource expropriation, degradation and similar injustice.

PATTERNS OF NATURAL RESOURCE INJUSTICE IN THE NIGER DELTA

Natural resource injustice encompasses all forms of unjust use of the natural resources such as destruction of the ecosystem including deforestation, resource marginalization of the host communities, gas flaring, soil contamination, water pollution, land pollution etc., which have manifold adverse effects on humans, the natural ecosystem and non -human species. The Niger Delta context provides a complex understanding of the various ways the dynamics of oil resource extraction accounts for natural resource injustice.

Oil resource extraction in the Niger Delta started in 1956 following the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in Oloibiri a community in present day Bayelsa State. Since the 1970s crude oil has been a major foreign resource earner accounting for over 95% of total revenue for Nigeria. However, the evidence that follows suggests natural resource injustice. Unequal revenue allocation is a strand of resource injustice. Despite the huge revenue that accrues from oil, Nigeria has unequal revenue allocation formula, which is not based on derivation as basis of revenue allocation. In this context, oil-bearing locals are systemically marginalized with only 13% revenue allocation. Nigeria's asymmetrical revenue allocation formula accounts for resource agitation. The ideals of distributive justice are essential because, on the one hand, resource extraction involves several stakeholder groups, not only the oil majors and the federal government but the local oil-bearing communities in whose soil the oil is extracted.

On the other hand, the overall replenishing of the natural environment in terms of ecological balance and harmony with nature in a sense of sustainable development and consensus, must also form part of the natural resource justice discourse. Soil contamination and non-clean-up. The non-clean- up of Ogoni, an oil polluted community in the region exemplifies resource injustice. A clear evidence of resource injustice has been the failure of the federal government to effectively implement the Ogoni clean-up. There is evidence of massive soil contamination among Ogoni communities thus oil spill has given rise to water and land pollution (see UNEP, 2011). Soil contamination arising from oil spill has accounted for livelihood vulnerability including low crop yield and decimation of aquatic creatures.

Thus, natural resource values and divergent concepts of justice could help mitigate resource injustice by building particular resource justice principles across various stakeholder groups by advancing related concepts central to resource justice such as resource accounting, ecological efficiency and distributive justice (Amadi, Igwe &Wordu, 2014). These concepts tend to be marginal factors in social and ecological constructs in the Niger Delta. Their application may vary from one polity to another, and importantly based on varying ecological worldviews, belief systems and values. In the oil rich developing societies of the global south such as the Niger Delta, it is widely accepted that natural resource justice remains illusory. This implies that there are contradictions in practical terms regarding implementation of resource justice policies in the region.

Water pollution is an aspect of resource injustice. According to UNEP (2011:6) "in a significant number of locations, serious threats to human health from contaminated drinking water to

concerns over the viability and productivity of ecosystems". Amadi, et al. (2014), has provided illuminating insights regarding natural resource dilemmas of resource degradation that the Niger Delta faces in resource extraction contexts.

These complex degradation accounts for resource related conflicts between the local oil-bearing communities and the oil multinationals on one hand and the local oil-bearing communities among themselves on the other. While simultaneously exploring the overall vulnerability of these communities to water and land pollution, acid rains, gas flaring, deforestation in relation to rural livelihoods and ecosystem transformation. UNEP's (2011) flagship report for example comes handy in understanding the various forms and incidence of resource injustice in rural communities such as Bodo in Gokana Local Government Area, where land contamination and non-clean up by the federal government and oil multinational continues to threaten the eco system, human and non-human species (UNEP, 2011). This accounts for conflicts that have unleashed   more suffering and harm to the oil-bearing localities. For instance, in several cases there have been conflicts not only arising from degradation but from oil rents accruing to the communities. Such conflicts have been common and causes further vulnerability, natural resource dilemmas and contradictions to resource justice and transparency. In fact, resource injustice could be equated to a violation of ecological rights of the oil-bearing communities.

The lives of most oil-bearing communities are actually threatened because of issues such as gas flaring, oil spill, deforestation and coastal flooding (UNDP, 2006). From the point of view of capability, the survival of the local communities are undermined in situations where issues such as soil contamination pervade as the local communities derive their subsistence from tilling the soil (UNEP, 2011) The principles of resource justice, distributive justice, equity, and non-degradation are challenged by the local realities and concepts of sustainable rural livelihood (Chambers and Cornway, 1992; Scoones, 1998, Amadi, 2018), capabilities, human dignity and well-being (Sen, 2001; Nausbaum, 2020;Arneson, 2020).

Another example shows the problems of gas flaring applying the promotion of the principle of resource justice globally, or across cultural borders, shows that gas flaring contravenes resource justice. Debates on natural resource injustice posit that justice accounts for not only how the natural resources are extracted but the consequences of such extraction (Claassen, 2020). Most Niger Delta rural communities have witnessed terrible struggle for survival in contexts related to water pollution. For instance, soil contamination usually affects children under five, as well as pregnant women. Decline in fishery has accounted for livelihood distortion among fishing communities in the Niger Delta such as Oyorokoto the largest fishing post in West coast of Africa (Amadi, 2018).

The moral value that the capability approach gives to livelihood and human development (Alkire, 2009) is based on preserving dignity of man in the context of ability to engage meaningfully in all forms of activities that could enhance their survival. In this context, human development and survival are essential, not only to preserve human existence but also to uphold

the values that make human life meaningful including existential realities, social coherence, and decent social standards.

All in all, natural resource justice can be seen as essential for resource conflict resolution since it is inclusive and accountable. Therefore, as part of capability context natural resource justice privileges the marginalized groups, individuals and communities in contexts linked to maximization of what they can do for survival- 'capability'. Thus, adopting a very specific perspective of resource justice – one that essentially deals with individual or collective ecological rights, rather than exclusion, marginalization, resource plunder and exploitation. Capability theorists have criticized the dominance of capitalist exploitation (Sen, 1985) by emphasizing the need to bring out the potentials of individuals and groups in our context the local oil-bearing communities and unemployed youths. Thus, while capability has remained the dominant approach to human development – particularly within the marginalized and poor communities – there have been similar modes of human survival such as the livelihoods framework (Chambers & Conway,1992; Sccones, 1998) and new approaches to resource justice, that can bring wider and more inclusive approaches to resource conflict resolution particularly in local contexts. The persistent environmental degradation and its consequences has been less conceptualized from the natural resource justice perspective.

Recent environmental trends in the Niger Delta suggest that the 1990s and 2000s have witnessed complex environmental degradation (UNDP, 2006, UNEP, 2011). Local resistance to stem the tide of environmental pollution, acid rains, gas flaring, water and land degradation has been elusive. For instance, in 1990 a pan Ogoni association –the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed, other similar local resistant groups include Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Southern Minorities Forum, The Association of minority States, the Committee of Oil Producing Areas, the Ijaw Ethnic National Rights Protection Organisation, the Movement for Reparation to Oloibiri (Suberu, 2006).

As a consequence, protests and demonstrations persisted including violent attacks by local Justice and Environmental Movement Organisations (JEMOs). Allen, (2010) in his study found that the situation worsened since the beginning of the 1990s as foreign and local oil company workers were taken into hostage regularly. For instance, Allen, (2010:2) reports that in April 2002, an Ijaw armed gang in Ekeremor took ten expatriates working for Shell hostage. And that on the 11th of November 2003, nine crew members working for Shell and four military escorts of oil barges were kidnapped by armed members of JEMOs in Bomadi, Bayelsa State.

These gaps which account for resource injustice continue to fuel post amnesty violence. Natural resource justice has been concerned primarily with creating an equal opportunity for resource access, use and control. Thus, the key issues have been how to strike a balance in resource access between oil multinationals, the federal government and the oil-bearing communities. Proponents of natural resources and war argue that there is a strong linkage between resource injustice and civil wars (Keen, 1998; Brown, 2006).

TOWARD A CONVERGENCE BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCE JUSTICE AND CAPABILITY AS A PEACEBUILDING FRAMEWORK

While the term resource justice and capability in relation to post conflict peace building remains a less studied area in development studies and peace and conflict in particular, it will be proper to attempt a possible linkage especially as a peacebuilding framework. The most relevant convergence between natural resource justice and capability is the interrelated perspective they adopt namely human and non- human resource development. The natural resource justice observes three key strands of justice encompassing environmental, human, and non- human species with emphasis on issues of resource rents, distribution, access, environmental security, hazards and risks, and a rule-based framework for socio-economic development. Capability equally emphasizes human and natural resource enhancement through wellbeing, freedom sustainability, and livelihoods. Sen's capability approach is a moral framework. It proposes that social constructs and interactions should be directed primarily to the freedom people have to achieve functions they value. Thus, in Sen's (2001) perspective the capability approach is a framework that involves two core normative claims. First, the assumption that freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance. And second, that freedom to achieve well-being must be framed in term of people's capabilities. In essence, this is based on opportunities to do or be what they value.

This aptly justifies the basis for linking natural resource justice to the capabilities approach. Among the key elements of the capability is what Sen (2001) termed functional capabilities or "substantive freedoms", which is different from limited freedom that is hardly operationalized. In the Niger Delta context, the oil-bearing localities should have "absolute" freedom to control oil on their soil against institutional constraints posed by the political elite and the capitalist oil multinationals. This, as Sen, (2001) pointed out includes engaging in economic transactions, or participating in political activities; these are construed in terms of the substantive freedoms people have reason to value, instead of utility (happiness, desire-fulfillment or choice) (income, commodities, assets). The repressive state policies through coercion and degradation of the environment are evidence of natural resource injustice and abuse. Capability, conversely, is concerned with strengthening an individual's capacity on what the individual can willingly do, thus capability cannot thrive in an unjust social order. This injustice in the Niger Delta context continues to fuel disgust, agitation, and violent conflicts.

Thus, it is only when resource justice is served that human capability could be developed and peacebuilding can thrive. This interwoven framework for peacebuilding is essential for policy makers seeking for ways to build sustainable peace in the Niger Delta. For instance, resource injustice in the Niger Delta has made, Borofice, (2008:15) to argue that for an area in conflict such as the Niger Delta, a sustainable development approach to resolving the conflict would entail addressing a range of issues: the problem of food security; shelter for displaced people; expansion of health and education services; repair and construction of roads, rail and communication; and establishment of emergency response systems. As he notes, "these key areas are fundamental to the sustainable development of the society's cultural practices and the natural environment in pre-and post-conflict."

Similarly in 2011, the UNEP report provided a wide range of evidence suggesting resource injustice. Consequently, there have been resurgence of post amnesty militant groups following state lethargy and resource injustice. Ebiede and Langer, (2017) demonstrate how amnesty efforts in the Niger Delta triggered new violence, exemplified with the emergence of a new post amnesty militant group namely the Niger Delta Avengers in 2016.The group reopened attacks on oil facilities in Warri area of the Niger Delta. Similar to this, is the recent attack on November 2021 on the oil facility of Agip by a new militant group called the Bayan Men (Odiegwu, 2021). Thus, despite obvious differences in focus, wording and context, natural resource justice and capability share a common point of reference, namely human and natural resource development with social peace contexts. Moreover, both concepts are linked and similar with regard to the notion of freedom and equality essential to peacebuilding. Both terms, if adequately understood and applied in the Niger Delta context can help protect the natural environment, preserve the social contract embodied in natural resource governance and in particular the much-needed resource transparency advocated by NEITI. Essentially, resource justice extends to both gender rights, human rights, and natural resource rights. All these will promote and institutionalize post amnesty peacebuilding.

Figure 1 below provides a diagrammatical exegesis of key considerations in respect of natural resource justice and the capabilities framework.

Figure 1: Natural Resource Justice and Capabilities Framework

As the above figure 1 shows, the four quadrants of natural resource justice and capabilities framework-*Distributive Justice; Capacity Building; Sustainable Environmental Consumption,*

Public-Private Partnership - must coincide and work in sync for true empowerment, emancipation, and distributive justice to take place. This matrix, therefore, appears to be a sine qua non for sustainable peace, progress, and development in the Niger Delta.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to provide possible links between natural resource justice and capability, it particularly identified patterns of resource injustice in the Niger Delta and advanced natural resource justice and capability frameworks as alternatives. Thus, while there have been efforts at creating peace in the region, much of the essence regarding natural resource justice in contexts linked to capability for peacebuilding have been a missing research and policy agenda in the Niger Delta. While there is evidence of post amnesty violence, the options for resource justice have been in the margins. The point this article has been emphasizing is that there might be less likelihood of peacebuilding without first addressing the question of resource injustice. Thus, efforts at peacebuilding have sidestepped natural resource justice accounting for post- amnesty violence.

In essence, it appears that natural resource justice remains less transformative or non-existent in the region. However, natural resource justice if institutionalized has inherent transformative features that can lead to the building of human capability and radical transformation of the local oil resource bearing communities of the Niger Delta. While a transformative perspective would entail changes in the patterns and dynamics of existing natural resource appropriation, there are no universal principles in natural resource justice practice. Thus, there is need for the possibility of providing some specific shared principles that could strengthen capabilities of the local oil-bearing communities and in particular mitigate natural resource injustice.

Alternatively, for a sustainable transition- a broader 'homegrown' approach to natural resource justice, with a recognition of the vulnerability, livelihoods, basic needs and transformation of ex-combatants to sustainable social life is sought. Such an approach can be used to engage the ex-combatants with varied perceptions of livelihood, risk, and vulnerability factors to develop priorities for post conflict peace policy. This paper speaks to post conflict vulnerability, conflict mitigation, stakeholders, and policy makers. It has demonstrated that the recognition of natural resource justice and existential conditions of ex-combatants are central to sustainable peace building. The central point the paper has been emphasizing is that with natural resource justice, equity, accountability, and fairness would be served among stake holder groups and this will inevitably check mutual suspicion, resource conflict and conversely strengthen sustainable peace. Thus, natural resource justice could be applied locally and globally depending on the different social contexts, existential realities as well as particular interpretation of values involved.

In the Niger Delta context, there is still a tendency to deploy natural resource justice, such clamor is suitable for sustainable peace not merely in a normative context but in socio-economic realities where equity and transparency in natural resource access and use is essential. Researchers, social justice crusaders, and civil society groups may propagate natural resource justice as a strand of resource transparency of NEITI and in particular, recognize that the quest for natural resource justice is to build sustainable peace and preserve the eco system for both human and non-human species including the flora and fauna. Furthermore, in terms of public policy efficacy, deliberate, honest, and proactive engagement between the federal government and the oil multinationals is necessary to implement extant laws and global best practices in resource utilization and environmental protection.

This implies development of conscientious policies, public-private initiatives, responsibility, and accountability matrix that are geared towards fostering investment in green and carbon-neutral technologies with realistic targets akin to the UK net-zero legislations and regulations. This sustainability strand can be seen by the Antaco (UK Company) Hydro-Thermal Carbonization (HTC) technology that converts all kinds of organic wastes (wet and dry) to activated carbon, used to purify, dechlorinate, decolorize and deodorize, liquids and vapor (gases) applications as well as boilers for heating systems and industrial plants. This carbon-neutral HTC coal or biofuel is similar in heat value to fossil coal and is indeed a direct replacement to it. This is not only guaranteeing renewable energy through biomass conversion, but also, environmentally friendly, more energy, and cost-efficient providing employment opportunities and promoting the green economy. This restorative and symbiotic context of resource utilization, responsible environmental consumption and public-private partnership is intrinsic in our conceptualization of resource justice and capability theorems.

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WOMEN AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY THE CASE OF JOINKRAMA, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper examined the role of women in conflict management in a patriarchal society - Joinkrama (Ahoada West Local Government Area of Rivers State, Nigeria), using data generated from copies of questionnaire and focus group discussions. The research contributes to the body of knowledge in the field of conflict management in rural communities by assessing the extent to which patriarchal practices have hindered women's involvement in local conflict management and peacebuilding processes. The primary conclusion is that women play limited role in the management of conflicts, as patriarchy remains a key factor, dominating nearly every traditional governance institution in the area of study. The most common source of conflict in the four villages of study (Ususu, Isua, Odawu and Edagberi) is the struggle for farmland. In addition, people struggle for land to build houses, and for keeps. Other sources of conflict include scuffle for chieftaincy stool, market square disputes and cultism. The least is family conflict. Violent conflict is not common in these villages. The study recommends, among other things, that women's contributions to family and village leaders' meetings for inter-personal dispute resolution be given more consideration by villagers. Furthermore, women groups at the village level should seek and advocate for more participation in such meetings, particularly where conflicts affect them as victims.

Keywords: Women, Conflict management, Patriarchal society, Joinkrama, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

Conflict is an integral part of social life. This reality is hardly debatable in the context of human nature, characterized by daily challenges in fulfilling basic needs and pursuing the dreams of life. Too often, they lead to disagreements and competing systems and interests. In addition, in any environment where resources are scarce, the everyday struggle for access to these resources would mean a lot of conflict and peace. Incompatible goals, values and interests are the clear reflections of conflict, with implications for interpersonal relations in a world of endless struggles for a better life. Individuals pursue their interests differently. While some follow general and specific peaceful orientations, others can rely on different categories of approaches that aggravate relationships and make conflict resolution longer than necessary. For some, their approach is highly exclusive, since the main players in the conflict are undermined to the detriment of society. Each conflict has a unique context and factors that are important for understanding the conflict at hand, the role of actors in the conflict and its management.

The Peace and Conflict Studies sub-area has a key interest in explaining conflicts in terms of nature, causes, dynamics, impact, and management or transformation. Conflict management methods differ based on type, actors and culture. Moreover, the level of development of societies, education, interests, values, problems and several other factors tends to define the nature of conflicts and their management. Conflicts can be intra-personal, interpersonal, or take the form of group against group, domestic, family, national and international. It happens on every level of the human relationship.

Conflict can refer to disagreements between the parties on an issue of mutual interest. Schellenberg (1996) described social conflict as situations where groups and individuals are in opposition to issues of interests, differences and even identities. In our day-to-day lives, we are sometimes involved in some form of conflict management, consciously or unknowingly. Recently, community disputes have increased. Some have been of ethnic/cultural origin, some religious, land/boundary adjustments, others are the feelings of deprivation and marginalization amongst others. However, various communities have made and continue to make efforts to curb the growing level of community conflict.

Since conflicts do not discriminate against age, gender, educational qualification, marital status, tribe, social status and so on, all hands must be on deck to bring about resolutions when they occur or to try to prevent them from escalating into violent conflicts. Various communities participate in a few activities that bring them together (for example, trade). Disagreements can occur during such activities. In Africa, men are generally considered heads of households. They are thus often entrusted with the responsibility of managing conflict in the family. While that is true, women also have a role to play in the peace process. The home is the first point of reference for conflict management. People who have self-control values are sometimes regarded as having the capacity to prevent and manage conflict.

Speaking to a Tide Newspaper reporter, Maina (2013), a one-time Minister of Women Affairs and Social Development in Nigeria, called for the inclusion of women in peace-making and

peacebuilding. In other words, women should be included in every peace process. The idea is that women can be viable contributors to protecting lives and property. At the same time, women and children are the most vulnerable in conflicts. Their voices should therefore be heard in peacebuilding processes. Ogoloma and Ukpere (2011) have argued that women are the first in the peacekeeping process because of their role in childcare. Their femininity and closeness to children have been proposed as strengths for interventions as peacemakers in families. This natural capacity can be exploited and channeled appropriately into conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes.

The global awareness on the need for men and women to be mutually recognized and involved in development processes has increased. Such developments owe much to various international conferences such as the one in 1985 in Nairobi, and Beijing in 1995. Others include the United Nations' commitment to the issue of gender in development. This means that societies or countries should have long started to plan their governance institutions and practices to reflect the interest and contributions of men and women. Gender perspectives on economic, political, social, and general development issues in the form of inclusiveness of men and women in decision-making, have become a major theme in national and international discourses. Access for men and women to key decision-making institutions in formal and informal contexts has remained fundamentally flawed by inequality. The notion that everything is about a man's world has been challenged but the literature and practices tend to continue to show that only little progress has been made.

The exclusion of women in peace processes will sum up to discrimination and marginalization. This will slow down development processes and deny society the benefits from the potential women have to drive change in society. In countries like Burundi, Somalia, and Sudan, where violent conflict has ravaged society, women groups have agitated with much lobbying, consistency and persistence to be a part of the peace process (Agbalajobi, 2009). In many countries, modest achievements of increased representation of women in decision-making bodies at the formal and informal settings have raised the profile of such countries as making progress. But all of this seems to have amounted to only little or marginal progress.

Managing conflict is a critical aspect of life, particularly in countries troubled by violent conflict. Conflict management by women and men is still an enormous aspiration in the interest of peace and development. Yet in many parts of the world, women continued to play a small or often excluded role in key development decision-making processes. In a patriarchal society, where institutions of governance and conflict management promote male dominance and authority, what role can women play in bringing about peace or resolving conflicts? What is the impact of patriarchy on women involvement in the management of conflict? This study tries to answer these questions by focusing on the case of Joinkrama communities in the Ahoada West Local Government region of Rivers State, Nigeria.

Although patriarchy, as a source of gender inequality, continues to define both the theoretical and empirical feminist literature, there is an interesting emerging body of literature on the role of women in conflict management, during and after conflict in many parts of the world,

including Africa (Osita, 2015, Moran 2010; and Richter-Devroe 2008). Issifu (2015) has given a graphic account of how women contributed to the peacebuilding process during and after the genocide in Rwanda in 2004. The issue, however, is that women, girls and children have been presented more as victims in violent conflicts and less as active parties in addressing the problem of violent conflict (Puechguirbal 2005, p.1; Wokoma 2005, p.167). Adequate attention has not been given to women as peacemakers or peacebuilders. The minor segment of the empirical literature pointing to women's role in the management of violent conflict, identifies outstanding activities of women's rights groups working to influence peace in countries affected by war or violent conflict, by focusing on resolving the burden on women and girls. For example, the *Mano River Women's Network* has worked hard to provide women with opportunities to be part of peacebuilding in Eastern Africa (Puechquibal, 2005).

Similarly, *Women's Initiative for Gender Justice* has promoted the value of women and girls in Liberia, particularly in war-affected areas. They have been involved in peacebuilding and public decision-making platforms in their country. Their activities are visible and very impactive (Shulika, 2016). Women organisations are increasingly emerging to provide a voice for women. This is not surprising. The literature points to the rising gender equality question in context of development. Now, progress at closing gender inequality varies across countries. The issue is as much a matter of justice and democracy under law in parts of the world (Desmond and George-Williams, 2005). Women have acquired new roles as actors in conflict management especially after violent crisis. They are actively playing the role of reconciliation at the community, national and international levels. That was the case in Uganda and Somalia, where war tends to have made women bolder in speaking out for peace, though some also joined as combatants in the attempt to resolve the conflict. Women in those countries took up new roles as breadwinners and decision makers on behalf of their families as their husbands left for battle with some meeting their deaths and being unable to return alive. Women in those places have challenged the decisions of men concerning peace and mobilized fellow women against war because of the huge suffering they and their children have endured from war.

In many instances, women have played combat roles in violent conflicts such as in Sierra Leone, Somalia and in Liberia where they played key roles in bringing the Liberian war to an end both as combatants and peace activists. Women have also been involved in many national struggles for freedom, which, for example, have led to their involvement in the formal decision-making processes of the Mugabe led government following Zimbabwe's Attainment of political freedom.

Elsewhere, Ethiopia has been noted as a country in Africa with a rich history of women's involvement in conflict management. Women have played roles as victims of violent crisis and as combatants. History shows that women took an active part in the war against Italy after her invasion of Ethiopia between 1935 and 1936. But even before that invasion, the 14th-century era saw women as advisors to the Ethiopian king on various issues. The conflict with Italy between 1936 and 1941 saw the involvement of women as well (Adugna, 2001). *The Ethiopian women Welfare Association* was formed in response to a clarion call by Haile Selassie 1, that women get involved in the war to protect their country. A parallel women organisation, by the

name of *Ethiopian Women's Volunteer Service Association,* was formed almost the same time. These organisations did not waste time participating in the conflict at that time. They played significant roles as nurses, cooks, intelligent officers and soldiers during the conflict.

In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, women groups have utilized non-violent peacebuilding techniques to promote resolution of the conflict (Ikelegbe, 2005). Account in studies conducted have shown that since the violent conflict between armed groups, on the one hand, and oil companies and government, on the other, started, women have found opportunities to speak out and to demand solutions to the problems. Wokoma (2005) claims that, given existing ingrain patriarchal nature of gender relations in the Niger Delta, women's involvement in the conflict represents a significant shift in roles. She further states that culture is an important factor in women activism in the region, as it has, at the same time helped them to resort to formation of socio-cultural groups to which they easily return for mobilization in times of crisis. Those groups easily serve as regular meeting points on which issues affecting them can be discussed and decisions taken.

Two approaches to explaining the role of women or gender in conflict management are readily observable (Richter-Devroe, 2008): The Agency-Base and Structural Approaches. Understanding the first, which sees the activities of women as individuals or members of organisations carrying out activities for the purpose of promoting gender equality, is not complete without looking at structural issues that either promote or hinder those activities. The empirical literature is full of activities of such women and their organisations, as well as societal structures, such as patriarchy, that hinder success in the participation of women in development. By extension, the existence of organisations and activities of individuals interested in pushing the rights of women towards gender equality and the structural issues that tend to have made this difficult to achieve, as quickly as possible, suggest a relationship between practice and theory.

The implication for this study is that patriarchal structures have to be understood in specific contexts as a factor in understanding the role women play in development, and, in this case, conflict management in traditional rural communities. From the agency-based perspective, the role of women in society can be located in their ability to bring change to society. The conflict management literature highlights conflict management strategies in which women play important roles. Both sides of the literature have expanded in recent times, especially since the United Nations Security Council came up with Resolution 1325.

In any case, the structural dimension to gender relations needs adequate understanding with many countries like Nigeria where patriarchy has survived and resisted change at the local and national levels. The agency-based explanation rightly assumes that change and more inclusion of women in decision-making settings can bring improved gender equality. But this, which, in context of the structural factors, is still found in traditional and formal practices, puts a question-mark on getting the best from women and men as equal partners in the business of development (Puechquirbal, 2005).

Despite all these progresses, we are forced to recognize that women are not systematically involved in peace processes and that obstacles to their participation are numerous, ranging from lack of time, status, resources, political experience, and exposure to the burden of traditions. How can we explain why women who are active in the promotion of peace and reconciliation in communities, at the grassroots level, become invisible in official and formal peace processes?

This question and related ones concerning gender and conflict management are yet to be fully addressed. This study will help fill the gap by looking systematically into whether women are active in the management of conflict at the informal and formal fronts in rural communities of the Niger Delta.

Scholars continue to showcase a deep yearning among feminist scholars and activists, to play more role in the development process of countries. Gender perspective to development is being promoted like never before in global arenas, such as the United Nations, its agencies and the donor world. Many governments, as a result, are taking steps to reflect international policy on gender in development. Regarding their role in conflict management, the literature captures the potential of women to make important contributions both in conflict and post-conflict situations. But it is yet to provide an adequate and systematic explanation of how patriarchy hinder women from contributing to peace building in typical rural communities such as those in the Niger Delta, where patriarchal structures have existed for centuries. Against this background, the aim of this study is to assess the impact of patriarchy on the involvement of women in conflict management. Specifically, it examines the nature of conflict among local people in Joinkrama, their patriarchal practices and impact on women, the role of women in conflict management, and the extent to which patriarchy has affected women's involvement in conflict management.

METHODOLOGY

The study covered four villages making up Joinkrama in Engenni of the Ahoada West Local Government Area of Rivers State. The people are part of Engenni Clan, known mainly for their fishing and farming culture. The Engenni kingdom lies on the banks of Orashi River. There are 19 villages in Engenni, all of them settled by the Orashi River. The Okilom-Ibe of Engenni is the paramount chief or traditional ruler of the kingdom, recognized second-class chieftaincy stool. All five federating clans have group-heads known as Okilom-Opiri and the individual communities or villages within the clans have traditional leaders known as Okilom-Akie. Engenni has five clans, namely:

1. Enuedua (Joinkrama)
2. Ogua
3. Ejiro-Ede
4. Ejiro-Ekunu and
5. Ogbogolo clans

There are four villages in Joinkrama, namely, Ususu, Isua, Odawa and Edagberi. The Engenni people speak three main dialects, namely, Ogua, Ejiro and Enuedua, with no significant problem of understanding and communication among those speaking them from the dialect groups. As earlier mentioned, the Engenni people are mainly farmers fishermen and women. They also possess crafts making skills in the areas of canoe-building, basket-weaving and trap-making for both fish and animals. The quota and purposive sampling techniques which are non-probability sampling methods were used for the study. Purposive sampling is a technique that involves handpicking of sample elements (Obasi, 1999), while quota sampling ensures that the chosen sample group or elements cuts across all elements in a proportionate manner and reflects certain characteristics of the population the researcher wants to get data from. These sampling methods were adopted because accurate population figures were not available in these areas.

The researchers chose forty (40) persons from each community with gender as a key consideration. Twenty (20) men and twenty (20) women to whom the questionnaires were administered. A total of one hundred and sixty (160) copies of questionnaire were distributed in the four communities out of which one hundred and thirty-seven (137) were retrieved. Of the 137 retrieved, seventy-three (73) were from the men while sixty-four (64) were from the women. The participants who were invited for the focus group discussion were a total eight (8) persons, two persons from each community and taking into consideration gender sensitivity one (1) male and one (1) female from each community in Joinkrama. The venue of the focus group discussion was Ususu (JoinKrama 1). The justification of the quota sampling technique was the equal number of elements chosen for the study and to reflect the gender characteristics. Another justification for the use of purposive sampling technique was that the researcher needed to concentrate on persons who are literate and knowledgeable in the affairs of conflict resolution in those communities. Also, the rural communities are farming communities.

The period of the research was the planting season and many persons had gone to their farms as such the researcher had to work with those found in the villages at the time of the fieldwork. However, it is proper to state that these sampling methods are not just convenient but are much more informative than most probability sampling methods for this kind of research. The study utilized mainly primary data derived from the questionnaire. It was an interview questionnaire, with open-ended and closed questions. The researcher obtained relevant information by distributing questionnaires one on one. A focus group discussion was also convened as the second instrument of data collection. This was necessary to ensure the interviewer got an in-depth knowledge of the study objectives correctly. The questionnaire was to get the views of respondents as it relates to women and conflict management while the focus group discussion gave the participant the opportunity to air their feelings as it also relates to women and conflict management. This enabled the researcher to know whether or not women participate in conflict management in a patriarchal society like Joinkrama. All were geared towards the researcher achieving the objectives of the research. A combination of these instruments was necessary for the researcher to elicit concrete information concerning the study.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Generally, a theory of patriarchy, which the study adopted as the theoretical framework, is viewed in terms of being a key component of feminist literature in relation to gender equality. The theory has gained wide acceptance in the analysis of gender relations in different settings of human interactions. Patriarchy is a centuries-old practice worldwide. Theoretically, with the assumption of women's subordination in development processes, Africa has received much less attention from researchers than the Western world.

As early as 1405, Christine de Pizan wrote the Book of the City of Ladies, which dealt with the issue of patriarchy as a problem in society. In the same vein, Mary Wollestonecraft wrote A Vindication of the rights of Women in 1792. Both women and their books represented an early attempt at responding to the challenge posed by patriarchy to gender equality from a western perspective (Mclennan, 2011). These writings were however driven by a sense of activism and not by any adequate rigorous scientific processes. In any case, the interest of feminist scholars in gender relations is much about the experiences of women with men in social, economic, and political systems as with the movement or activism that emanated, especially in the mid-nineteen century. This study takes a different position from the activism and feminism which have blurred the dividing line with academic study of gender issues.

Patriarchy is seen in nearly every aspect of human relationships and systems, and has been particularly a subject of advocacy by feminists. There have been waves of women movement, which somehow, have informed the development of the theory of patriarchy, as identified in the literature. First in the United States, between mid-1800s and the 1920s (Mclennan, 2011, p.584). This era was driven by ideologies challenging patriarchy. The Declaration of Rights and emotions around issues that touched on women, regarding the 1848 Seneca Falls Women's Rights Convention is particularly worth noting (Tetrault,2014).[1]

Patriarchal theory, otherwise known as the *radical theory* of feminism, does not only provide a convenient way of approaching common questions around gender inequality, it has a special appeal for this study in specific ways, in the attempt to understand the role of women in conflict management at the micro-level unit of analysis. Review of the theoretical literature shows that concerns by scholars and activists around gender relations have continued to increase, mainly in relation to the experiences of women and men in other parts of the world. The case of Africa, like many other problems of development, seems clearly a fairly recent one.

Conceptual analysis is increasingly a key component in the research. Patriarchy, a conceptual tool and a theory means dominance of social structures or spaces by men to the disadvantage

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[1] The first ever women's rights convention in the United States held on July 19 and 20, 1848, at the Wesleyan Chapel in Seneca Falls New York. It was attended by 200 women and led by two women activists and abolitionists (anti-slavery campaigners), Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady. It was in that convention that grievances of women were declared and voting rights for women demanded in the United States. This did not go down well with the majority of the US population at the time, because of existing patriarchal practices. Many did not see the patriarchal political culture where women did not have rights to vote as an issue.

of women. This is a widely perceived conceptualization that is yet to be adequately applied to the micro settings of communities in a developing country like Nigeria. As insinuated already, many of the scholars associated with feminist theories have written from the background of gender inequality in their countries (Hudson-Weems, 2004; Walby, 1990). Walby is probably one of the most prominent feminist scholars with strong theoretical contributions since the age of Enlightenment. She became popular in the late twentieth century through elaborate theorizing of patriarchy as key determinant of gender relations. She views patriarchy as "a system of social structures, and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women" (Walby, 1989, p. 214).

Earlier views on patriarchy which many believe is an issue that has existed from time immemorial, such as those associated with Max Weber, simply saw it as government dominated by men because of their position as heads of households. This suggests that governmental positions were men's entitlements for being heads of families. Many scholars insist that patriarchy is an authoritative system that deprives women of opportunities to make important contribution to the development of society (Hudson, 2004). Some even see it as a form of violence against women, with implications for restraining them from contributing to positive change in society (Hudson, 2004).

Since Weber's time, through the age of Enlightenment, when feminism grew, to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, feminist theories have advanced, with successes of firm positions on the importance of gender in any development planning across the world. Here, success is relative in terms of the gradual acceptance by governments and non-governmental organisations that gender matters in development. The slow pace of progress in gender relations and women development with men has been explained by this theory. This theory helps this study to make important contributions to understanding the role of women in the management of conflict. To that extent, Walby's six levels of structures of patriarchy was found useful: patriarchal mode of production; patriarchy in paid employments; formal setting (state) patriarchal relations; violence by men against women; patriarchal relations in sexuality; and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions (Walby, 1989).

In terms of production mode, patriarchy manifests in capitalist production settings. Men dominate capitalist productive systems, with women being exploited in the process. In her book, Walby (1989) argues that men benefit from that system to the detriment of women. Within the family, gender relation is unequal. Women do the cheap work in family in order to aid their husbands who must give their labour to the capitalist. But such labour, offered by women in their homes, is usually not accounted for. In fact, it is cheap labour that supports the thriving of capitalist exploitation without a corresponding taste of the profit from capitalist investments to women. The women wash their husbands' clothes, cook for them, and do several other things for them to get them ready for work every morning, without such services factored into the remuneration that goes to their husbands from the work they do for their employers. Mode of production therefore is a cite for manifestation of patriarchy. This thinking, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, has been critiqued for adopting a single factor of production in the analysis gender relations.

On the other hand, patriarchy manifest in paid employment. The practice of paying men more than women in work activities that both have equal potential to deliver is seen to be improper, and as such, patriarchy, where men dominate in the decisions about payment for work done in expectation of salary. Third, patriarchy manifests in state or governmental settings public institutions and policies. The theory of patriarchy captures how this subordinate and hinders women from playing useful roles in development. By implication, the formal setting is crucial in any advancement of the women's role in development and in dealing with issues that render women and men playing commensurate role in changing society for good. The nature of gender relations in any society is to a large extent a function of what the state is doing or not doing to close gaps and bring about improvement. Violence against women may take different shapes, including psychological, verbal, and physical. Such violence is seen as manifestation of patriarchy. Even gender relations in sexuality, where men have to take decisions about sex, and play the dominant role in decisions about reproduction is inferred here as clear manifestation of patriarchy. Finally, the manifestation of patriarchy in cultural institutions, such as is interpreted in this study, corning informal traditional institutions and practices in the management of conflict is critical for understanding how that affects the role of women. This aspect of theory informed the framing of two hypotheses, on the basis of which data were collected and analyzed.

Patriarchy is a key element in nearly all-feminist literature for describing gender relations and normative argument of the ideal in the development of society. A feminist legal theory of patriarchy that situates women's subordination through discriminatory laws and policies in development processes is equally noticed in the literature (Showden 2011 and Chamallas 2003). As early as the 1830s in the United States, women of African origin (feminist theorists) had argued that existing legislations deprived them of rights to participate fully in the political system compared to their white counterparts (Hawkesworth, 2011). This theory has implications for how the law can help reduce gender inequality and challenge patriarchy, even in core traditional societies naïve to western legal mechanisms for dealing with issues of gender relations.

The theory of patriarchy has been critiqued to be too tilted towards explaining the situation in the western world and paying too little attention culturally. It is however useful in this study, for the capacity it has through its key assumptions, to address the key questions of this research. Besides, it helps to fill a gap in the theoretical literature in the case of Nigeria, where the women's movement and ideology is much more recent than many countries in other parts of the world. It is useful for understanding the role of women play conflict management in typical rural non-formal settings. Not only did it help address the research questions and objectives, but the theory's propositions also support the framing of the hypotheses in this work.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The questionnaire and focus group discussion data collection methods used in this study yielded qualitative and quantitative data which have been analyzed and discussed accordingly.

Table 1: Number of copies of questionnaire distributed and retrieved

S/NO	COMMUNITIES	SAMPLE SIZE	RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES		PERCENTAGE RETURNED
			MEN	WOMEN	
1	Ususu	40	20	20	25%
2	Isua	40	20	20	25%
3	Odawu	40	14	5	11.8%
4	Edagberi	40	19	19	23.8%
	Total	160	73	64	= (137)

Source: Field Work, 2017

As indicated in Table 1, a total of one hundred and sixty (160) copies of questionnaire were distributed in the four Joinkrama villages. In Ususu community, forty copies were distributed, and all were retrieved. In the same vein, all Forty distributed in Isua were retrieved. However, in Odawu community, out of the forty copies distributed, only nineteen were retrieved. In Edabgeri community, thirty-eight were retrieved out of the forty copies distributed. The total number of retrieved copies of questionnaire was one hundred and thirty-seven (137), which the author considered adequate for the analyses of the data.

Seventy-three men and sixty-four women responded to the questions on the questionnaire, respectively. The gender dimension is critical. Be that as it may, men were more open-minded and willing. The men were more forthcoming with the answers to the questions asked. On the other hand, females were not as enthusiastic as males. That was true for the women of the Odawu community. The message is that men are more interested in conflict than women. They express themselves better than women, and this is not strange because of the influence of patriarchy rooted in the culture and traditions of the people. This perspective serves as a reminder of what much of the literature suggests about the role of women in conflict management. Literature makes it clear that society is inherently patriarchal, especially in Africa. But it also indicates that there are improvements in women's awareness on issues that affect them.

The study at the level of field data collection was gender sensitive. Conflict affects men and women, a reality that the study acknowledges and helps to understand how the two are also involved in the fight against the causes of conflict. Communal conflicts tend to affect women more than men. This is evident in the burden of care for the family because of the loss of lives, husbands, and male children. Women are even easily raped when conflict becomes violent, and

people need to run away to be safe. The Joinkrama people have no recent history of such violent conflicts, with the remembrance of collective violence. However, on a general note, women who flee for security during conflicts, become vulnerable as often, their host might take advantage of their vulnerability to sexually harass them.

It is instructive to note that women were rather dismissive in attitude concerning their participation in this study. They seemed more preoccupied and interested in personal issues than in the study. This was seen in the number of retrieved questionnaires where women were more culpable. It seems clearly a sign of lack of sufficient interest in matters of gender relations in the management of conflict for which many believe should be the responsibility of the men. Women are less visible in the process of conflict management. They are reserved and slightly withdrawn from issues about how they relate to conflict involving men. In addition, issues of gender relations and conflict in the study area tend to be emotionally laden. The data generated through focus group discussion supports this notion, where women easily became very emotional about their subordinate position in matters, which ordinarily their contributions could be seen to be useful but are usually taken with lack of seriousness by the men.

Table 2. AGE COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS

AGE OF RESPONDENTS	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
A (18 – 24)	3	4	7
B (25 – 34)	12	15	27
C (35 – 44)	24	17	41
D (45 – 54)	16	15	31
E (55 – 64)	14	11	25
F (65 and above)	4	2	6
TOTAL	**73**	**64**	

Source: Field work 2017

The majority of respondents fall within the age group of thirty-five and forty (35 – 44). Forty-one respondents (41) fall within this group. The age group with the least number of respondents is the sixty-five (65) and above, which had just six (6) respondents. Eighteen to twenty-four (18 – 24) group had seven (7) respondents, twenty-five to thirty-four (25 – 34) age range had twenty-seven (27) respondents, forty-five to fifty-four (45 – 54) had thirty-one (31), whereas fifty-five to sixty-four (55-64) group had twenty-five (25) respondents. This figure shows that the respondents were a combination of young and mature adults, knowledgeable in conflict affairs of the communities they belong, and have or may have been involved in one conflict or the other. Some of them were expected to have been involved in the management of those conflicts.

Figure 1. MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS

As shown in Figure 1, seventy-seven (77%) percent of the respondents were married, whereas twenty-percent (20) were single at the time of field work. This is an indication that respondents are responsible adults who should be able to provide good answers to the questions asked. Just a few (3%) are divorced/separated. This tells the researcher that marital conflicts leading to divorce and separation are not prevalent in Joinkrama communities.

Table 3: EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF RESPONDENT

Highest Level of education	Total number	Percentage %
Tertiary	23	17
Secondary	97	71
Primary	5	3
Vocational	8	6
No formal education	4	3

Source: Field work, 2017

Based on the data gathered, only 17% of the respondents have attained tertiary education, 71% secondary education, 3% primary, 6% vocational education and 3% have no formal education. The information above shows that more than seventy percent of the respondents have attained an acceptable level of education and cannot be called illiterates. They have acquired some level of education and would be expected to be in position to make important contributions in the resolution of conflicts from the vantage point better understanding of issues. It is important to

note that education is an advantage in conflict management especially when it comes to mobilizing people for reconciliation.

NATURE OF CONFLICT AMONG THE JOINKRAMA PEOPLE

The majority of participants in this study disagreed with the idea raised by a section of the participants the occurrence of conflict in the communities of study is regular. This suggests the varied understanding people have of conflict. Conflict is part of the reality of the daily life of people, if seen from the perspective of disagreements or pursuit of divergent interests and goals. Violent conflict at group level is something that does not happen all the time. Only 2 persons said that conflicts do not occur at all in Joinkrama which is actually not correct because conflict, as earlier said, is inevitable in society. In any case, what the responses demonstrate is that violent conflict is not common in the four villages making up Joinkrama. The people are peace-loving and prefer a quiet atmosphere to a hostile one. However, it does not rule out the fact that violent conflicts at inter-personal level, among youths, adults occur from time to time. Their experience with conflict, however, suggests at least four types of conflict in the four villages of Joinkrama.

Table 4: Types of conflict

Types of conflicts prevalent in Joinkrama.	Frequency	Percentage %
Land	60	44
Chieftaincy	41	30
Marital/family	6	4
Cult	13	10
Others (Inter - communal crisis, market stores disagreements, association disputes, church disputes and so on).	17	12

Source: Field work, 2017

Table 4 indicates the types of conflicts prevalent in the four communities, namely, chieftaincy tussle, land, cult, marital/family and others (which includes inter-communal crisis, market stores disagreements, association disputes, church disputes and so on) are common areas of conflict in the communities. The most common of these conflicts relate to land issues. A total of sixty (60) respondents, which represents 40% of the sample size, strongly attests to the fact that the most common conflicts were those relating to land acquisition and usage (for farming and building). Struggle to secure personal and family land from those in need of it has become a key concern because of increasing population of people amidst scarcity.

Need for land has increased, making struggle for it a key aspect of conflict in the communities. Forty-one (41) respondents (30%) were of the view that following after land related conflicts is the struggle for traditional stool. The highest stool in Engenni Clan is the *Okilom-Ibe of Engenni* (in charge of all Engenni communities). People struggle to become Okilom-Akie (the traditional ruler of villages such as those of the four Joinkrama communities and members of council of chiefs and family elders). These are areas that generate conflict in Joinkrama.

There are other types of conflict, as shown in the aforementioned figure. At least seventeen (17) respondents, which represent 12%, point to this. Thirteen (13) respondents which represent (10%) said cult related conflicts are prevalent. Six (6) respondents (4%) said marital/family conflicts are prevalent conflicts in Joinkrama. The matter of cult related violence may not be as serious as other communities in the Ahoada West and Ahoada East local government areas, but youths from the Joinkrama communities also belong to some of the groups. Incidence of cult violence in these communities is however mainly low and hardly noticed. There have not been inter-cult fighting at group level, and open flaunting of violent weapons such as guns and knives are not common. In any case, what cannot be ruled out is the possible link between cult members in the Joinkrama villages and those from areas where issues of cult activities are more serious.

Land is a major source of conflict in Joinkrama among family members and between individual members of villages. Like many communities in Nigeria, land has continued to be of value. The people attach high importance to it. That agrarian nature of the Joinkrama society and the fact that land is their major source of income and food explains why the people easily get into conflict over land. Many, even those working outside the communities, such as Port Harcourt, tend to have become more interested in securing farmlands at home as a way of helping their family economies, in context of recent economic hardship. Food security is a key driver of the increasing quest for land.

In situations where conflict over land arises, some people easily utilize the services of what they refer to as *Juju priest* by summoning offenders to them. However, because the people of Joinkrama have had early contact with Christianity, many of them would not see Juju as the first point of call-in seeking justice over land matters. Women within families have shown to play important roles by appealing for peaceful resolution of conflicts at personal levels and relationship with those in conflict.

PATRIARCHAL PRACTICES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

On women being equal members with men in village council of chiefs, only 1 respondent strongly agreed. 5 agreed, 55 disagreed and 76 strongly disagreed with this statement. The Village council of chiefs is the highest decision-making body in Joinkrama communities. The survey data reveals that women do not occupy equal positions with the men in the councils. The ruling council is made up of only men. Women cannot become chiefs in any Joinkrama community.

Figure 2. Nature of patriarchal practices in Joinkarama

Regarding whether women are often represented in village and family disciplinary committees, 11 respondents strongly agree, 31 agree, 59 disagree and 36 strongly disagree. This shows that women are not represented in these committees. A total of ninety-five (95), out of one hundred and thirty-seven (137) respondents disagree to women having representatives in disciplinary committees.

On men and women having equal opportunities in the management of conflicts, 5 respondents strongly agree to this statement, 25 agreed to the statement while 68 disagreed and 39 strongly disagreed. The survey exposes the inequality that exists between both genders in the management of conflicts. The ratio between men and women in the management of conflict is 107:30. This reveals that men do not allow women equal opportunities in the management of conflicts. The men have the upper hand and are usually in charge when it comes to conflict management.

On women inheriting properties from their late husbands and being part of decisions about sharing such properties, 29 respondents strongly agree, 47 agree, 41 disagree and 20 strongly disagree that widows inherit properties of late husbands and also have a say in decisions concerning such inheritance. Note that from the responses to this statement, the margin between the agree and the disagree is 'slim' (55% percent as against 45%). Still, some are of the opinion that women should not take part in deciding the inheritance of their late husbands.

Regarding men dominance of institutions where decisions about resolving conflicts are taken, a total of 76 respondents strongly agree, 49 agree, 5 disagree and 7 strongly disagree. The margin between agree and disagree is in the ratio of 125:12. This data shows the nature of patriarchal practices in Joinkrama. It exposes to the researcher that women have little or no voice in these communities when the men are involved. There is a strong male dominance in the area of decision-making in Joinkrama communities. Women occupy little or no position at all when it comes to decision-making in the communities.

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Participants were asked questions to elicit valuable information on the role of women in conflict management.

Table 5. Women and Conflict Management

| QUESTIONS	PROPORTIONS				
	SRONGLY AGREE	**AGREE**	**DISAGREE**	**STRONGLY DISAGREE**	**DECISION**
Men mainly contribute to how conflicts are resolved in chiefs' meetings, family, youth, women and church	50	51	29	7	Agree =101 =74%
Women are hardly given opportunities to be part of decision-making in the management of conflicts.	26	67	31	13	Agree =93 =68%
Women have opportunities to contribute to management of conflict.	22	66	41	8	Agree =88 =64%
Women own land and take decisions about how to use it.	49	40	26	22	Agree =89 =65%

Source: Field work, 2017

Women hardly have opportunities to participate in conflict management and peacebuilding decision-making processes. Meanwhile, they understand that since conflicts can emanate from both genders, the management of them should be a collective effort of both genders – as shown in the table. It means that women are hardly given opportunities in decision-making environments when it comes to conflict management. In reality, they have limited opportunities. 68% of the respondents agree to this while 32% disagree. Men contribute most to how conflicts are resolved in chiefs' meetings, family, youth, women and church. From the data gathered, it is clear that though women can make contributions to conflict management, they cannot take decisions about their contributions. The actual and final decisions concerning conflicts reside with the men. It also means that the contributions made by the women may or may not be accepted.

IMPACT OF PATRIARCHY ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

On whether the dominance of men in the management of peace and conflict affects women's role as conflict managers, 30 respondents to the statements made in the questionnaire, indicated strongly agree, 55 agree, 21 disagree and 31 strongly disagree. The ratio between agree and disagree is 85:52, suggesting a difference of 33, which is slightly below a quarter of the total responses received. This indicates that there is male dominance in the management of conflict. This puts women on a disadvantage which affects their role.

Regarding whether women are members of associations that contribute to peace with or without men, 25 respondents strongly agree, 59 agree, 33 disagree and 20 strongly disagree. The total number of respondents that point women belonging associations is 86 (63% of the respondents). This is also an indicator that women can belong to associations that can contribute to peace with or without men.

Figure 3. IMPACT OF PATRIARCHY

IMPACT OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN JOINKRAMA AND IMPACT OF PATRIARCHY ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The statement "women report cases of abuse to chiefs, family and associations and secure justice with or without male dominance report" received diverse responses from respondents**.** 29 indicated strongly agree, 57 agree, 39 disagree and 12 strongly disagree. Majority of the respondents indicate that women report cases of abuse to chiefs, family and associations to secure justice. Regarding whether dominance of men in conflict management situations prevent women from contributing to peace, 24 respondents indicated strongly agree, 58 agree, 41 disagree and 14 strongly disagree. The ratio between agree and disagree is 82:55, a difference of 27 responses (19.7%), which is less than a quarter of the respondents. Critically analyzing this situation, it can be observed that male dominance does not actually prevent women from contributing to peace. Rather, fewer women contribute to peace processes.

In summary the information gathered is that women in Joinkrama are not active participants in peace and conflict matters. It can be clearly seen from the analysis above that there is male dominance in the management of conflict in the area of study. In any case, women have some opportunities to contribute to peace. All that is required interest.

TABLE 6. EXTENT OF IMPACT OF PATRIARCHY ON WOMEN INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

QUESTIONS	PROPORTIONS				
	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DECISION
Men often do not accept women's position in conflict management.	21	65	39	12	Agree =86 =63%
All too often opposition of women by men has made women to withdraw from conflict management.	**29**	**60**	**32**	**16**	**Agree =89 =65%**
All too often women involvement in conflict management is low due to dominance of men.	**47**	**61**	**18**	**11**	**Agree =108 =79%**

Source: Field work, 2017

Figure 4. PATRIARCHY AND INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Regarding whether men often do not accept women's position in conflict management, 21 respondents indicated strongly agree; 65 agree; whereas 39 indicated disagreed and 12 strongly agree respectively. As things stand, majority are of the view that men do not accept women's position as potential contributors to peace. The data suggest that men are often not willing to accept the position of women in matters of conflict. Data generated from both the questionnaire and focus group discussion support each other on this. It is equally in line what is prevalent in the gender and conflict literature. All too often opposition of women by men has made women to withdraw from conflict management. 29 respondents indicated 'strongly agree,' 60'agree,' while 32 disagreed. 16 indicated 'strongly disagree' on the idea that men's opposition to women affect women's willingness to participate in conflict management. The difference between the 'agree' and 'disagree' responses is 35, which is 26% of the total.

This speaks clearly about the opposition of men to women in Joinkrama when it comes to conflicts, causing   many to withdraw from participating in decisions about resolution of conflicts. Hence their impact is hardly felt in conflict management.

Women involvement in conflict management is low due to several reasons including dominance of men**.** The last statement concerning low women involvement in conflict management due to dominance by men has the following responses: 47 indicated strongly agree and 61 agree. On the other hand, 18 disagree. 11 respondents specified strongly disagree. The difference between category of agree and that of disagree is 79 (58%). This shows that the low involvement of women in conflict management in Joinkrama is mostly attributed to male dominance. In summary, patriarchy has to a large extent negatively influenced women participation in conflict management in Joinkrama. The males dominate when conflict issues arise, giving little or no opportunity to the women to make useful contributions.

As earlier mentioned in the section for methodology, a focus group discussion was organised on 14 January 2017 at Ususu Joinkarma, with eight (8) participants on a gender balance of four men and four women. Each of the four villages in Joinkrama were represented on the basis of one man – one woman, thus making gender sensitivity a key element in the research. Based on discussions, as part of the findings supporting data from questionnaire on the main question of this study, when men gather to discuss an issue, the women are not allowed to be present except when called for. This alone draws the line between both genders on women participation in conflict management. The women are not given any recognizable positions in the communities and so cannot act in any capacity to influence peace rather, they have to refer the matter to the men who take the final decisions which are binding.

In responding to the question of types of conflict common among the people of the community, one of the participants from Edageberi, Mr Eshimkinye Fineboy, pointed to land dispute, a comment that the rest of the participants concurred. But, as found in the data generated with questionnaire, chieftaincy and family conflicts are prevalent too.

When it comes to membership of associations or groups with mandate for addressing conflicts, women are hardly aware of any, except social clubs with that are either men or men as members. No association of women so far takes the responsibility of dealing with the prevailing conflicts in the four communities of Joinkrama. This however does not foreclose or prevent the interest family members sometimes show in settling family conflicts involving husband and wife. Separation and divorce resulting from family conflicts are not common, but when families come under the threats of separation and divorce, or even in ones that might not lead to those extremes, family members, such as in-laws make effort to resolve such conflicts. There are no women chiefs in Joinkrama. This explains the exclusionary traditional leadership composition, which owes a lot to age-long tradition of the people. Traditional leadership is strictly men's affairs. "We don't give women chieftaincy positions," was how Mr. Odoya, responded to the question of whether there are women chiefs in the area of study.

This has implications on how women contribute to conflict management from the angle of traditional leadership institutions. The perception of women becoming a chief is mainly not positive. A participant argued that there are no financial incentives or benefits for chieftaincy stools as to warrant interest of women in the office. Besides, any woman who seeks chieftaincy title might likely be seen to be lazy as the men and even some women would conclude she just wants to avoid being busy with farm work since such leadership responsibilities require a lot of time investment. Reference was made of a distant village within the Engenni Clan in which Joinkrama is part of, where a woman was made chief. But that become a source of problems for the entire village in terms of what society expected should be the proper conduct of a woman in a leadership position regarding gender relations and tackling of issues in the community. The story was unpalatable.

In Edagberi, chiefs receive financial payments from Shell but there are no women among the chiefs. A woman leader is usually appointed to lead the women but she has no influence over men and the decisions they take concerning village matters. In any case, women compete to become women leaders in Edagberi since the office attracts financial payments by Shell. Decisions about distribution of benefits from the company among women are easily influenced by the women leader.

Regarding participation of women in town hall meetings when decisions about parties in conflict are taken, participants acknowledged contributions of women. Women's position and contributions towards resolving conflicts in town hall meetings are to some extent recognized. This has to depend on whether they are invited by the men dominated leadership structure. Women participant in the focus group discussion were reserved and skeptical as they claimed the men do not regard them or treat them as people of worth when it comes to decision-making. This is part of the problem of a patriarchal society for which the entire community of Joinkrama can be categorized to be.

Women are part of social clubs that often experience conflict within. Such clubs have mechanisms for resolving conflicts. The source of conflict in many of those clubs, which are often women or men in terms of membership, is financial. Many of the clubs make financial contributions and have the character of cooperatives with rules that guide the behaviour of members. Violation of rules attracts conflicts, which have to be resolved accordingly. Some of the clubs have disciplinary communities. Women are part of disciplinary committees of some of the clubs, but they do not have the final says when it comes to enforcement and apportioning of disciplinary measures against any one that violates rules. There are also vigilante groups that enforce decisions of community leaders for which women play a role in terms of reporting infractions or violations. Clearly women do not play active role in the management of conflict in Joinkrama. This is supported by the theory of patriarchy, which hypothetically explains the situation with the dominant nature of men in gender relations at informal and formal settings. In addition, the second hypothesis framed in this study, which says that management of conflict in rural communities is mainly gender insensitive, seems true in the study area. This also strengthens the theoretical and empirical literature regarding gender issues in Nigeria.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The first research question (which borders on the nature of conflict among people of the study area, the Joinkrama people) sought to find out the types of conflicts the people experience, the volatile nature of those conflicts and how often they occur. The notion that conflicts is inevitable in human existence is as much true in these communities. Their experience with conflict shows different types but mainly not violent. Land related conflicts are prevalent and seem clearly the most prominent among many. Other types are chieftaincy related, cult, and others, which includes church disputes, market stores disagreements and lastly marital/family conflicts. These are not in any way in order of their visibility. Struggle for land is common to most communities in Nigeria. It however suggests that because land is such an asset with capacity for increase in an age of rising population and quest for economic survival, as a major means of production in the local peasant farming-based economy, locals are constantly in search of farmland. Those without shelter need it for building, while others simply want to be able to have more for selling to buyers.

The people of Joinkrama have gradually become exposed to modern sub-urban life-styles and desires that are associated with such life. The national grid has been connected to the villages. This means that whenever electricity is available, people want to enjoy it and use it for minor economic activities such as salon and other businesses. Besides, the presence of industry workers has meant renting of accommodation in the communities. All of this, put together, has raised the stakes when it comes to the value of land. In any case, rising cost of living has made farming a bit more rewarding for farmers.

The ascendancy land dispute therefore does not come as a surprise. But that women are hardly part of the processes of resolving such disputes is the cross of the matter. The gender gap is serious enough, when consideration is given to the fact that women in the study area make up the majority of those that need land for farming. Women own land for farming and are hardly denied inheritance of farmlands. This strengthens what the gender literature in Africa is basically saying. Gender inequality remains an issue, that is not going away from the minds of tradition even though governments and legislations are beginning gradually to discourage it. The second research question (on the nature of patriarchal practices and its impact on Joinkrama women) reveals that men dominate institutions where decisions about conflict resolution are taken. Patriarchal practices had always occurred in times past in traditional African societies. One would assume that with developments in technology, education and urbanization of most rural areas these practices would have been eroded. But the researcher discovered that in Joinkrama these practices are still highly upheld.

Women are not often represented in committees in traditional leadership structures that resolve conflicts in the study area let alone taking decisions and they are not also given opportunities to be in the ruling class. As we shall see below regarding discussion of the data generated from focus group discussions held in the study area, whenever not invited, women have no place regarding decisions about conflict in the communities. The third research question (on the role of women in conflict management): findings shows that women are hardly given opportunities

to be part of decision-making process about conflict management. They can only contribute their feelings but the final decision lies in the hands of the men. In Joinkrama women don't play any specific role in conflict management.

The fourth research question is about the impact of women participation in conflict management and the impact of patriarchy on women involvement. The responses on the questionnaire reveal that males dominate when it comes to the management of peace and conflict. The women are not willing to be participants in the peace and conflict processes due to male dominance and as such have no meaningful impact on the community in peace/conflict matters. Findings in relation to the fifth research question (on the extent of impact of patriarchy on women involvement in conflict management) clearly exhibits the strong presence of male dominance. The activities of the males (such as not accepting women's opinions most times in conflict situations) cause a withdrawal effect on the women and reduces their participation to almost zero.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research assessed the impact of patriarchy on involvement of women in conflict management in Joinkrama communities (Isua, Ususu, Joinkrama and Edageberi) in Ahoada West Local Government Area of Rivers State, Nigeria. It addressed questions, bordering on the nature of conflict among the people; patriarchal practices in conflict management processes; women roles in conflict management; impact of patriarchy in conflict management and the extent to which patriarchy has women involvement in conflict resolution. Women are not permitted to sit with men when such issues are decided but can be called to make contributions if the men so wish. Men seem to have the final say in many issues with a disposition of unwillingness to accept or reject contributions made by the women.

The research adopted the descriptive approach and utilized survey technique and qualitative methods of data collection. This was based on the nature of data required to address the questions posed in the study. A focus group discussion was conducted with participants drawn from each of the villages. The purposive sampling method was used to distribute the questionnaire to 40 mature adults (20 males and 20 females) from each of the four Joinkrama communities. The study had a sample size of 160 drawn purposively and quota basis because the research team needed to work with available participants. Data collected were presented using tables from which percentages were derived and charts were drawn to further clarify the collected data.

The key findings of study are:
- Land is the most prevalent source of conflict among local people. Others include chieftaincy, cultism and marital, which is the least, suggesting low-level marital conflicts capable of leading to divorce.
- Women play limited role in conflict management in rural communities of Joinkrama.

- Conflict among the people is mainly non-violent, suggesting again that the threat of violent conflict is limited.
- Patriarchy is a key element in gender relations, manifesting in traditional leadership institutions such as village council of chiefs and family heads. Women have never been allowed to ascend such leadership positions.

From the findings of this study, the researcher concludes that in traditional cultural governance institutions in Joinkrama, patriarchal practices deny women significant roles in conflict management in traditional communities. It has been rightly observed from the study that conflict management in Joinkrama is mainly gender insensitive.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Drawing on the findings of the study, we recommend as follow:
- Joinkrama women should be encouraged to participate on conflict management.
- Contribution of women should not be over ruled in meetings where conflict matters are discussed.
- Women should be allowed to attend meetings where conflict matters are discussed.
- Women should be given recognized leadership roles in the communities to make them relevant and their impact felt in the communities.
- Women should be encouraged to attain higher education which will make them exposed and bold to speak out in conflict issues.
- Peace keeping associations or disciplinary committees should be established in the communities with a percentage of women as members.

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MONETARY POLICY, INSTITUTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AN INTERACTIVE LINK TO SECURE NIGERIA'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the link between monetary policy, institution, and macroeconomic stability as an option to secure Nigeria's financial system. Time series data were sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) – Statistical Bulletin, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – Annual Abstracts and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) for the period covering 1981 and 2019. The paper proxied monetary policy using money supply, currency substitution was measured using exchange rate, macroeconomic stability adopted inflation rates while institutional performance was measured using the rule of law index. Thereafter, descriptive statistics, unit root and non-causality analysis methods of the Toda and Yamamoto (T-Y) Granger were used for data analysis. The outcome of the T-Y test revealed the absence of causality between monetary policy variable (money supply) and macroeconomic stability and the presence of unidirectional causality between inflation and institution represented by rule of law but no feed-back mechanism. From a policy standpoint, the paper thus proposes that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and other institutions should follow the rule of law in their operations to maintain a healthy macroeconomic environment in Nigeria. This can be achieved through collaborative efforts between the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and other anti-graft agencies to properly monitor activities of Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), Bureau de Change (BDCs) and others to guard against sharp practices in the Nigeria's financial sector and guarantee security.

Keywords: *Macroeconomic Stability, Monetary Policy, Granger causality and Institutions.*

INTRODUCTION

Economic growth and prosperity are a function of environmental stability. This is because oftentimes, investment and consumption decisions of economic agents can be planned sequentially. Improper planning of resources may make economic agents to become erratic, postponing investment and/or consumption plan, causing macroeconomic instability. In economic literature, the measure of macroeconomic stability of an economy is obtained by using developments in the prices of goods and services. (Chaudhry, Faridi, & Riaz, 2015; Ehigiamusoe, Lean, & Chan, 2020; Dramani & Frimpong, 2020). Scholars do adopt this primarily because a stable price level engenders domestic investment, favourable balance of trade, peace; security, investment inflows (either foreign direct investment or portfolio investment), etc.

An unstable macroeconomic environment (Blanchard, 2017) mirrored by rising price levels has far-reaching consequences. Higher inflation rate results in higher nominal interest rate, and this raises the opportunity cost of holding investible funds. This cost will naturally be higher during periods of hyperinflations, leading to depletion of money balances by economic agents. Economic agents get entrapped by money illusion and graduate to higher tax brackets as nominal income increases over time. In the money and capital market, financial assets become riskier as inflation become variable. This is because the real value of a financial asset, going into the future, becomes uncertain with variable inflation (Blanchard, 2017). The position of Beaugrand, Loko and Mlachila (2002) is that rising inflation could be beneficial to developing countries like Nigeria, which has racked up massive debt, as it will reduce the real debt burden of her debt stock.

The desire to own property and engage in economic activities for the sole purpose of generating wealth is imbedded in the sub consciousness of economic agents that they can own the product of such spirited venture. Where such property rights exist and are State-enforced, economic agents can exert efforts in accumulating capital (Greenspan, 2008). In economies where rule of law is weak, economic agents will fail to willfully carry-on economic activities, creating supply rigidity and fuel further variable inflation. The nexus between the trio of monetary policy, institutions and macroeconomic instability is more viable looking at some programmes and policies in Nigeria. Policy programmes such as Agricultural Transformation Agenda, Anchor Borrowers Programme, Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS), Agricultural Credit Supply Scheme (ACSS), among others have been initiated by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) with the intention to boost agricultural output and tame the rising prices of commodities. Contrary to this expectation, goods and services in Nigeria since 2015 have become highly priced and can be explained using monetary policy option. Monetary policy stance is best analyzed using the standard gauge of inflation trends in an economy.

Inflation is always a monetary phenomenon in economic literature. Available data on price movement in Nigeria reveals that, on a month-by-month basis, inflation rose from 8.2 percent in January 2015 to 11.38 percent in February 2016. At 18.75 percent in January 2017, it declined to 11.02 percent in August 2019, gaining momentum as it sprung from 11.24 percent

in September 2019 to 18.12 percent as at April 2021 (CBN, 2021). From the mixed results of monetary policy outcomes above, some economic scholars like Habibullah, Cheah and Baharom (2011); Jalil, Tariq and Bibi (2014); Ezeanyeji, Priscilla and Ugochukwu (2019); Narayan, Narayan and Prasad (2019); Maitra (2019) *and others* have maintained that growing fiscal deficit and increased debt profiles in developing countries (Nigeria inclusive) is another cause of macroeconomic instability.

Others purport the variation of money supply and monetary policy rate (MPR) are culprits for increasing inflation in Nigeria (see Ezeabasili, Mojekwu, & Herbert, 2012; Denbel, Ayen, & Regasa, 2016; Sasongko & Huruta, 2018; Okotori, 2019; Sultana, Koli, & Firoj, 2019). These observations would definitely enthrone another controversy in policy discourse on whether to toe the line of monetary policy or fiscal policy to manage the skewed economic space in Nigeria. This paper does not belong to such inconclusive debate. However, as its main objective, this study considered the role of monetary policy and level of institutional quality in achieving macroeconomic stability in Nigeria. The rest of this paper is structured in five (5) parts. Issues in literature and methodology are presented in Sections 2 and Section 3. Results are presented in Section 4, while concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.

ISSUES IN LITERATURE

On a panel made up of 11 EU countries, Yevdokimov, Melnyk, Lyulyov, Panchenko and Kubatko. (2018) examined the role of economic freedom and democracy on macroeconomic stability. This investigation covered the period between 1996 and 2016, and applied the panel unit root and random effect methods in analyzing the data. They estimated four models corresponding with the use of consumer price index, misery index, macroeconomic stability pentagon and indicator of macroeconomic stability as indices of macroeconomic stability. From the estimated models, economic freedom and democracy were found to be statistically significant in promoting economic stability.

Shah (2017), who used annual data of forty-three (43) sampled African countries from 1990 to 2015, assessed the impact of macroeconomic stability on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. The fixed effects results underlined a depreciated currency, large internal market and liberalization as fostering increased inflow of FDI into the recipient countries. Ajibola (2016), who used the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method, showed that monetary policy could be deployed in Nigeria to achieve macroeconomic stability. This conclusion followed the positive and significant relationship estimated between broad money and real gross domestic product (employed as measure of macroeconomic stability). Interestingly, from the results, narrow money supply and inflation rate insignificantly influence real GDP.

Ozekhome (2017), in applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) on annual series from 1981 to 2015, empirically attests to economic growth in Nigeria being significantly predicated on democratic institutions and foreign direct investment. Rule of law and accountability negatively affect economic growth, while an increased FDI inflow stimulates growth. Using a similar method, the results of Izilein and Mohammed (2017) were akin to this,

as a weak institution was found to hamper growth in Nigeria. With Nigerian data covering from 1981 to 2013, Iyoboyi and Ademola (2016) found that industrial growth is significantly determined by the quality of the service delivery, government expenditure as percentage of GDP and real exchange rate. Quality of service delivery, which was used as index of institutional environment, had a positive impact in the long and short run.

The indexes of policy environment, which were government expenditure and real exchange rate, had short-run positive impact, but differ in terms of long run impact. Whilst government expenditure enhances long run industrial growth, real exchange rate hampers industrial growth in the long run. Measuring inflation using consumer price index and employing monthly data covering January 2007 to July 2017, Sasongko and Huruta (2018) found that causality between inflation and money supply in Indonesia runs from money supply to consumer price index. Estimating two models of four variables each, using the error correction mechanism, unit root and cointegration methods, Okotori (2019) noted that monetary policy instruments such as money supply, monetary policy rate, liquidity ratio, treasury bill rates and reserve requirement significant affect inflation in Nigeria from 2009 to 2017. In a Vector Error Correction (VEC) framework, Denbel, Ayen and Regasa (2016) investigated the inflation, money supply and economic growth relationship in Ethiopia in the years 1970 to 2011.

The long run causality result depicts bi-directional causality between money supply and inflation, and causality running from real gross domestic product (GDP) to inflation. Short run estimates depict causality running individually from economic growth and money supply to inflation. Modeling the exchange rate volatility and inflation relation in the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) environment, the granger results of Timothy, Mbah and Chigozie (2016) diverged from this: causality was reported to run from inflation to exchange rate. Ditimi, Sunday and Onyedikachi (2017) demonstrated the absence of causality between money supply and inflation in Nigeria from 1970 to 2016. Their Autoregressive Dynamic Error Correction Model (ADLECM) results reinforced this stance, as money supply was insignificant in affecting long and short run inflation. With Bangladesh monthly data from May 2010 to December 2017, Sultana, Koli and Firoj (2019) Granger results were identical to those of Denbel, Ayen and Regasa (2016), as long run bi-directional causality between money supply and inflation was discovered. They equally found that changes in money supply do not statistically affect inflation in the short run. In Nigeria, Dahiru and Sulong (2017) found that inflation responded positively to positive changes in money supply, exchange rates and oil prices. The model estimated through the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) identified inflation as negative for interest rates, financial stability and real GDP.

Estimating inflation function in Nigeria from 1999Q1 to 2018Q4, Inim, Samuel and Prince (2020) associated changes in inflation to changes in monetary policy rate, exchange rate, money supply and government spending on infrastructural development, economic and social development. Based on the Autoregressive Allocated Delay (APRD) estimates, all identified regressions were positively linked to inflation. In the cases of Sultana, Kali and Firoj (2019) and Denbel, Ayen and Regasa (2016), no causal relationship was established between money supply and inflation. Onodugo, Anowo and Ofoegbu (2018) found monetary policy

instruments to be effective in combating inflation in Nigeria. The instruments considered were the monetary policy rate, the liquidity reserve ratio, the exchange rate and the interest rate. While applying the error correction mechanism, unit root and cointegration methods, the monetary policy variables were statistically insignificant in causing changes in inflation.

By applying the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, Inyiama and Ekwe (2014) found that inflation had a positive and insignificant impact on exchange rate in the long run. While examining causality between the variables, there were no evidence suggesting that causality exists between exchange rate and inflation from 1979 to 2010. Umar and Dahalan (2016) investigated, using data from the emerging economies of Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia, the asymmetric causality between exchange rate and inflation. It was evident from the Toda and Yamamoto result that causality runs from positive exchange rate shocks to positive inflation shocks for Malaysia and Brunei. For Singapore, positive and negative exchange rate shocks originate from positive and negative domestic inflation shocks. Using dataset of 45 sub-Saharan Africa countries from 1996 to 2007, Nondo, Kahsai and Hailu (2016), who adopted the fixed effect estimator, concluded that institutional quality does not significantly affect foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Divergent results were presented by Khan, Kong, Xiang and Zhang (2020) who studied 15 emerging and growth-leading economics (EAGLEs) in the years 1996 to 2016.

Their two-staged least square (IV-2SLS) panel results, robust using generalized least square (GLS) and panel VAR methods, disclosed institutional quality had a positive and significant impact on FDI. Bouchoucha and Benammou (2020) estimated a foreign direct investment (FDI) function for 41 African countries in the years 1996 to 2013. The static estimation followed the spirited random effect method, while the dynamic relationship was based on the system generalized method of moments (GMM) method. The authors, through their results, emphasized the role of institutional quality in attracting FDI. The leading positive institutional determinants of FDI were identified as control of corruption, quality of regulation, effectiveness of governments and voice and accountability. With dataset of 48 non-renewable commodity exporters, Bova, Medas and Poghosyan (2018) evidenced that, from 1970 to 2014, barring entrenched strong political institutions, fiscal rules primarily do not significantly reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policy to commodity price volatility. Saputra (2019) made thought provoking empirical discoveries. While using the dataset of 30 developed and developing countries distributed as 19 and 11, respectively over the period of 1995 to 2016, the random effect results of bilateral export in both developing and developed countries are unaffected by domestic level of corruption.

Interestingly, the results revealed that where corrupt tendencies are low in the partner country, export from the reporting country to the less corrupt trading partner will increase. Howbeit, the positive effect is higher in developing countries than developed ones. Fazio, Silva, Tabak and Cajueiro (2018) used bank data from 66 countries sampling them from 1998 to 2014 and found that countries with high institutional quality and which have adopted inflation targeting (IT) policy have not experienced significant influence of the IT policy on their financial stability.

In countries where the institutional quality is low, a negative association between inflation targeting and financial stability was drawn from the fixed effect results.

METHODOLOGY

In this section, we provide information on the variables used for this study, the analytical framework of the study and methods adopted in analyzing the annual information. We chose the Toda and Yamamoto (T-Y) (1995) method, as we are interested in causal relationship between the variables and the T-Y method overcomes the pre-test bias of unit root testing and can be performed when the series are mixed orders (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995; Rafindadi & Usman, 2019).

DATA AND SOURCES

The paper used annual data on money supply, consumer price index, exchange rate and rule of law index. We proxy macroeconomic stability using consumer price index and institutional level was proxy by rule of law index between 1981 and 2019. The annual data were sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin and Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Variable	Description	Data Source
Inf_t	Inflation is measured in this paper as Consumer price index (CPI). It is the cost of purchasing a given basket of goods and services. The study employed this as index of macroeconomic stability.	CBN Statistical Bulletin and Website
MS_t	Broad money here measures the volume of money in circulation at a given period.	CBN Statistical Bulletin
EXR_t	Exchange rate here depicts the value of the naira in terms of the US dollar.	CBN Statistical Bulletin
ROL_t	Rule of law index is used in measuring institutional quality.	Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)

Source: Authors' Compilation from Economic Literature (2021)

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In an attempt to explain how the economy works, economists do rely on the use of models. An economic model mimics the real world's situation. To explain the connection between monetary policy, monetary policy, institutions and macroeconomic stability in Nigeria, this paper relies on the earlier work of Ajibola (2016). Ajibola's study dwells more on the likely impact of monetary policy on macroeconomic stability while the present paper adds institutional quality and analyze the model using granger causality approach. Thus, the functional relationship between the variables is expressed as:

$$Inf = f(ms, exr, rol) \qquad (1)$$

Where; Inf denote inflation, ms is broad money supply; exr denotes exchange rate and rol stands for rule of law.

ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES

The analyses of the variables in the model were done in three phases. The first was to test for the trend in the series using descriptive statistics, followed by unit root test, co-integration and granger causality test. Thereafter, post estimation tests were conducted to ascertain the robustness of the model.

(a) UNIT ROOT TEST

The study carried out univariate analysis of each series employed for this investigation. The purpose of this is to examine if the series have unit root. The consequence of estimating a specified econometric model wherein a series or the employed variables have unit root or are non-stationary is having misleading inference about economic relationship, when a meaningful relationship do not exist (Greene, 2003; Gujarati, Porter and Gunasekar, 2012). The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of Dickey and Fuller (1979) and KPSS test of Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) were used in ascertaining the order of integration of the series.

The superior test of KPSS was used to validate the result of the ADF test as certainty of the level of stationarity of the series is required when applying the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach to Granger causality. The two tests are unique in their separate ways as their respective null hypotheses are exact opposite. While the ADF approach test asserts the null hypothesis that the series has unit root, the KPSS test has the null hypothesis of a stationary series with an identifiable break point.

The ADF estimation model with constant is specified as;

$$[?][?][?]Y_t = c + ([?][?] - 1)Y_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{q} \varphi_i [?][?][?]Y_{t-j} + \epsilon_t \qquad (2)$$

When constant and trend is included, the ADF model is of the structure below;

$$[?][?][?]Y_t = c + [?][?]t + ([?][?] - 1)Y_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{q} \varphi_i [?][?][?]Y_{t-j} + \epsilon_t \qquad (3)$$

Unit root testing using the KPSS approach involves estimating the model below;

$$X_t = c + [?][?]T + p \sum_{j=1}^{q} \beta_j + \epsilon_t \qquad (4)$$

(b) GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST

As an improvement over the Granger (1969) causality test, the study applied the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach to testing for causality between inflation, money supply, exchange rate and rule of law. The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) edges the Granger (1969) test as it minimizes the risks of incorrectly identifying the integration process of a series and the approach can be applied when the series are mixed orders as it is able to generate robust and consistent Wald test statistic in such cases (see Akadiri, Eluwole, Akadiri & Avci, 2020; Rafindadi & Usman, 2019; Mavrotas & Kelly, 2001; Amiri & Ventelous, 2012). The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach to Granger causality involves augmenting the vector autoregressive (VAR) model of k lags with $k+d_{max}$, where k is the optimal lag length for the VAR model and d_{max} is the maximum order of integration of the employed series.

Assuming two series, Y_t and X_t, the Granger (1969) approach follows estimating the models below;

$$X_t = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \alpha_j Y_{t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \delta_i X_{t-i} + \varepsilon_{1t} \quad (5)$$

$$Y_t = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \varphi_i X_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{k} \theta_j Y_{t-j} + \varepsilon_{2t} \quad (6)$$

The multivariate setup of the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) framework involves estimating these models:

Where; Y_t and X_t are variables in the system; δ_0, δ_{i1}, δ_{2i}, α_0, α_{i1}, and α_{2i}, are coefficients to be estimated; d_{max} is the maximum order of integration of the variables in the system and k is the optimal lag length selected using either the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), final prediction error (FPE) or Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The results of our analysis are presented in this section. We begin with the summary statistics of the modeled variables. The purpose was to obtain the averages of the modeled variables and the volatility in the series. This was followed by unit root tests and causality result which informs on the direction of causality between the modeled series.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS TEST RESULTS

Table 2 showed that inflation averaged 19.12 per cent over the period covered by data. Money supply in the economy averaged N6585.30 billion and rule of law averaged 54.75. For the sample range, the dollar exchanged for N94.25 on the average. Fluctuation was observed in

money supply, inflation and exchange rate over the study period. The Kurtosis results showed that inflation, money supply and rule of law are leptokurtic, while exchange rate is platykurtic. We observed that only exchange rate and rule of law are normally distributed.

Table 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Mean	Max.	Min.	Std. Dev.	Kurtosis	JB	Obs.
Inf	19.12	72.84	5.38	17.07	4.9966	27.1673 (0.0001)	39
MS	6585.30	34257.90	14.47	9911.82	3.7856	14.4257 (0.0007)	39
EXR	94.25	306.92	0.61	92.86	2.8462	4.2666 (0.1184)	39
ROL	54.75	66.60	47.00	4.73	3.2127	2.1085 (0.3484)	20

Note: p-value are in parentheses; JB = Jarqe-Bera.
Source: Authors' Computation (2021)

UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS

Table 3 shows the outcome of the unit root test performed using the ADF and KPSS approaches. The lag length for the ADF model was based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The result of the unit root test is reported in Panel A, while the unit root test with constant and trend is contained in Panel B. We rely on the unit root specification with constant in deciding on the order of integration as the inclusion of time trend tends to weaken the power of the tests (see Harris, 1995).

The ADF test shows all the series are non-stationary in levels. The KPSS results agrees with this, but present different conclusion with respect to inf_t, where the test concludes inflation is a stationary series. With the KPSS test being a higher power to the ADF test, the decision of integration process of the series was based on the former approach. Summarily, our series are of mixed orders and the maximum order of integration (d_{max}) is I (1).

Table 3: UNIT ROOT AND STATIONARY TESTS

Panel A: Constant					
Variable	ADF		KPSS		Remark
	Level	1st Diff.	Level	1st Diff.	
inf_t	-2.9139	-5.6797***	0.3057***	-	I(0)
lms_t	-0.6480	-4.1092***	0.7497	0.1844***	I(1)
$lexr_t$	-2.1194	-5.2000***	0.7069	0.3463***	I(1)
rol_t	-1.5302	-3.8603***	0.3930	0.1284***	I(1)
Panel B: Constant & Trend					
Variable	ADF		KPSS		Remark
	Level	1st Diff.	Level	1st Diff.	
inf_t	-4.0117**	-	0.1008***	-	I(0)
lms_t	-0.7355	-4.1298**	0.1261**	-	I(0)
$lexr_t$	-1.2776	-5.6075***	0.1869	0.0602***	I(1)
rol_t	-2.2202	-3.8058**	0.0933***	-	I(0)

Note: *, **, and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ADF null hypothesis: series has unit root; KPSS null hypothesis: series does not have unit root; I(0) = stationary series; I(1) = non-stationary series.
Source: Authors' Computation (2021)

GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS

The lag length for the VAR model was informed by the AIC, HQ and FPE information criteria. The VAR (2) model was estimated and found to be stable following the use of the AR inverse root stability test (see figure 1). The VAR (2) model was then augmented by d_{max} in line with the framework of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and the causality between the variables estimated. The results of the causality test are summarized in Table 4.

Figure 1: AR Inverse Root Stability Test

Table 4: Toda and Yamamoto (T-Y) Granger Non-Causality Test Results

Variables	Df	Direction of Causality	Chi-Sq.[1]	Chi-Sq.[2]
$Inf\ MS$	2	No Causality	1.951303	0.452531
$Inf\ EXR$	2	$EXR\,[?][?][?]\,Inf$	15.45934***	3.036462
$Inf\ ROL$	2	$Inf\,[?][?][?]\,ROL$	3.985946	15.79529***
$MS\ EXR$	2	No Causality	0.030291	2.122648
$MS\ ROL$	2	$MS\,[?][?][?]\,ROL$	0.047370	11.61357***
$EXR\ ROL$	2	No Causality	0.104930	3.376978

Note: *** and *** denote rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. Df = degree of freedom. Chi-Sq.[1] = when the first variable is the dependent variable; Chi-Sq.[2] = when the second variable is the dependent variable.
Source: Authors' computation (2021)

The results in Table 4 showed that the direction of causality is evenly distributed between the paired variables. The results revealed absence of causality between inflation and money supply. This result supports those of Medee and Nenbee (2014), Ditimi, Sunday and Onyedikachi (2017) and Inim, Samuel and Prince (2020), who reported similar findings, but is in aberrance to those made by Denbel, Ayen and Regasa (2016), Sasongko and Huruta (2018) and Okotori (2019).

The policy implication of this result is that macroeconomic instability (inflation) in Nigeria is not necessarily caused by monetary policy variable (money supply) but rather it may be traceable to other factors like excess demand, high cost of production by business firms, structural rigidities and so on. Furthermore, there exist unidirectional causality between inflation and rule of law but no feed-back mechanism. This implies that in the face of macroeconomic instability, institutions might be weak and can attract negative expectations about economic progress. Moss (2014, p.73) candid view on negative expectation is that it sometimes intrudes on the happy circle of production and consumption. Sowell (2015, p.15) admonishes economists succinctly in this regard, "prices are not just ways of transferring

money. Their primary role is to provide financial incentives to affect behavior in the use of resources and their resulting products".

In addition, the T-Y causality results equally established no causality between the paired series of money supply and exchange as well as exchange rate and rule of law. However, there was statistical evidence that supports one-way causality that goes from exchange rate to inflation. This result agrees with Umar and Dahalan (2016), but diverges from those of Timothy, Mbah and Chigozie (2016) who found opposite direction of causality.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality approach was employed to test causal relationship between monetary policy, institutions and macroeconomic stability in Nigeria from 1981 to 2019. The paper concludes that there is no causality between monetary policy variable (money supply) and macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, there is a unidirectional causality between inflation and the institutions represented by the rule of law, but no feedback mechanism. From a policy standpoint, the paper thus proposes that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and other institutions follow the rule of law in their operations to maintain a healthy macroeconomic environment in Nigeria. This can be achieved through collaborative efforts between the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and other anti-graft agencies to properly monitor the activities of Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), Bureau de Change (BDCs) and others to guard against sharp practices in the Nigeria's financial sector and guarantee security.

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CHILD PROTECTION RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Children in northern Nigeria are exposed to socio-cultural practices that endanger their lives and violate their rights, as contained in the Child Right Act promulgated by the United Nations. Nigeria whose child rights violation is yet to be sufficiently documented is a signatory to this Act. The paper examined the violation of Child Rights in the northern region of Nigeria. It identifies the prevalence of violation, impact on victims, and the gender distribution of the impact. Four States were purposively selected from the northern region of Nigeria with 486 parents participating in the study. The questionnaire consisting of ten items pertaining to violation of Children's Rights were used and the data obtained was statistically analyzed. The results of statistical analysis revealed a significant rate of prevalence, harmfulness, and future impact on victims' lives. Girls were found to be more affected on sexual exploitation and street trading, while boys were more commonly involved in the use of illicit drugs, child soldering and community security. Both boys and girls experience child abandonment, arms begging, forced labour, participation in organised crimes and sale of children. The study concludes that children in northern Nigeria were subjected to violent acts, exploitation, abuse, neglect, and mental health, educational and learning difficulties, poor parenting, homelessness, vagrancy and displacement among others. The paper recommends the setting up of a monitoring team for child Rights violation by the government in relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to investigate reports and prosecute violators of children's rights. In addition, non-governmental associations, human rights groups, and the United Nations Children and Education Fund should step up advocacy for the protection of children in vulnerable and violent societies like the present case.

Keywords: *Child Right, Empirical Assessment, Protection, Northern Region of Nigeria.*

INTRODUCTION

The term 'child protection' has been used and defined in various ways by different authors and organisations. It shall however generally be considered as protection of the child from violence, abuse, and exploitation in this paper. The scope may include such issues as child prostitution, violence at home or school, child trafficking, abandonment or neglect, child pornography and many other social and cultural abuses common to children across the world. As early as 1924, the rights of children had been recognized and entrenched in international law through the first international declaration on the Rights of the child which was adopted by a few nations. Since then, there have been other legal human rights instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man promulgated in 1948, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 1966 and United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989. (O' Dennell & Seymour, 2004).

Despite the adoption of these instruments and commitments of member nations, children continue to suffer violence, victimisation, and neglect. The development and survival of the child continue to be in jeopardy as many cases of child human rights violations are either not recognized or under-reported. On many occasions children whose rights were violated suffer physical and mental damages, drop out of school or are abandoned or neglected by the families and societies they are born-to. Children are also illegally recruited into armies as soldiers, and coopted into community vigilante and security structures. They also take illicit drugs, and become street traders and beggars. A host of others indulge in several anti-social behaviours.

The issue of child protection evokes a special concern especially in violent societies where legal instruments for the protection of the child are weak and ineffective. Many children in such societies are becoming refugees internally or displaced in their countries. In many warming countries, for instance, there is lack of humanitarian access, breakdown of social and family structures, traditional and cultural values that nourish and cherish children are broken thereby leading to children becoming orphans, drug addicts, criminals and terrorists. At times, they may become soldiers or witnesses of war crimes, girls are sexually abused or voluntarily turn to "survival sex" which is in most cases unprotected leading to the spread of diseases including HIV/AIDs. Nigeria is one of the signatories to many of the child Rights Instruments earlier mentioned and has domesticated it in its constitution. Unfortunately, the Northern part of Nigeria has been under the siege of the Islamic fundamentalists called "Boko Haram" since 2011. In 2014, about fifteen (15) local government areas in Bornu State were under the administration of "Boko Haram" with its flags hoisted in places where successive administrations in Nigeria have spent large chunks of money to procure military hardware and ammunitions to secure. There have been wanton killings of military personnels and civilians with many civilians now in refugee camps. The loose expanse of land, poorly guided, coupled with the proliferation of small and light weapons have made northern Nigeria more vulnerable to these attacks.

Children have become members of the civilian Task Force (CTF) to assist the Nigerian Army in fighting the insurgence as they are familiar with the terrain and topography of the area. The military embraced the initiative and appreciable breakthroughs were made but not without considering the extent of causalities on the side of children who volunteered to serve in the CTF. At the time of writing, the CTF continued to function alongside internally displaced camps (IDPs).

The ongoing fight against the insurgents in northern Nigeria has exposed children in the geopolitical zones to severe human rights violations and breakdown of the legal and institutional frameworks put in place to protect them. There is no doubt that failure to protect the child undermines national development and would have negative consequences for the child, the family, the Nigerian society, and the world at large.

The situation in Nigeria is such that the government is preoccupied with fighting the insurgence and paying little or no attention to the displaced children. Most of these children have become refugees in neighbouring countries while others are in displaced persons camps across the country. In most of the IDP camps, children and adults were camped with no special attention given to the children. The feeding and welfare of inmates often have been left at the mercy of philanthropists and non-governmental organisations. Even so, supplies of materials or support have been mostly inadequate.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The term 'Child Protection' has been viewed differently by scholars under different situations, but the convention on the rights of the child sees it as protecting the child from violence, abuse and exploitation (O' Donnell & Seymair, 2004). Generally, child protection focuses on the protection of every child against harm and ensuring that children receive what they need for development and survival. The scope of these rights includes issues such as child prostitution, violence in homes and schools, child trafficking, child trafficking, child pornography, sexual exploitation, abandonment, and the sale of children.

The issue of child protection has been a global concern and has been attracting international attention since 1924 when the first international declaration on the Rights of the child was muted and adopted by the League of Nations. Since then, similar laws have been passed by regional, continental, and bilateral organisations. For instance, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) incorporated the rights of children. Some legal instruments specifically address the rights of children. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child came into being in 1989, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law (1949), the Geneva Protocol on Humanitarian Law (1977), International Labor Convention No 138 of 1973, etc.

Another mechanism of child protection is the Committee on the Rights of the Child comprising of 18 members elected by member states to the Convention but serving in an individual

capacity. The committee receives and review reports from member states on relevant laws and measures adopted to enforce its objectives, while, at the same time, following up on the progress made with regards to the implementation of these rights.

On the one hand, there is a close nexus between child protection and children's well-being. For instance, malnourished children are more likely to experience frequent sickness than well-fed ones. Equally, there is a higher risk of out-of-school children becoming sexually abused and exploited. While on the other hand, well-protected children stand the chance of developing physically and mentally healthy, confident, self – respecting and less likely to be exposed to abuse and exploitation (O' Donnell & Seymour, 2004). The consequences of unprotected children can undermine national peace and security due to their vulnerability to recruitment as bandits and insurgents.

When violence occurs every member of that society is affected in one way or the other. While some could run away to neighboring towns and cities (internally displaced persons IDPs) others may escape to the neighboring countries and become refugees. The more vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly and women, may not be as lucky and so often suffer various forms of violence. Children in violent societies are particularly vulnerable to a number of vices such as rape, prostitution, abandonment, sexual exploitation, and alms begging to mention a few. The place of children in violent societies could be viewed from two perspectives: there are situations where violence is directed at children, in other words, children are victims of violence and in situations wherein children are involved in inflicting violence on members of the society. For instance, in northern Nigeria, children are often recruited as suicide bombers by Boko Haram insurgence, while a number of them whose parents were killed during one violence or the other often take to the street for begging, prostitution and other forms of survivals.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study examines public perception on child protection in northern Nigeria. The region consists of three geopolitical zones out of the six in Nigeria. These zones are, North East, North West and North Central. The study region has been under a siege imposed by Boko Haram for nearly a decade. Successive administrations in Nigeria have strived to change the tide and defeat the insurgents. Boko Haram fighters occupied about ten local government areas in northern Nigeria and successfully sacked democratically elected local government administrations in those areas. So far, Boko Haram has continued its assault on this part of the country.

The study used descriptive statistical analysis (frequency analysis, percentages, cross-tabulation analysis) to answer research questions on the rate of prevalence of child abuse in northern Nigeria, and the harmfulness of forms of child abuse.

RESLTS

Fig 1: Multiple Bar chart showing the degree of prevalence of child right violation

Figure 1 shows a multiple bar chart showing the degree of prevalence of activities considered to violate child protection rights in the northern region of Nigeria. All the ten right protection violation activities tested in the study indicated high rate of prevalence ranging from 75% to 98%. Participation in community-based security apparatus had 83% prevalence rate, sexual exploitation was 90% prevalent, child abandonment with 98%, alms begging had 94% prevalent rate, participation in militia group activities with 77%, use of children for hard labour with pay indicated 94% prevalent rate, use of illicit drugs with 90% prevalence, street trading indicated 94%, participation in organised crime recorded 84% while sales of children showed 74% prevalence rate.

Fig 2: Multiple Bar chart showing the degree of harmfulness of child right violation

Figure 2 showed the degree of harmfulness of the ten activities considered to violate Child Protection Right (CPR) in the Northern region of Nigeria. All the participants in the study agreed that all ten activities were very harmful, but the degree of harmfulness varies, ranging from 85 degrees to 99 degrees. The degree of harmfulness of participation in community

security apparatus was put at 85-degree, sexual exploitation at 98 degree, child abandonment at 98 degree, alms begging at 93 degree, participation in armed militia activities at 91 degree, use of children for hard labour at 99 degree, use of illicit drugs at 95 degree, street trading at 94 degree, participation in organised crimes at 94 degree, and sales of children at 94 degree.

Fig 3: Multiple Bar chart showing the degree of the future impact assessment of child right violation

Figure 3 showed the ratings of the ten activities constituting violation of Child Protection Right (CPR) in the northern region of Nigeria on the basis of future impact each of them has on the victims.

All but one of the activities were rated as severely impactful on the future of the victim. Participation in community security apparatus was rated to have 85% impact on the future of the victim, sexual exploitation at 86%, child abandonment at 86%, alms begging at 90%, participation in militia group activities at 84%, hard labour with pay at 86%, use of illicit drugs at 87%, participation in organised crimes at 83%, sales of children at 85%. However, street trading was rated least with 46% impact on the future of the victim. This is probably because street trading has become the norm in northern Nigeria and is generally approved in the religious arena.

Figure 4 indicated the gender that each of the ten activities affected more and the percentage distribution on males and females. Participation in community-based security apparatus is more prevalent among boys than girls with a prevalence rate of 88 to 12 percent respectively. Sexual exploitation affected female than males with the prevalence rate of 91 to 9 percent. Child abandonment affected both genders almost equally at the rate of 51 to 49 percent between females and males. However, alms begging affected boys more than girls at the rate of 81 to 19 percent. Participation in militia activities also affected boys more than girls at a ratio of 88 to 12 while participation in hard labour recorded similar distribution at a ratio of 72 to 28. Boys were also found to take illicit drugs more than girls with a ratio of 86 to 14. However, girls engage in street trading more than boys in the proportion of 65 to 35. Participation in organised

crimes showed boys higher than girls at the rate of 89 to 11 percent while sales of children occur more with girls than boys with a distribution of 60 to 40 percent.

DISCUSSION

The paper examined the violation of child protection rights in northern Nigeria. It specifically studied the prevalence, degree of harmfulness and future impact on the victims as well as investigating the gender that was more affected by the acts of violation. It was observed that the northern region of Nigeria has been experiencing violent attacks of terrorism, banditry and insurgency over time thereby making children in the region vulnerable to abuse. This view is consistent with the position of Mbu (2002) when he posited that children in Nigeria are vulnerable to abuse because of the culture of violence that permeates the different communities and ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Barnett, Manly and Cicchetti (1993) argued that since violence is a human phenomenon and cuts across races and tribes and religions, violation of children's rights, maltreatment and abuse are inevitable in human societies. In line with the literature, the paper observed various forms of violations of children protective right as manifested in different activities. Ten activities signifying rights violation were studied and found prevalence at very high degrees in the study area. Participants in this study were asked to confirm whether or not these acts were happening to children within their communities and rate the degree of prevalence. All the acts were confirmed to be rampant and the degree of prevalence was observed to be very high.

Font, Sarah and Jamie (2018) posited the existence of numerous approaches to the measurement of children's rights violation or maltreatment of children but argued that each of them has its limitations. They observed that the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS) which is a federal database comprising extracts of state child welfare records, and the National Surveys of child Adolescent Well-being (NSCAW) which is a federally sponsored longitudinal survey CPS investigations merely contain information about families investigated by CPS, thus excluding Brown, Patricia, Jeffrey and Suzanne (1998), WHO (2002) (2010) & (2011). In Nigeria, data on child rights violation, abuses, neglect or maltreatment are very scanty and therefore there was the need to generate data using appropriate instruments categorized into parent-reported instrument, child-reported instrument, and teachers – reported instrument (WHO, 2002).

The parent-reported instrument focus on the primary parent or guardians (who retain custody of their children at the time of the study) while the child – reported instrument asked questions from children ages 11 and older. In this study, parents – reported instrument was used for data collection. This is because the parents or guardians (participants) often have regular contact with children and information about them in their communities. The use of child – reported instrument was avoided because of excluded children under 11 years of age and more importantly, the data envisioned from the study (disclosures of child maltreatment, victimisation or right violation) will introduce legal and ethical dilemmas (Putnam, Liss Landsverk 2014). The degree of harmfulness of acts constituting a violation of child protection

right could vary from mild, acute or severe and may have a short or long-term impact on children who have experienced physical abuse long after the injuries have healed. Some physical abuses may lead to poor physical or mental health later in life, including depression, anxiety disorder, eating disorders, sexually transmitted infections and risky sexual behavior (Norman et al, 2012).

Other long-term effects of physical violation could lead to children not doing well at school, criminal risk-taking behaviour, drug and alcohol problems among others (Gover & Mackenzie 2003). Children whose rights are violated may also suffer emotional abuse and severe damage to mental health, emotional development or sense of worth. A child who is being emotionally abused by caregivers, parents, siblings or neighbours may develop risk-taking behaviors such as robbery, aggressive behaviour and usually running away from home (Goodyear –Brown 2012). Studies have shown that emotional abuse can increase the risk of developing mental health problems, eating disorders or self-harming. Shaffer et al (2009) found a significant correlation between emotional abuse, eating and language development. Shaffer et al (2009) also argued that adolescents who have been emotionally abused over a long period of time are more likely to hunt like self–harm and experience mental health problems. Gavin (2011) posited that one of the most significant problems with emotional abuses or with children who do not get the affection and warmth they need from their parents may find it extremely hard to develop and maintain healthy relationships with others in their life. He concluded that lower satisfaction with life is often experienced by those adults who had been abused as a child compared to those who have lived a life without abuse.

CONCLUSION

The study observed series of negative activities and socio-psychological pains inflicted on minors in northern Nigeria. These activities vary in type and magnitude depending on a number of factors. Children constitute a very significant population of vulnerable groups, especially during violent periods and terrorist attacks as observed in the northern region of Nigeria. Ten dimensions of negative activities against children were studied and measured in four selected states of the northern region.

These are: use of children for community security service, sexual exploitation, child abandonment, alms begging, use of children in militia groups (such as the civilian joint task – force that confronted the dreaded Boko Haram terrorists), use of children for hard labour (with and without pay), use of illicit drugs, street trading, participation in organised crimes, and sales of children. These ten dimensions were viewed as violations of the Child Right Act enacted by the United Nations and domesticated by the Nigerian Government. Using these ten items as measurements for Child Right Violation (CRV) scale, research questions were answered by this paper. The degree of prevalence of violation, degree of harmfulness of these actions, degree of the future impact of the violation on the victims, and the gender most affected by the violation were statistically provided.

Findings revealed that all the ten activities of violation indicated high prevalence rate, high degree of harmfulness, high degree of future impact on the victims and affected both male and female children, although at varying magnitude. The paper concluded that the rights of children in the northern region of Nigeria are not protected by society but are grossly violated with impunity. The consequences of the violation are many to the country (Nigeria), Nigerians and the world at large. On the one hand, it can breed youth with hardened health who can turn out to be bandits and terrorists thereby constituting threats to world peace and security. On the local scene, they may harbor so much hatred against the government of their country (Nigeria) for failing to protect them when required. Thus, losing all sense of patriotism and nationalism required to build a nation. If the trend of this prevalence is not checked, children from northern Nigeria stand the risk of extortion or growing up to become maladjusted adults, poor physical and mental health, dropping out of school, poor parenting skills later in life, homelessness, vagrancy and displacement (O'Donnell & Seymour, 2004).

The incidence of violations of child's protection right is not found in Northern Nigeria alone, in 1994, a National in-depth telephone survey of a large representative sample of children aged 10-16 years old, in the United States, reported violent victimisation far exceeding those found in official government statistics (UNICEF). In South Africa, 22,911 cases of child abuse were reported to the South African Police Service Child Protection Unit in 1994, which represent 36 percent increase on the figures for 1993. From 1993 to 1994, Child rape cases increased from 4,736 to 7,559 in Africa given an increase of 62.7% (UNICEF).

The paper calls on the government of Nigeria to go beyond legislation to implementation by ensuring that all the 36 states of the federation domesticate the child right act, and create the ministry of children's affairs with the responsibility to look into the affairs of children across the country. Non-governmental organisations, United Nations Information and Children Educational Fund (UNICEF) and Human Right groups should step-up advocacy for the protection of children's rights in Nigeria and bring to book offenders across the country. Religious and community leaders should also be enlightened on the danger of violations of child rights and encouraged to provide regulatory frameworks in their domains.

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THE UNITED STATES' RECOGNITION OF JERUSALEM
AND POWER PROJECTION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

The paper examined the implications of the U.S decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The issues were framed from the assumptions of Power Theory (PT), operationalized in the context of the U.S use of power in disregard of United Nations resolutions, and global condemnations. The study relied on secondary data and used content analysis both as a method for collecting and analyzing the data. One of the findings of the study is that the decision of the United States to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was an affront on the United Nations. It has reinforced the notion that the organisation is somewhat unable to effectively address certain issues of international concern when challenged by a superpower like the United States. The net result of the decision is that the Palestinian state has severed diplomatic relations with the United States and created a condition likely to delay any progress in negotiations in resolving the conflict. In addition, the decision, taken by former President Trump cannot be reversed by any present or future U.S President, because it was backed by the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995. The paper then recommended among others, an amendment (not repeal) to the Jerusalem Embassy Act that considers the interest of Palestinians in the recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel and called a mediation process with other countries such as France and China from a confidence-building frame.

Keywords: *United States, Israel, Palestinians, Jerusalem, and Power*

INTRODUCTION

Jerusalem is an ancient city presently under the control of the State of Israel. It is home to many sacred sites to the three Abrahamic religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The Palestinian or Arab rejection of the United Nations sharing formula (55% Israel and 42% for the Palestinians) in 1947 resulted in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Hostilities ended with the General Armistice Agreement or Rhodes Agreement, signed by Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt in 1949. This saw the city split into two sections, East and West. In the aftermath of the war in 1948, the Eastern part of the city was controlled by Jordanian forces while the Western part was controlled by Israeli forces (Moaz & Nusseibeh, 2000; Phillip & Rienet, 2006; Milshstein, 2019; Montefiore, 2020).

The 1967 Six-Day War displaced the Jordanian forces from East Jerusalem, giving way to full occupation by the Israeli military. This meant that the city had lost its international status (Laron, 2017). The position of Israel on the status of Jerusalem is encapsulated in the position of former Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, who stated that Jerusalem is an organic and indivisible part of the state of Israel (Hume, 2006). Palestinians have at the same time claimed that Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian state. The Palestinian authority under the leadership of Yasser Arafat enacted a law that formally gave the city a capital status in all its official representations in 2000 (Cohen, 2013).

On the part of the U.S, domestic political considerations have made Jerusalem an issue of significant interest during the presidential election campaigns, to attract votes from the Christian and Protestant voting bloc. The issue has had a lot of influence on U.S policy on Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt 2008). The United States under President Harry Truman, was the first country to formally recognize the State of Israel, eleven minutes after the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948. Since then, the United States have consistently provided Israel with economic, military, and diplomatic support. Israel on its part, remains an ally to the US in a region mainly dominated by Muslim states. Some of these states are hostile to Israel (Hammond, 2016; Slonin, 2020; Sharp, 2018; Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2018). The United States has also performed the role of a mediator in trying to bring about an amicable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The US has provided the single highest funding to humanitarian agencies catering for Palestinian refugees in several refugee camps in the Middle East and has supported the Palestinians since the 1994 signing of the Oslo Accords (Lieber, 2018). Previous US presidents, prior to Trump, were reluctant to officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel despite the legislative backing via the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995.

This legislation provided domestic legal support for the United States to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The only caveat in the Jerusalem Act is that it allowed U.S Presidents to suspend its implementation every six months (United States Congress, 1995.) The excuse of national security was a convenient and legal reason for President Clinton, Bush, and Obama to consider the impact of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital even if that meant through peaceful negotiations.

The controversy surrounding the status of Jerusalem can also be seen in the insistence of the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Belgium Italy, and Sweden on having Consulates in Jerusalem when many countries have their embassies (permanent offices) in Tel Aviv (Rinehart, 2018). On the 7th of December 2017, in a radical departure from previous U.S administrations, President Donald Trump shattered the diplomatic glass ceiling and officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel. The move was in disregard to the official position of the United Nations, which directed that the U.S embassy be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (Holland & Lubell 2017). The paper examines the implications of this unilateral US action on the dynamics of the conflict. It also attempts to bring to the fore the complexities that his decision has placed on the present and future efforts of the US to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POWER THEORY

The study operationalized the Power Theory of international relations. Waltz (1979) and Gilpin (1981) opine that the definition of power remains wrapped in controversy as scholars in the field of international relations are yet to agree on a widely accepted understanding of the term. The consensus however, is that power remains an effective theory or instrument in explaining the actions of actors in the international arena. Morgenthau (1978) and Carr (1946) have argued that the predominant explanation that gives scholars an understanding of international politics is the perspective of the interests and objectives of states expressed in power projections. Power theory supports the position that the interests of states in the international system are material, can be seen, and achieved. This is in contrast to any notions of idealism.

The instruments of power are then seen to be effective when the capabilities and potentials of actors in the international system can drastically and dramatically change the activities and behavioral tendencies of other actors in the system (Waltz,1979; Bennet & Duvall 2005). As Dahl (1968) suggested, power is the ability of state A, which is endowed with power, to get State X and state Y to do what they ordinarily would not want to do. Such changes may manifest themselves in the opinions, preferences, attitudes and actions of those States. According to Waltz (1979) and Gullick (1955), instruments of power can be measured by the quality and quantities of an actor in such areas as geography, military capabilities, technology, population, industrial capabilities, the skill of population, and natural resources. These variables form the elements of national power.

EMPIRICAL REVIEW

Rinehart (2018) has argued from a foreign policy analysis perspective that the decision taken by President Trump in recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital was an appeasement to the Christian Evangelical right in the United States. He suggested that it was also to solidify his support among this group of voters for his reelection bid in 2020. The Christian Right in the United States holds the position that Israel remains God's chosen people, and is a bulwark in the fight against terror and fundamentalism. Rinehart referenced the words of Pastor John Hagee when he said that about Sixty Million Evangelical Christians were closely watching his

promise, and a fulfillment of it. He said this would engrave President Trump in the history books. At once, the decision has led to the souring of U.S - Palestinian relations during the Donald Trump administration. On the other hand, the decision enabled stronger ties between the U.S President and the Israeli Prime Minister (Rinehart, 2018).

Sohn (2019) adopting an institutional approach to the analysis of the issue argued that the U.S recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a result of the cognizance of the empirical situation on the ground. He contends that the majority of national institutions governing the State of Israel like the Prime Minister's Office, the Supreme Court, and Knesset (Parliament) are all situated in Jerusalem. Such important institutions are usually found in capital cities. The decision therefore aligns with the interest of citizens who have always considered the city of Jerusalem as their capital city. The author argued concerning the Palestinians, that Jerusalem is also the capital of the Palestinians, judging by the presence of many Palestinian administrative departments in the city, and the fact that the Palestinian people, in their hearts also see the city as their capital. The conclusion is then made that the recognition given by the U.S was one-sided. Nonetheless, this should not be a stumbling block to the Palestinians in approaching the U.S to grant them the same privilege given to Israel.

For Amai (2018), the decision by President Trump was a breach of international law, and the position of the United Nations which views Jerusalem as a disputed city. Hence the decision of the U.N to give it an international status in the Partition Plan of 1947. In addition, the study argued that the declaration was an official endorsement of the Apartheid-like practices that have been taking place in Jerusalem since its takeover by Israel in 1967. There are different laws for Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem, many of which are discriminatory against the Palestinians. This discrimination can be seen in the refusal of citizenship of non-Jews residing in Jerusalem. Many non-citizens are constantly under the threat of eviction from their places of abode. Again, Palestinians living in Jerusalem are not allowed to exercise any voting rights in electing the leaders who govern the city. They are not also allowed to run for elective offices.

In Yahaya's analysis of the issue (2020), Jerusalem remains one of the most sensitive issues in the world, and with the decision of the United States, the country has consciously taken a step to isolate itself from further participation in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The United States has incurred condemnation from Arab states in the Middle East. It has led to violent protests and heightened security measures in some Middle East countries. In the same vein, Aswar (2018) explained that the United States' position on the status of Jerusalem was in direct confrontation with the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 487 of 1980 and 2334 of 2016 which stipulated that the city of Jerusalem was to be among the final status issues to be deliberated between the Palestinians and Israel and the recognition that East Jerusalem would be the capital of a future Palestinian State.

METHODOLOGY

The study adopted the descriptive research design, which was effective in allowing the study to describe the patterns, relationships, and events between the variables under investigation. The study is qualitative and data was generated from books, journals, newspapers, government documents, historical speeches, magazines, and audio-visual materials. The content analysis method was utilized to collect relevant data related to the study. The method involves the coding of information from written text and audio-visual transcribed data. The data collected was analyzed using content analysis methods, and it involved the systematic labeling and evaluation of written texts to locate the relevant and useful information with their context, meanings, and findings that were relevant to the investigation undertaken.

DISCUSSION

The possession of capabilities of national power makes it possible for a powerful country to take decisions and actions in situations where there is a need for extensive consultations and consideration. The super power status the United States occupies is hinged on the presence of multiple power capabilities that any sitting U.S President can utilize in the pursuit and attainment of foreign policy objectives in the international arena. In line with the power theory, the paper analyzed the systemic challenge the U.S position on the status of Jerusalem imposes on a world trying to embrace multilateral approaches in tackling global problems, and the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The decision to unilaterally recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is one of the decisions taken and implemented in direct opposition and disregard to the position of the United Nations. The U.N General Assembly Resolutions 181(II) of 1947 and 194 (III) of 1949, designated and reaffirmed the city of Jerusalem as a city demilitarized and neutral (Dumper, 2014). The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967), 252 (1968), 267 (1969), and 298 (1971) reaffirmed its position on the illegality of the U.S and Israeli actions, and on the status of Jerusalem as an international city. The UN Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) rejected the Jerusalem Law enacted by the Israeli Parliament which stated that Jerusalem was the united and complete capital of Israel (United Nations, 1981).

Despite the plethora of U.N resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, the Trump administration went ahead to make the announcement in flagrant disregard for the authority of the United Nations. The study agrees with Aswar (2018) that the U.S action was an affront to the United Nations and further finds that the catalyst for the actions of the U.S rests on the United States possessing the diplomatic power capabilities to ensure its actions cannot be severely punished by the U.N Security Council where it is a permanent member and has the power to veto resolution against its actions.

This was seen when countries like Honduras, Guatemala, Togo, Micronesia, Palau, Nauru, Marshall Island, took a cue from the U.S by deciding to join it in disregard of the historical position of the United Nations, voting not to condemn the actions of the U.S in United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES10/L.22 (Aljazeera, 2017). The then U.S Ambassador to the

U.N, Nikki Haley warned or threatened other countries that the U.S would be taking note of the countries that voted against the decision of the U.S to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital when she stated that countries must be aware that their vote was being monitored by her and that President Trump had requested, she gives a report on those countries that voted against the U.S decision (CNN, 2017). Four countries have defied the United Nations' position, and have relocated their embassies to Jerusalem, namely, Kosovo, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States.

Malawi and Equatorial Guinea making plans to relocate their embassies to the city (Embassy pages, 2021). The unilateral action of the powerful United States with disregard to the United Nations is not a recent phenomenon. It happened through the invasion of Grenada in 1993, the attack on Libya in 1986, the Panama invasion of 1989. Others include the attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Global Policy Forum, 2005). These actions taken by the United States did not have the authorization of the United Nations. The decision to recognize Jerusalem is the latest in a long list of unilateral actions in an arena where multilateralism should prevail.

These actions violate international law and threaten the continued existence of the United Nations as a "World Government" that should be respected by sovereign states. The League of Nations failed as a result of the unilateral actions of states like Japan in invading China in 1931, Germany in rearming and sending troops into Rhineland in 1935, and Italy in invading Ethiopia 1935. They all took unilateral actions without reference to the League of Nations. The powerlessness of the League and failure to curtail the excesses of those countries are critical issues (Teasdale & Bainbridge, 2012; Davis, 2021). Another implication of Jerusalem's decision by the Trump administration was the breakdown of high-level diplomatic relations between the Palestinians and the United States. The internationally recognized representatives of the Palestinians refused to have any peace parleys with Israel during the tenure of the Trump administration, accusing it of open bias against the Palestinian people (Osborne, 2017; Bachner, 2018). When the Israelis and Palestinians who are directly involved in the conflict refuse or cannot meet and deliberate on the contending issues, there is bound to be no movement towards negotiated settlement (Kellar, 2019).

The Trump administration, in response to the Palestinians severing high-level diplomatic contacts, took counter steps using its economic power by cutting funding to the West Bank and Gaza, completely stopping all U.S funding to the UNRWA, and evicting the Palestinian representatives from their office in Washington over the non-payment of rent (Zanotti, 2019).

There were fallouts from the U.S decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The worry by previous U.S administrations on a possible outbreak of violence if the U.S officially implemented the Jerusalem act was proven to be true. The announcement by the Trump administration was met with violent protests in Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank, leading to many deaths and injuries. Palestinian militant groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad responded by calling for violence, and there was an increase in rocket attacks against Israel (OCHA, 2020). The violence was not restricted to Palestinian territories. There were protest

events in Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Jordan (Carey, Lee & Dewan, 2017).

The response from the Malaysian Foreign Ministry described the decision as a miscarriage of justice, stating that the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel ignores the reality on the ground, endorses Israel's repressive policies, violates Palestinian human rights and contravenes international law" (Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). The decision also drew condemnation from bodies like the Organisation of Islamic Countries (O.I.C), and encouraged its members to take measures against countries and organisations that decide to move their embassies to Jerusalem (Abdallah, 2019). The implication for the position of the O.I.C is that its members would have diplomatic spats with any country or organisation that decides to follow the U.S example, thereby disrupting the relative peace and cooperation that exists between these states and members of the O.I.C.

The study found that call for a reversal of the United States' position on Jerusalem is virtually impossibility for the Biden administration or any future president of the United States. As earlier indicated, this is due to the fact that the decision taken by the Trump administration is backed by the Jerusalem law passed by the US Congress in 1995. The act behaves the U.S President, the domestic legal authority to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The passage of this controversial law in 1995 brought the Executive arm of the U.S government to be at odds with U.S Congress, this was expressed by President Bill Clinton refusing to give his presidential signature or assent to the bill after the U.S Justice Department concluded that the Jerusalem Act was an intrusion by the Legislative arm on the powers of the Executive to conduct foreign relations (U.S Justice Department, 1995). The successful passage of the Jerusalem Act in spite of the opposition from the then sitting U.S President (Bill Clinton) was a demonstration of the influence that pro-Israel lobby groups wield in the domestic political affairs of the United States.

An anticipated implication of the U.S recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel will be seen in any future negotiations on the status of Jerusalem between the Israeli and the Palestinians with the United States acting as mediator. The Trump administration put the present and future U.S governments in a quagmire, as these administrations will not be able to consider any Palestinian demands on the status of Jerusalem. This will be coming from the backdrop that the Palestinians viewed East Jerusalem as the capital of a future sovereign Palestinian State (Elgindy, 2018).

That decision by the Trump administration gave impetus to Israel to evict Palestinians from areas in East Jerusalem which it has controlled since 1967. Already, legal challenges have been ongoing between Israelis and Palestinians as to which group originally occupied sections of East Jerusalem, but recently there has been violence associated with the eviction of 13 Palestinian families from the Sheikh Jarrah section of the city. The Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood is strategic because of its proximity to the old city and the Holy sites (Haley & Mitchell 2021). The study found that Jewish groups who legally purchased land in East Jerusalem close to the sacred tomb of Shimon Hatzadik in 1876, but were displaced after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948,

have stepped up efforts to have Palestinian refugees who were resettled on their land in East Jerusalem to be evicted.

The resettlement of Palestinian refugees on land purchased by Israelis in East Jerusalem was a fallout of the Eastern part of the city falling into the control of Jordan in 1948 (as stated in the introductory section of this paper). Jews residing in Eastern Jerusalem were asked to move to the West of the city under Israeli control. Palestinians living in the West of Jerusalem were also forced to move to the Eastern part of the city under Jordanian control (Reality Check, 2020). Palestinians asked to move from the West of the city to the East in 1948 are denied the right to reclaim their properties as Jews given the ability to do so in Eastern Jerusalem (Kingsley, 2021). The paper attributes this heightened eviction activity to the U.S recognition of Jerusalem as politically and administratively belonging to Israel. The paper takes this position because these increased attempted evictions were not seen until after the Trump announcement in 2017. These evictions if and when successfully achieved would definitely change the demographic color in Jerusalem, with the Jews having a greater and more visible shade in the city.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the U.S to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel has come at a great cost. It has had implications for the efforts of countries at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The position of the U.S as an unbiased mediator has been seriously compromised by that decision. The present and future U.S Presidents cannot reverse the decision taken by President Trump. The United Nations has once again been rendered ineffective in playing a decisive role in ending the conflict as its resolutions are not respected, violence has ensued leading to the loss of lives and the destruction of property. There is a continuation of the diplomatic stalemate on resolving the impasse while the activities on the ground in Jerusalem continue to tilt towards Israel assuming total political, and religious control of Jerusalem, with a continued expectation of Palestinian resistance. In the midst of these negative results, the study looks forward to a negotiated settlement. This will depend on steps taken and recommendations.

The U.S Congress should introduce an amendment to the Jerusalem Act of 1995. The amendment should make provision for Palestinians to be given a part/section of the united and undivided capital of Israel as stated in the original bill. Experts in the drafting of bills should be engaged to make contributions to the amendments of the Act. This can restore Palestinian confidence. The United States should not be the sole mediator between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The paper recommends that other friendly and concerned nations with the relative requisite diplomatic, economic and military power like the U.S, should initiate peace moves between the Palestinians and Israel. The countries of France, China, and Russia are recommended for this activity. These selected countries have relatively good relationships with the contending parties in the dispute.

    A. Israelis and Palestinians be allowed to reclaim property

B. originally owned by them in East and West Jerusalem before the Rhodes agreement came into effect. The one-sided reclamation going on in East Jerusalem by Israelis will only lead to more violence as Palestinian resistance will continue

C. Member nations of the U.N should respect the organisation's position on the status of Jerusalem, and not join the United States in relocating their embassies to Jerusalem

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KIDNAPPING MINORS
A PRODUCT OF STATE FAILURE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The state exists for the protection of lives and properties. The Nigerian State, however, has had a prolonged battle with crime and has not lived up to its duty of guaranteeing security. While the challenge of terrorism has taken on various dimensions, it has more recently dealt with young children, some of whom have been kidnapped by these terrorists. The study examines the failure of the Nigerian State and its institutions in the protection of lives and properties in Northern Nigeria and explains why children are targets of terror groups. The paper concludes that children are abducted because of two reasons. First, child abduction attracts local and global attention. Secondly, terror groups receive huge financial gains in ransom payouts.

Keywords: State, State Failure, Terrorism, Children, Kidnapping, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

Most scholars agree that the state exists mainly for the protection of lives and properties. (Queiroz, 2018; Gokhale, 1984; Duguit, 1917). Recent happenings suggests that the state has not only struggled in guaranteeing the welfare of Nigerians but has failed in the onerous task of guaranteeing the safety of lives and property. From Weber's standpoint, the monopoly on the use of physical force or violence is a fundamental distinguishing feature of the state (Ibodje, 2009; Ekekwe, 2009; Gokhale, 1984). The Nigerian State has failed to provide adequate security for its citizens. It has also failed to maintain expected monopoly of physical force. As a result, it has been exposed to contending forces with the most troubling in recent times being full-scale terrorism, especially in post-2009 Northern Nigeria.

The consistent attacks by Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations on citizens have not only been responsible for huge fatality, but also the sacking of communities, and consequently, displacement of more than two million people (Onuegbu & Lebari, 2022; Brechenmacher, 2019; Afzal, 2020; Amalu, 2015). The global terrorism index suggests that Nigeria has become one of the most terrorized states in the world (Institute of Economics & Peace, 2016). Terrorism in Nigeria, particularly Northern Nigeria, has since metamorphosed from bombing of markets, schools, religious places of worship and security infrastructure to consistent abduction of school children. Between April 2014, when the infamous abduction of over 276 Chibok School Girls took place and October 2021, more than ten attacks on schools have been reported, with far more than a thousand school children abducted and over a million children shut from school (Ojelu, 2021; Yusuf, 2021).

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The subject matter of state failure became popular in the 1990s (Amaechi, 2017, Cojanu & Popescu, 2007; Rotberg, 2002). Barani and Powell's notions of state fragility, weakness and failure focus on two issues; including the unwillingness and inability of states to provide security, socio-economic amenities, and the rule of law. Some states exist only on paper, in view of their virtual disconnection from the social needs of people (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007, 115). State failure opens the door for non-state actors to attempt or struggle for the seizure of state power through violent means rather than democratic process. The features of state failure include its loosing of the monopoly of the use of force. Such a state also tends to face high risk of disloyalty among citizens. With over a decade of war against terrorism and the growing insecurity it brings, Nigeria falls into this description of a failed state.

VICTIMS OF TERRORISM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

The Governor of Kastina State, Bello Masari led a team of state officials into the forest to negotiate with bandits. The intention was to stop the kidnapping and killing perpetrated by bandits (This Day Newspaper, August 24, 2021; Sahara Reporters, June 8, 2020). Similarly, the Governor of Zamfara State, Bello Matawalle reportedly paid huge sums of money to terrorists in the bush and bought them vehicles, appealing for an end to violence (Sahara Reporters, January 19, 2021; Gusau, 2021). The Nigerian State has continued to extend an open

hand to these terrorists, which arguably may not be out of order, but in doing so, the state ought not jeopardize the security of the people.

What is seen is the state releasing arrested members of these terrorists' organisations and considering to recruit ('former') members into the armed forces on the 'premise' that these people (most of whom were arrested) had repented, amidst reports of monthly payments to those alleged to have repented. This situation calls for critical questions: what is repentance to the state? What are the prerequisites for determining the repentance of a terrorist? How can the state explain the repentance of a terrorist who did not submit himself but was apprehended? What are the rationales for considering the recruitment of someone with a history of terrorism into organisations as important as the armed forces? How does the state intend changing the narrative that 'crimes pays' since law abiding citizens are continually neglected whereas the Nigerian State has continued to provide jobs and stipends for those who take to crime? Interestingly, these and several questions tend to be begging for answers, yet the answer to one generates even further questions. As the Nigerian State continues to exhibit features of state failure (pampering terrorists rather than following them heavily on the offensive and empowering terrorists financially to perpetrate further acts of evil on the state and the citizens), children face the risk of multiple attacks with consequences of dropping out of school. Below is a table showing incidence of the abductions of school children in between April, 2014 and October, 2021.

Table 1: Incidence of School Children Abductions in Northern Nigeria

Date of Attack	Description of Attack	Actual/Suspected Attackers
April 14th, 2014	276 female students abducted from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State	Boko Haram
February 19th, 2018	110 female students abducted from Government Girls Science Technical College, Dapchi, Yobe State	Boko Haram
December 11th, 2020	303 male students of Government Science Secondary School, Kankara	Boko Haram
December 19th, 2020	80 students abducted from an Islamic School in Dadume, Kastina State. (They were however rescued almost immediately by the Nigerian Police).	Unknown
February 17th, 2021	41 students abducted from Government Science College Kagara, Shiroro Local Government Area of Niger State	Bandits

February 26th, 2021	317 female students abducted from the Government Girls Science Secondary School Jangebe, Zanfara State.	Bandits
March 11th, 2021	39 students abducted from the College of Forestry, Afaka, Kaduna State	Bandits
April 20th, 2021	20 students abducted from Greenfield University, Kaduna State	Bandits
May 30th, 2021	More than 100 students abducted from SalihuTanko Islamic School, Tegina, Niger State	Bandits
June 30th, 2021	80 students abducted from the Federal Government College, BirninYauri, Kebbi State	Bandits
July 5th, 2021	121 students abducted from Bethel Baptist High School, Kaduna State	Bandits

Source: Ojelu (2021); Yusuf (2021); Premium Times (August 28, 2021)

There are children still in captivity whose whereabout are unknown in Northern Nigeria. Government security personnel have mostly suggested through their behaviour that they are unable to restore these children to their parents without negotiation and payment of ransom. Meanwhile, Verjee and Kwaja (2021a) argues that the continuous abduction of school children in Northern Nigeria is only a reflection of state failure. They believe mere policing cannot resolve the crisis. Elsewhere, these authors (2021b) have argued that despite the heavy militarization of schools across Northern Nigeria only little has been achieved as results. Security has not been guaranteed. School children and their teachers continue to feel unsafe.

CONCLUSION

Children have long become targets of abduction. Their abduction attracts local and international attention. The nature of the political economy of abduction by terrorists with growing suspicion of security agencies being part of this economy has complicated the war against terror and led to accusation of the military being a factor for the failure of the government to defeat the enemy.

The paper explained the failure of the Nigerian state and its institutions in the protection of lives and property in northern Nigeria. It examined the targets of terrorist activities and used securitization theory in analyzing how state failure has created room for terrorism. The study concludes that children are kidnapped because of the attention it draws both locally and globally, as well as the monetary returns from the ransoms these terrorists generate for the state and their victims. There is little contention around the reality of state failure and the

manifestation of this reality in Nigeria. The context of full-scale terrorism orchestrated by Boko Haram and others in Northern Nigeria has continued to have negative implications on children, particularly as it affects their education. While it appears that the Nigerian State lacks the capacity to deal with the problem it has recorded some successes too.

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VIOLENCE-INDUCED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS IN BENUE STATE

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores violence in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in Benue State. It critically considers human rights violations in IDP camps. The researchers paid visits to selected IDP camps for the purpose of collecting field data through interviews. Debasing life conditions in the IDP camps were observed amidst government interventions. The paper paints a gloomy picture of the IDPs.

Keywords: *Violence, Violation, Human Rights, IDPs and Benue State*

INTRODUCTION

Though violence in Benue State has a fairly long history, the ones that led to Internally Displaced Persons camps (IDP) started on 23rd April, 2013. Ten farmers were killed in an unprovoked attack in Mbasenge community in Guma local government area. Similar attacks occurred in May, 2013, by Fulani herdsmen who were seeking dominance of the region. Members of the group wanted to extend their sphere of control over land resources through a barrel of a gun. Otu and Agbaji (2020) noted these attacks and their impact. In 2013 alone, eight (8) attacks occurred in the two local government areas of Guma and Agatu. One hundred and ninety persons (190) were murdered, 6000 people displaced and 120 cows said to be lost in the process. The dastardly attacks also inflicted physical and psychological trauma on the survivals.

In 2014, the number of attacks increased to fifteen. This time, in Logo, Guma, Gwer West, Makurdi, Katsina-Ala and Kwande local government areas (Otu and Agbaji, ibid). These attacks caused more than 209 deaths and over 80,000 displacements. Six attacks responsible for 155 lives were recorded in 2015 including the destruction of properties. The sporadic attacks and plunder of Benue communities continued in 2016 with 11 attacks that claimed 836 lives including security operatives. Five (5) attacks with colossal damage of 48 human lives were recorded in 2017 and thirteen (13) additional attacks occurred in 2018 which resulted to the killing of 105 persons (Otu and Agba, 2020). In a similar development, Duru (2019) reported killing of at least 16 persons in Agagbe communities, in Gwer West Local Government Area. Again, the people of Ebete in Agatu Local government Area, on February 20, 2019, suffered a gruesome murder of 17 people in an attack perpetrated by militia Fulani herdsmen. There were allegations of cow theft by Livestock Guard in the succeeding month leading to the death of 16 farmers.

On March 19th, 2019, the militia herdsmen attacked Tse-Ioreleegbe village and killed ten people (en.m.wikipedia.org). June 22nd, 2020, saw another attack in Itakpa where 13 people were killed including the ward PDP chairman (SaharaReporter, 2020). Another attack took place on September 29th, 2021 in Guma. These were coordinated attacks from Friday to Monday uninterrupted by security forces. These attacks resulted to the death of nine (9) persons (Charles, 2021). The killing spree continued in Katsina-Ala Local Government Area and claimed more than 100 lives across several villages (Olufemi, 2021, Wantu and Agbogonye, 2021). These persistent attacks on Benue communities by Fulani militia have produced a sub unit of Benue society known as the Internally Displaced Persons Camps. The camps are made up people who have fled from their ancestral homes and are now seeking refuge anywhere for survival purposes.

CAUSES OF FULANI HERDSMEN ATTACKS IN BENUE STATE

The Fulani (herdsmen) are known for their predative life style. They conquered and subdued most Northern ethnic nationalities including the Hausas but adapted their language which is generally spoken in most parts of Northern Nigeria (Nongo, 2018). This predative disposition thrives on the wheel of dominance. Their quest to control politically and otherwise make them acquire weapons of destruction for the plunder. Recent factors, for these attacks, however, include Fulani predation and dominance, climatic changes, ethnic chauvinism and open grazing prohibition.

CLIMATE FACTOR

Many have agreed to the preposition that adverse weather condition in the Northern hinterlands compels the Fulani herdsmen whose herds survive on open grazing to look for where the cattle could find pasture – a quest that takes them down Benue valley and other places Southwards (Beetse and Nongo, 2022). This submission is not satisfactory because early practices of this open grazing movement was not greeted with any form of violence that was so targeted and protracted. At the time, disagreements between the grazing herdsmen and farmers were amicably settled. In fact, the herdsmen were only seen with sticks and knives not with heavy pricing AK 47 riffles.

OPEN GRAZING PROHIBITION

The Fulanis have often asserted to anti-open grazing law as the cause of their attacks on Benue communities (Duru, 2021). Again, this submission does not seem to tally with the reality. Sustained attacks on Benue communities as can be seen in the above data started in 2013. It was in 2017 that the law prohibiting open grazing was enacted in Benue State. The law in Benue and now in other States in Nigeria is rather the outcome of the attacks and not the cause.

HUMAN RIGHT VIOLATIONS

The protracted herdsmen attacks on the rural communities of Benue State have produced a new phenomenon of Internally Displaced Persons camps that provides a temporal residence for escapee families. The Benue IDP Camps are created and maintained in the Local Governments most affected by the herdsmen plunder. Some include but not confined to:

Camp	LGA
Daudu 1, 2, 3 -	Guma
Ukpaiam -	Guma
Gbajimba	Makurdi
Abagena	Makurdi
Baka	Makurdi
Tse Yandev (Uni Agric Road)	Makurdi
Naka	Gwer West
Anyin	Logo. Etc.

Among these camps, visitation was made to three where data on human rights violation was collected through interviews. The data obtained are structured under education, housing and other abuses.

EDUCATION

The Universal Declaration of Human Right by United Nations adopted by Nigeria clearly states every body's right to education. Education shall be free and compulsory especially at the elementary level (UN, 2015). The IDP Camps in Benue State presents a situation of serious violation of this right as stated. The Baka Camp located along 72 Battalion Army barrack's road North Bank, reveals stunning abuses. The Baka Camp houses 5,079 population according to the interview with the Camp chairman held on 18 /11/2021.Out of this figure, 2,022 are children. The pictures below show some of them that were gathered at the time of visitation.

UNSCHOOLED CHILDREN IN BAKA CAMP, MAKURDI

The children as seen above and many others do not have any school to attend in and around the Camp. They only roam and play. The interview revealed that a better person from among them gathers them and teaches what she knows. The Tse-Yandev Camp also suffers the same fate. The camp has 10,120 population from December 2020 but increased to 10,502 in November 2021. According to the camp leader interviewed also on 18/11/2021, out of this figure 2,117 are children. The children have no school in around the camp to attend. They hover around, beg for money on the road and play.

Abagena Camp is slightly different. Out of 8,210 total population, children constitute 2,257. From the interview with State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Staff on the 18/11/2021, there is primary and secondary Schools anchored by volunteer teachers. Leaving the children to grow in this condition does not only violates the human right contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but distorts their personality development. Cognitive development of a child enhanced by a well thought out subject area, learning based on curriculum with the resultant social and emotional development becomes problematic (Foundation of Child Development, 2015). From the data presented above, a total of 4,199 children from the selected camps are totally deprived of education thus growing up to be misfits in the society.

HOUSING

Housing is one of the human rights as declared in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is indeed part of what constitute standard of living to be ensured by States to her citizenry. Housing in IDP Camps in Benue State is horrible and dehumanizing. Below are some of the Camps captured in the photographs.

HOUSING CONDITION AT BAKA CAMP, MAKURDI

HOUSING AT TSE- YANDE CAMP, MAKURDI

HOUSING AT ABAGENA CAMP, MAKURDI

Predominantly, these houses are made with mosquito nets with mats as their beds. It is rare to see them use bamboo bed which is considered a bit better. Its unimaginable that old men and women, and children live in that state all through rainy and sunny (dry) seasons so many years without end in sight. It is more than slavery for people in their ancestral land where they were relatively comfortable, to be forced out to be refugees in that deplorable condition in overcrowded camps. The IDP Camps in Daudu and Ukpiam for example have up to 20,000

people each. (The New Humanitarian, 2015). Obviously, this creates a condition for easy transfer of disease from one person to the other.

OTHER VIOLATIONS

Sexual assault, coercion and intimidation have been reported in various IDP Camps in Benue State. It happens with children at the consent of parents who would allow it for pecuniary reasons and married women who are vulnerable in hands of men that are helping them in one way or the other. Ugwa (2021) narrated how a lady at Ikpaam Camp in Guma Local Government became a sexual victim to a man who helped her in getting food and accommodation in the Camp through his connection with the camp chairman. The said helper later used this as an advantage to force himself on her. Naudes, Danjuma and Gembu (2020) confirmed in their studies that a variant of sexual abuse i.e., child abuse is prevalent in Benue IDP Camps. The table below explains the forms of child abuses in Benue State IDPs:

S/N	Forms	Camps		
		Daudu	Ugba	Abagena
1.	Physical abuse	56%	30%	49%
2.	Sexual abuse	13%	7%	8%
3.	Neglect	60%	30%	29%
4.	Emotional abuse	10%	50%	28%
5.	Other abuses	20%	11%	16%

Source: Adopted from Nandes, Danjuma and Gembu, 2020

These child abuses do not only violate the child's rights but are capable of distorting their growth and development. Another violation witnessed in the IDP Camps is associated with the source of their food. Food is part of what make for standard of living emphasized in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UN, 2015). Interview conducted on the 18/11/2021 from the Camps visited revealed dehumanizing survival strategy adopted by the IDPs. The working population among them go out every day to do any available work anywhere in other to get food to survive. Some are hired out for menial job like assisting in rice winnowing and other farm work within their reach. This is slavery considered from the stand point of their personal volition in food production and consumption prior to their coming to IDP Camps. It is simply a matter of compulsion into a life pattern considered strange. This way, the dignity and human worth of IDPs has been reduced.

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF IDP CAMPS IN BENUE STATE

IDP camps in Benue State were a 2018 creation resulting from numerous but sporadic attacks of Fulani herdsmen militia on indigenous communities of the State. Out of 27 Camps in Benue as at 2020, only eight are official where a SEMA staff is and the rest unofficial where there is no SEMA staff (Guardian Editor, 2020; Nandes, Danjuma, and Gembu, 2020). The presence

or absence of SEMA staff in a camp indicates State Government attention and intervention. It means government is only attracted and can render assistance to less than half of the IDP camps. The implication is that others are left to fend for themselves. Even in the camps that have Government presence, meaning official camps, there has been complain of dishonesty in the administration of the camp. From the interview conducted at Abagena camp, some food, money and material donations through Government by humanitarian agencies disappear in tin air while they suffocate in poverty and misery.

Again, the Federal Government intervention is least felt. At some point, it offered to assist with ten billion naira for the rehabilitation and resettlement of the IDPs in 2018 but the intervention plan could not be realized till date (Wantu, 2020). Instead of the Government, Non-Government Organisation (NGO) presence is very well felt in almost all the camps. They include Medicine San Frontiers (MSF) also known as Doctors Without Borders, UNICEF, Red Cross, individuals and churches. The interview revealed that the Medicine San Frontiers provides health care services for IDPs. It treats malaria, eyes and skin infections commonly found among IDP in the camps. The MSF also create awareness of behaviors that constitute human right violations and that such behavior should be reported. UNICEF also creates this awareness and digs boreholes for them. Considering the population in these camps, the good efforts of the NGOs are not enough for the IDPs in the State.

CONCLUSION

Violence occasioned by herdsmen attacks have produced undesirable effect on many IDP camps in Benue State. The camps on the other hand provided fora for gross violation of human rights perpetuated by opportunists. These violations include deprivation in the area of education, squalid condition of living especially accommodation, sexual and child abuse among others. The camps also suffer from neglect from the government (Federal and State) as they wallow in these lacks protractedly. Non-Governmental Organisation and individuals have been found to be of immense assistance in providing health care services, water, food and some form of training, much still remain undone.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Owing to the discoveries, the paper recommends the following:
1. Government should commence the process of driving away herdsmen who have taken over the ancestral lands of Benue farmers. Since farmers' movement was occasioned by the herders' invasion, their departure will naturally end the IDP camp's phenomenon.
2. Government attention should be fully drawn to all the IDP camps across the State. The 1.5 million published figure of total population in the camps is not too much to help in crisis period. Small facilities to make life bearable may suffice. They should also be honest and sincere in administering these camps so that the IDPs themselves will witness the transparency.

3. More humanitarian efforts should be directed to palliating the suffering of the people in the camps. The make-shift tents should be extended to all camps to improve the accommodation of the IDPs. International NGOs and spirited individuals should be handy for this.

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CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY RESPONSE IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Climate change remains a major concern for governments and the policy community across the world. In recent years, conscious efforts have been made in many quarters, including the United Nations and other regional organisations to find workable strategies to address the problem. As signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Nigeria has also shown policy interest in tackling climate related issues in the country. This paper explains the impact of climate change in Nigeria and the government's policy response. It argues that climate change in Nigeria poses a major challenge to development. The Government's efforts in this regard are reflected in its national climate change policy and its involvement in multilateral policy processes. None of these efforts, however, have produced substantial results for the welfare of both human and non-human elements of the environment.

Keywords: Climate Change, Policies, Conflict, Environment, Livelihood.

INTRODUCTION

Climate is the weather conditions on earth expressed in terms of temperature, rainfall and wind conditions based on historical observations. On the other hand, climate change is a change in average climate or climate variability that persists over an extended period (Riedy, n.d.). At the time of writing, massive flooding in 33 out of Nigeria's 36 states created a state of insecurity and humanitarian crisis across the country. The socioeconomic and health consequences have been enormous. Climate events of this magnitude affect the quality of life of people; lead to the loss of property and cause severe damage to the ecological system. Other incidents of climate change such as erosion, drought, deforestation, and desertification have equally had their toll on the welfare of people. Okoye (2014) argued that there are two main sources of climate change, namely natural (biographical) and man-made (anthropogenic). It has also been noted that climate change exacerbates communal conflicts as biodiversity resources including fresh water become scarce, especially in marginal areas of the country and the phenomenon poses significant threats to the country's food security. In monetary terms, climate change impacts could cost the country between 6% and 30% of its GDP by 2050 (NNAPF, 2020). Reidy (n.d.) identifies two kinds of response to climate change, namely: adaptation and mitigation. According to him, adaptation is a process of adjustment to climate change in which humans take actions to moderate or avoid negative impacts and exploit beneficial opportunities. Actions taken to reduce the severity of climate change and its impacts are known as mitigation measures.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Climate change debate continue to thrive among academics, activists and the policy community. Aprioku and George (2013) define climate change as a significant and lasting change in the statistical distribution of weather patterns over periods ranging from a few decades to millions of years. It may be a change in average weather conditions, or in the distribution of weather around the average condition. For Efe (2011, p. 43), climate change is a long-term significant change in average weather that is being experienced by any given region of the world. The average weather condition includes average temperature, precipitations, wind patterns, and changes in variability in the atmosphere ranging from decades to millions of years. It includes shift and magnitude of sporadic weather events as the slow continuous rise in global mean surface temperature (Ifeanyi-obi, Etuk-wai, 2012, p.24). According to the National Research Council (2012), anthropogenic factors are the major reasons for the rising issues of climate change, following emissions from burning of fossil fuel. Despite the natural process for the production and consumption of CO_2, mankind increased the emission of CO_2 into the air arising from the exploitation of various carbons like coal and oil to other harmful activities for the environment. In addition, CO_2 and other greenhouse gasses, like methane, have also been emitted. The activities of man have been attributed as solely responsible for the global changing climate, while changes observed in the environment would not qualify to be seen as climate change; experts say that is historical and has been observed as such over a period of time (UNFCCC, 1992).

PUBLIC POLICY

The literature on public policy has seen diverse opinions from scholars, practitioners and policy makers. However, the definitions adduced points to policy as an important mechanism for the attainment of public goals and objectives. According to Nnamdi (2014), policy means a plan of action agreed or chosen by government, a business or organisation. It is the principle of behavior or belief that influences how one behaves. He further states that policy is essentially a programme of action, which captures what is intended to be done and what is intended to be achieved by an organisation. For Robert and Janet (2009), policies are practical guides to actions. They generally refer to statements of intent by persons, groups or organisations. Egonwam (2004) avers that public policy is the governments' programme of action which stands for various degrees of government activities; that is what government intend to do or achieve and how it intends to do it. For Anderson (2003), a policy is a relatively stable and focused course of action pursued by one or more actors to address a problem or issue of concern.

Dye (2002, p. 40-41) argues that policy formulation takes place in government bureaucracies, among interest groups, legislative committees, within special commissions meetings, in think-tanks – with details often formulated by staff. Adebayo (1981) states that before a policy can be formulated, certain steps must be considered. The steps are: identification of the problem; development of alternative course of action; analysis of alternatives and selection of alternative policy choice. To this end, the policy development process is critical to achieving the goal for which the government is established. Public policy is an instrument of governance at all levels, including public and private sectors. It is the process of making important organisational decisions, including the identification of different alternatives such as programmes or spending priorities and choosing among them on the basis of the impact they will have (Omotola, 2011). Obikeze and Obi (2004, pp. 95-96) refer to policy as a process of decision making and activity undertaken over an extended period of time. They went on to say that policy is an exercise of power and rationalities which entails interactions between a variety of external interest groups. It is in this regard that Cochhram and Malone (1999. P. 46) posed a series of questions that confront policy formulation and outcome (Cochhran & Malone, 1999, 46).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study draws on the political systems theory which identified the characteristics of systemic behaviours in society (Anyambe, 2018). System theory borrows from the biological system of life processes which interacts with the environment by producing a changing yet stable body condition (Obi et al, 2008). System theory also views public policy as an output of the political system. According to Easton cited in Sambo (1999), a political system may be that system of interactions in a society through which authoritative allocations are made and implemented in the form of policies and decisions. Thus, public policy may be seen as a political system's response to demands arising from its environment. The political system, as Easton identifies it, comprises those identifiable and interrelated institutions and activities within a society.

In relation to this study, the negative consequences and economic impact of climate change are presented as a system in which each part reinforces the other and so maintains the system as a whole. According to Adeyemi (2007), in Nigeria, inputs to the system from external sources to change the cyclical nature of socio-economic impacts are either blocked or diverted for personal use by government officials. Government response to poverty, for example, is a function of demand in the form of input. This comes from the environment and are fed into the conversation box to generate an output. This is the policy framework directed at addressing the problem of poverty. If we consider the assertion by Ndu (1998), that a theory is a reasoned shorthand explanation of the general and basic principles of a fact or set of facts, which belong to the same family, then the above explanations make the systems theory most relevant to this study.


Fig. 5. Illustrating David Easton's Political Systems Analysis.
Source: Olaniyi (1998, p. 58).

METHODOLOGY

The study is both qualitative and descriptive and it adopted the ex-post facto research design. According to Ary and Razavieh (1972), the fundamental objectives of the ex- post facto research design are to discover and establish a functional relationship among variables, in view of the notion that careful investigators prefer the functional, rather than the causal relations. As a result, data for this study were obtained basically from secondary sources- documentaries, journals, and magazines. These were discussed and content analyzed.

OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES IN NIGERIA

The Federal Government of Nigeria recognizes that responding to climate change from both mitigation and adaptation requires strategies and approaches from policy regulators to

institutional frameworks (FME, 2010). This study examines Nigeria's climate change policies below follows:

THE NATIONAL POLICY ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN NIGERIA

The national policy of climate change is a strategic policy response to climate change by the Federal Ministry of Environment and it aims to foster low carbon, high growth, economic development and a climate resilient society through the attainment of set targets. The plan clearly identifies climate change as one of the major threats to economic development goals and food security. The NPCC's vision is a climate resilient Nigeria, and its mission is to strengthen domestic efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate change in a participatory way. Nigeria adopts the adaptation and mitigation measures as response to climate change related hazards activities.

The policy identifies 11 sectors where it carries out adaptation and mitigation programmes as follows: Energy; agriculture; water; coastal areas; forestry and land use; transportation; health; culture and tourism; population; human settlement; information and communications technologies. The guiding principles of the policy include the idea that climate change has to be tackled within a framework of sustainable development. In addition, climate change policy provides viable entrepreneurship opportunities as well as mitigation and adaptation being integral components of policy response. Climate change policy has to be integrated with other interrelated policies promoting economic and environmental efficiency. It requires adequate coordinated and strategic institutional policies and legislative response to climate change challenges. Energy has to be seen as key driver of economic growth and pursued within the context of sustainable development involving energy conservation, and energy structure optimization. Furthermore, research and development, best practices, and capacity building programmes as well as actions taken where significant evidence of climate related risks exist with more emphasis on causes, rather than the impacts.

NIGERIA'S NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLAN FRAMEWORK (NAP)

The NAP was developed by the Federal Ministry of Environment which aimed at building appropriate capacity for adaptation action; defining adaptation options at various levels of governance; creating an enabling environment for effective adaptation; designing a coherent approach to fund mobilization for effective climate change adaptation; developing suitable strategies for engaging the private sector; developing effective communication strategies in the various phases of the adaptation process, and developing an effective monitoring and evaluation plan to facilitate implementation.

The Nigeria National Adaptation Plan (2020) is the government's responds to the adverse impacts of climate change in many ways ranging from international, national and local levels. At the national level, Nigeria is a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since 1992. The country is also a signatory to both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The country also subscribes to other key international

agreements such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reeducation and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for accelerated national development. It further states that at the national level, the country has a plethora of policy instruments on climate change and other aspects of the environment such as the National Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy (NCCRS), the National Policy on the Environment and the National Population policy. Further to its response mechanism on climate change, the country also launched the Sovereign Green Bonds to fund environmental projects that are relevant to climate change management following the signing of the Paris Agreement.

Below is a tabular presentation of projects funded with Nigeria's First Sovereign Green Bond.

Table 1. Projects Funded with Nigeria's First Sovereign Green Bond

S/N	PROJECT	MINISTRY	DESCRIPTION
1	Renewable Energy Micro Utilities in 45 communities	Federal Ministry of Power, Works and Housing	An initiative to provide access to electricity to 45 unserved communities across the country, employing mini-grids with distributed loads of between 33-50KW per community
2	Energizing Education	Federal Ministry of Power, Works and Housing	A rural electrification initiative that seeks to develop clean off Grid Independent Power Plant
3	Afforestation Programme	Ministry of Environment	Afforestation programme to increase forest coverage through the plantation of seedlings to cover 131,000 hectares of land

Source: Nigeria's National Adaptation Plan Framework, 2020.

The Table above shows climate change mitigation projects funded with Nigeria's First Sovereign Green Bond under the Federal Ministry of Power, Works, and Housing, as well as the Ministry of Environment. The projects range from provision of renewable energy micro utilities in 45 communities by providing access to electricity to 45 unserved communities across the country and setting up mini-grids with distributable loads of between 33-50 KW per community. The second project under the scheme is referred to as energizing educator. It is a rural electrification initiative aimed at developing clean off –Grid independent power plant, while the third is the afforestation programme, under the Federal Ministry of Environment, which would increase forest coverage through planting of seedlings to cover 131, 000 hectares of land.

Table 2: SLCP ABATEMENT MEASURES ADOPTED IN THE NATIONAL SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE CHANGE POLLUTANTS (SLCP) PLAN

SOURCE SECTOR	SLCP ABATEMENT MEASURES	TARGET
Transport	Renewal of Urban bus fleet in Lagos Adoption of CNG buses in Nigeria Introduction of Low Sulphur diesel and petrol Elimination of high emitting vehicles that do not meet vehicle emission standard Reduction of vehicle journeys by car through transport modal shifts	5000 new buses in Lagos complete and Danfo buses fully replaced by 2021 25% all busses converted to CNG by 2030 50 ppm diesel fuel introduced in 2019; 150[ppm petrol introduced by 2021 Euro IV limits met by all vehicles by 2030 500,000 daily journeys shifted from road to rail and water ways
Residential	Increase in population using modern fuel for cooking (LPG, electricity, kerosene, biogas, solar cooking) Replacement of traditional biomass cook stoves with more efficient improved biomass stoves Elimination of kerosene lamps	80% of H/H using modern fuels for cooking in 2030 20% H/H using improved biomass stove for cooking in 2030 All kerosene lighting replaced by solar lamps by 2022
Oil and Gas	Elimination of gas flaring Fugitive emissions/leakages control Methane leaking reduction	100% gas flaring eliminated by 2020 50% methane reduction by 2030 50% Methane reduction by 2030
Industry	Improved energy efficiency in the industrial sector	50% improved energy efficiency by 2050
Waste Management	Reduction of methane emission and open burning of waste at open dumpsites through adoption of digesters at dump sites Septic sludge collection Sewage system and municipal waste water treatment plants	50% Methane recovered from landfills by 2030, 50% reduction in open burning of wastes by 2030 Promote septic collection, treatment and recycling in 37 municipalities Establish, expand sewage system and municipal wastewater treatment plants in Lagos, Kano and Port Harcourt
Agriculture	Increased adoption of intermittent aeration of rc paddy fields (AWD) Reduce open field burning of crop residues Anaerobic Digestion (AD) Reduce Methane emissions from enteric fermentation	50% cultivated land adopt AWD management system by 2030 50% reduction in the fraction of crop residue burned in fields by 2030 50% reduction by 2030 3% reduction in emission intensity by 2030
Power (Energy)	Expansion of national electric coverage	90% of the population have access to electricity grid by 2030

	Increase share of electricity generation in Nigeria from renewables	30-% electricity generated using renewable energy by 2030
Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs)	Elimination of HFCs consumption	10% of HFC's phased out by 2030. 50% by 2040 and 80% by 2045

Source: NAP- SLCP, 2018.

The Table above shows sectorial measures and target initiatives in addressing challenges posed by SLCPs. The policy documented the major sources of short-lived climate pollution, the priority SLCP mitigation measures, as well as the implementation pathways for the reduction of SLCPs emissions within the country's borders. Eight sectors and 22 measures were adopted in the policy framework. It ranged from Transport, Residential, Oil and Gas, Industry, Waste Management, Agriculture, Power and HPCs. The measures for the Transport sector included the renewal of urban fleet in Lagos, adoption of CNG buses throughout the country, as well as introduction of low Sulphur diesel and petrol, elimination of high emitting vehicles that do not meet vehicle emission standard.

The Table indicates that each sector has its abatement measures aimed at either mitigating of adapting to climate change related issues in the country. Specific targets are also applied to such measures as indicated in the table. Nigeria has over the years evolved various policy measures to address the problem and challenges of climate change. It began as a member of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well a participant in the various climate change protocols by the United Nations and relevant agencies. The relevant ministries and agencies saddled with climate change related policies are: Federal Ministry of Environment; Federal Ministry of Health; Federal Ministry of Agriculture. A major noticeable factor in policy implementation in Nigeria is that of the hydra-headed monster called corruption. This menace which is well-known has eaten deep into the fabric of the society and has made it difficult to implement policies of government aimed at mitigating and adapting to climate change incidents.

For instance, the SLCP abatement measures, which include elimination of high emitting vehicles that do not meet vehicle emission standard ought to be implemented by the Vehicle Inspection Officers. Despite the presence of these officials, it is common to see such vehicles still on Nigerian roads, thereby rendering the policy measure ineffective. We also note that the abatement measures on encouraging the population to use modern fuel such as LPG, electricity, kerosene, biogas and solar for cooking are highly realizable as the price of LPG continues to rise beyond the reach of the common man. The increasing cost of the product in recent times (2021) has made the commodity a luxury, and so poor individual households find it difficult to access it. It is also difficult to purchase kerosene as the illegally crude refining has infiltrated the market and so genuine kerosene is no longer available. This highly combustible illegally refined kerosene which is now available in the market has become dangerous as there have been reported incidents of kerosene explosions which have resulted to the death of many

Nigerians. More so, the epileptic nature of power supply in Nigeria has also made the use of electricity in cooking impossible.

To this end, the target of ensuring 80% of households using modern fuels for cooking in 2030 and 20% households using improved biomass stove for cooking in 2030 is highly difficult to realize.

This study also observed the lack of political will by government to address the issue of gas flaring as a major contributor to the warming of the atmosphere. Despite time lines issues by government to end gas flaring in Nigeria, it has been difficult, owing to lack of commitment and patriotism on the part of political leaders and those waddled with the responsibility of implementing the policies. For instance, the strategy on Oil and Gas providing measures for elimination of gas flaring by 2020. A year after the target postulation, there are no signs of tangible implementation of the measure. As regard improving energy efficiency in the energy sector by 50% by 2050, rather the energy generating mechanism increasing, it has continued to decline making it difficult to boost electricity generation and distribution in the country. This is coming at a time when increase in population and industrial activities makes improved energy generation necessary.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it is evident that successive Nigerian governments have evolved policy frameworks aimed at addressing climate change related issues. The climate change related policies cut across various ministries, departments, and agencies of government. For instance, under the Federal Ministry of Environment, there are various policy frameworks initiated, including a Department of Climate Change with a Director as head, to address issues related to climate change. There is also climate change policy framework under the Federal Ministry of Power, Works, and Housing, as well as the Federal Ministry of Agriculture.

These Ministries and their agencies have varied component of climate change related policies, all geared towards addressing climate change related issues in Nigeria. The policy frameworks are clear and unambiguous. However, despite the clear policy frameworks, Nigeria still has problems with implementation strategies. The lack of political will to ensure that climate change related policies are implemented to the latter is a major constraint. It is obvious that the problem with climate change policies in Nigeria lies with their implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings, this study recommends as follows:

- There is need to harmonize all the policies on climate change in Nigeria towards a unified approach to addressing the challenges the citizenry faced as a result of climate change.
- Policy makers and implementers should develop patriotic approach in executing relevant policies that would address issues relating to climate change.

● There should be the political will from politicians to address climate change related policies.
● Corrupt public officials who deliberately failed to implement policies aimed at reducing climate change incidents should be adequately prosecuted and punished so as to serve as a deterrent to others.

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RAISING THE BANNER OF GENDER EQUALITY
A STUDY OF DISE OGBISE (DO) FOUNDATION IN BAYELSA STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Inequalities exist in every society in the world. The concept describes unequal access of people to and control over resources. This paper examines the case of Dise Ogbise Foundation (DOF) in Bayelsa State, Nigeria. There are six aspects of gender inequality in Feminist Theory deployed in this paper to analyzed gender-based violence, particularly violence against women. To raise the banner of gender equality, the paper suggested among others that the existing laws must be fully implemented. Finally, more awareness on the rights of women is required.

Keywords: Dise Ogbise, Equality, Gender, Inequality, Violence Against Women

INTRODUCTION

Gender remains a subject of scholarly interest world-wide. Access to political positions, increasing relegation of women in decision-making processes and general lack of economic empowerment are issues both gender activists and scholars have continued to link with inequality between men and women in many societies. It is even an issue of culture for many societies in Africa. Progress has been made in many countries with the closing of gaps in many aspects of social and political life of women. Laws preventing women from achieving their potentials in politics, economy, career, and profession, amongst others, have been eased and in many cases, are no longer in existence in many democracies. Yet, gender inequality remains an issue when it comes to development.

It is for this reason that both governmental and non-governmental organisations have been noted to be actively involved in working to reduce gender inequality in modern democracies. This paper looks at the case of Dise Ogbise Foundation, a non-governmental organisation, established in 2017 in Bayelsa State with a mandate to work for the reduction of gender-based violence.

METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study relied on qualitative data derived from secondary source to address the research questions. Key assumptions of feminist theories were applied to explore the way and manner gender perspectives continue to shape aspects of human interactions in society (Cockburn, 2004 cited in Janine, 2017). The study highlights gender norms as reflections of power structures that are crucial for policy and cultural transformation in society (Okolo, 2021).

GENDER INEQUALITY

Gender equality refers to equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women, girls, and boys. There is no question of men and women becoming one and the same, because that could undermine the strength and values of a functional society. However, rights, responsibilities and opportunities should be accessed based on competence, interests, needs and priorities rather than gender. It is because gender equality is not necessarily a question of women, but a natural right of men and women.

INEQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS

Many rural women in Bayelsa, particularly among ethnic Ijaws, are more involved than their male counterparts in out-of-home work. Women living in poor households have uneven family responsibilities in addition to economic activities. They work longer hours than men. Amartya (1992) argues that this "division of labour" can be seen as the "accumulation of labour" for women."

Women are making progress in different areas of work life. At the same time, many of them are in limited and narrow workspaces or occupations people have described as "women's

industries." These industries include textiles, clothing, electronics, and food and beverages, which often pay lower wages than other industries. women are remunerated differently in these jobs. As far as earnings are concerned, women are often discriminated against male workers not only in the informal sector but also in administrative, commerce or professional jobs.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (VAW)

Violence against women is a historic expression of the unequal power between men and women in private and public life. This includes the use and abuse of power and control over women. This is a form of discrimination that seriously violates and impairs the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by women and girls (UN and CSR, 2014). The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, resolution 48/104 of December 20, 1993, defined VAW as any act of gender-based violence that causes or is likely to cause physical, sexual, and psychological harm or suffering to women.

There are three (3) contexts where violence against women takes place:

- The Family (most common form of violence against women) – psychological, physical, and sexual.
- Community where people share harmful social and cultural norms and practices that perpetuate power inequalities, condone and tolerate VAW. It is about non-partner sexual violence, physical, psychological, sexual intimidation, and harassment at the workplace. Other indicators include sexual harassment in educational and religious institutions and other public spaces such as streets, markets, and public transportation. Others are social exclusion and unpleasant practices like forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (UN, 2006).
- The State is a critical actor in perpetrating VAW. The state can do psychological, physical and sexual violence against women through its coercive forces or through discriminatory public policy and laws and ineffective implementation of laws (Idem: 52). It can also perpetrate VAW indirectly by tolerating GBV on an unofficial level (i.e., in the family and in the community) (Winrock, 2001).

RAISING THE BANNER OF GENDER EQUALITY

Nigeria has laws to support gender equality (see the National Gender Policy, 2006; and 11 laws from around the world that stand in the way of gender equality, available at https://www.globalcitizen.org). People have either been quiet about these laws or are unaware of their existence. The Dise Ogbise Foundation maintains a bi-weekly gender equality and gender-based violence programme on radio (Raypower FM102.). It also has the Speak-up Campaign programme involving primary and secondary schools. Much more needs to be done to address the gender gap in Bayelsa and in Nigerian society at large. For example, better implementation of existing legislation is required. In addition, a better understanding of constitutional rights is necessary.

CONCLUSION

The study highlighted the role of the Dis Ogbise Foundation (DOF) in advancing gender equality campaigns in Bayelsa, Nigeria. The result showed that gender equality remains a challenging task for the state because of the existing culture and the economic discrimination of women. The study noted employment and income inequality, homeownership inequality and violence against women as critical areas for improvement. The Dise Ogbise Foundation's efforts to create awareness has played a key role in bridging gender parity gaps in Bayelsa. However, more work is required to promote and enforce gender equality laws.

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ETHNICITY AND CHALLENGES OF FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzed the challenges posed by ethnicity to the practice of federalism in Nigeria. It used secondary data which include, textbooks, Newspapers, Journals, and documentary materials relevant to the study. The paper argues that ethnicity or tribalism has had a negative effect on Nigerian federalism. The Kano riot of 1953 was a negative manifestation of ethnicity which led to the death of many Nigerians and properties damaged. The 1962-63 census crisis in Nigeria was manifestation of ethnicity which led to the increase in hostility among ethnic groups. The 1966 military intervention in Nigerian politics and 1967-1970 civil war were manifestation of tribalism and ethnicity in Nigeria's political. The annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election results and the voting pattern of Nigerians during the second Republic general elections were also negative reflections of ethnicity and tribalism in Nigeria's politics. The study recommended, among others, the need for the federal government to enforce the rule of law and promote political education to reduce the role of ethnicity in the country's politics.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Federalism, Rule of law, Election, Politics.

INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity is an issue that militates against Nigerian politics and federalism. Federalism is a system of government where political powers are constitutionally shared between the central government and the component units. In Nigeria, the central government is the federal government while the component units are the states and local government. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural state. One of the challenges of Nigerian federalism is the disturbing effects of ethnicity (Ogu, 2021).

Nigeria was colonized by Britain between 1900 to 1960, and it used the divide-and- rule strategy for ruling Nigeria. This system of administration created hostility among various ethnic groups in Nigeria. Political parties formed during colonial era had ethnic affiliation and regionally based. For instance, the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun (NCNC) which was formed in 1944, featured prominently in the Eastern Region, Action Group (AG) which metamorphosed from Egbo-Omo Oduduwa was formed in 1951 and dominated the Western Region, while Northern People's Congress (NPC) which metamorphosed from Jamaa Arewa was formed in 1951 and reigned supreme in Northern Region. The political parties of the colonial epoch and the First Republic were not national. The Colonial Governor of Nigeria in 1946 (Arthur Richard) divided the country into three unequal parts based on ethnicity (Ogu, 2021).

The 1964 Federal Election crisis demonstrated the effects of ethnicity in Nigeria's politics. There were electoral malpractices right from the preliminary stage. The Eastern Region boycotted the election. The intervention of the military in Nigeria's politics in 1966 was, among other reasons, motivated by ethnic factors. The first and second coups in Nigeria (1966) were manifestations of ethnicity. According to Musa et al (2018, p.383). The second threat of secession in Nigeria led to thirty months civil war (1967 to 1970). The war led to the loss of lives and properties. The civil war was yet another negative manifestation of ethnicity (Musa etal, 2018). To proffer solutions to the problems of Nigerian federalism, late Sani Abacha initiated the 1994 constitutional conference. The conference recommended rotational presidency for Nigeria to solve the problem of unhealthy rivalry for power among various ethnic groups.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Nigeria is a federation with numerous ethnic groups. As far back as 1920, Sir Hugh Clifford, the British Colonial Governor had described Nigeria as, "Collection of self-contained and mutually independent native states. Separated from one another by vast distance, by difference of history and Tradition and by ethnological, social, tribal, political, and religious barrier" (Schwartz, 1965).

The situation has not improved significantly given the fissiparous and centrifugal tendencies in contemporary Nigeria. Those who fought for Nigeria's independence in the 1940s and 1950s were representatives, not of a united national entity, but ethnic and regional interests. For

instance, the late Yoruba leader, who later became premier of the defunct Western Region and leader of opposition in the Federal Government, stated that, "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are English, Welsh, or French. The word Nigeria is merely an appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not" (Awolowo, 1947). According to him, the colonial administration rather than unite the disparage ethnic group, exacerbated cultural differences, through the policy of "divide and rule." A major fallout of the distrust ethnic groups was the Nigeria civil war (Dunmoye, 2021).

ETHNICITY AND THE EFFECTS ON NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

As earlier noted, ethnicity has its origin from colonial period. Political parties formed during colonial era were formed based on ethnicity. According to Ibiyemi et.al (2001), the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) was formed in 1944 and featured mostly in the East. The Action Group (AG) which metamorphosed from Egbo-Omo Oduduwa cultural association was formed in 1945 in London by some Yoruba students. It became a political party in 1951 and featured prominently in the Western Region. The Northern People Congress (NPC) emanated from a cultural association known as Jamiya Jamar Arewa and became a political party in 1951. According to Ajayi and Fashagba (2014, p. 63), "The Northern Region was dominated by NPC, the NCNC controlled the Eastern Region, and AG controlled the Western Region. This development encouraged regionalism and had detrimental consequences of political instability on the Nigeria state." According to Ogu (2021, p. 94), The voting pattern during the second republic general election reflected ethnic and tribal politics. Alhaji Shehu Shagari of National Party of Nigeria (NPN) won most of the states in the North, Obafemi Awolowo of Unity party of Nigeria won most of the states in the West, while Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) won the states in the East. Ethnicity, tribalism and party affiliation seem to have played a major role in the inability of the law makers to override the President's veto. Now, the Igbos in the South East are clamoring for the Presidency come 2023 general elections. The Ohaneze Ndigbo, an ethnic Pressure Group in Igbo land has praised the All-Progressive Congress (APC) for zoning her Presidential ticket to the South in the fourth-coming 2023 general election in Nigeria. According to Ofoma (2022), ethnicity impacted negatively in Nigeria's politics.

According to Musa (2018, p.394) "ethnic conflict negates the developmental function of democracy and may ultimately attack the roots of democracy in a society." The first military Coup in Nigeria took place in January 1966. According to Ibiyemi et.al (2001, p.191), "the first military coup in Nigeria took place on 15th January 1966, led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, but the then Senior Military Officer, Major General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironisi later took position of the head of state." The first and second military coups in Nigeria had ethnic attachment. There have been agitations for state creation by some ethnic groups for some reasons. Resource control has been a serious issue among some ethnic groups. Various ethnic groups want to have lion share of the national cake. The Federal character is a policy introduced in Nigeria in 1979 which emphasizes equitable representation of all groups in all government establishments. Section 14(3) 1999 constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria stated: "The

composition of the Government or any of its agencies and conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and need to promote national unity and also to command loyalty. Thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of Person from a few states or few ethnic groups on any of its agencies." The complaints and disparity in the level of education among some ethnic groups led to the adoption of Federal character principles in 1979. The Federal Character Commission was established in 1996 to implement the Federal Character Policy. The view of scholars on Federal Character policy are examined below. According to Adebayo (1995, p.170), Federal Character policy is aimed at ensuring fair representation of every group in Nigerian public service recruitment to ensure the unity in Nigerian Federalism. Federal Character policy was established with the aim of addressing the challenges posed by ethnicity in Nigeria's federalism. Tribalism and Ethnicity is a major problem militating against Nigeria's politics.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The challenges posed by ethnicity to Nigeria's federalism started during the colonial era. The negative impacts of ethnicity have led to the death of many Nigerians and the destruction of properties worth substantial amount of money. The challenges posed by ethnicity to Nigeria's federalism manifested negatively in various dimensions. Formation of political parties during the colonial era and the first Republic were regionally based. The development had detrimental effects on Nigeria's politics. The motion for independence in the House of Representatives by Chief Anthony Enahoro, a Yoruba man and member of the Action Group was the main cause of 1953 Kano riot which claimed lives of many Nigerians. The 1962 and 1963 census crisis were caused by desperate desire of ethnic groups to manipulate the census figures so as to attract more national cake. The crisis had negative effects on Nigeria's federalism. The 1964 Federal election crisis was caused by tribalism and electoral malpractices. The malpractices led to political apathy. The Igbos boycotted the election. The second threat of secession led to 30 months Civil War in Nigeria. The Civil War had detrimental consequences on the Nigeria's state. Ethnicity and tribalism manifested in 1979 general elections. The 1966 Coup had ethnic attachment. The annulment of June 12, 1993, presidential election had tribal/ethnic attachment. The problem posed by tribal/ethnicity is a major problem militating against Nigerian Federalism.

From the foregoing, the following recommendations are made:

   i.   The three tiers of Government in Nigeria should embark on political education to the masses. The political education will enlighten the citizens on the core value of Nigeria's federalism, thereby promoting peace and unity.

  ii.   Ethnic groups should tolerate one another peacefully; citizens should tolerate one another peacefully and adhere strictly to rule of law.

 iii.   The 1994 Constitutional Conference report on rotational presidency is recommended. Rotational presidency, if adopted will offer every geo-political zone the opportunity to produce the president at their own time, thereby enhancing the Unity of Nigeria. Rotational presidency if adopted will minimize ethnic problems/distrust among many ethnic groups in Nigeria's Federalism.

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